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Abstract
In contemporary philosophy of perception, relatively little attention is paid to the
fundamental  question  what  we  talk  about  when  we  talk  about  perceptual
experiences,  that  is,  what  kind  of  entities  they  are.  The  present  dissertation
addresses  this  ontological  question,  so  as  to  outline  and  partially  to  defend  a
stative  view  of  perceptual  experiences,  that  is,  a  view  according  to  which
perceptual experiences are mental states as opposed to mental processes.
This project is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 unpacks and critically
assesses the main target of this dissertation, a processive view or a view according
to  which  processes  of  a  phenomenally  conscious  kind  are  essential  to  our
understanding  of  perceptual  awareness.  Chapter  2  formulates  the  ontological
stance I advocate, namely, a stative view. The following two chapters turn to a
positive defense of this position. Chapter 3 argues that the stative conception is
better  suited  than  a  processive  view  to  account  for  the  identity  over  time  of
perceptual  experiences.  Chapter  4  turns  to  what  is  known  as  the  assertive
character of  perceptual  experiences:  in  a  nutshell,  the  thought  is  that,  when a
subject  is  perceptually  aware  of  her  surroundings  or  undergoes  perceptual
hallucinations, she does not passively entertain a complex mosaic of worldly items;
instead,  her  experiences  present  her  with  such  items  as  being  the  case.  The
assertive  character  of  perceptual  experiences  is,  I  think,  a  feature  best
accommodated by a stative view than a processive one. Finally, chapter 5 explores
how a stative view may specify the difference between perceptual experiences and
beliefs:  in  this  context,  I  argue  that  a  stative  view  seems  to  vindicate  state
nonconceptualism, that is,  the view that perceptual states need not be concept-
dependent. 
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PREFACE
A crucial notion in the philosophy of perception – its subject-matter, if you may –
is that of perceptual experiences. Perceptual experiences refer to a fundamental
conscious component of perceptual phenomena and their deceptive counterparts.
Thus,  when you perceive the world,  you do not merely process  environmental
information the same way a standard stimulus-response system (e.g. a computer, a
very  basic  plant,  etc.)  does  so:  in  addition  to  that,  you  are  aware  of  your
surroundings. Likewise, when you undergo illusions or hallucinations, it seems to
you as if things are a certain way, even if they fail to be so. To pick up on the
relevant component of perceptual consciousness,  philosophers and psychologists
often  rely  on the notion of  perceptual  (i.e.  veridical,  illusory,  or  hallucinatory)
experiences. To a first approximation, then, the experience in perception picks up
on a subject's awareness or consciousness resulting from her perceptual interaction
with the environment: when a subject is perceptually aware of the world, things
appear in a number of ways to her. To focus on the visual modality, when a subject
is visually aware of her surroundings, worldly items look a manifold number of
ways to her. 
In a stimulating but utterly neglected paper, Elizabeth Wolgast focuses on
visual, veridical perception so as to introduce the notion of perceptual experience:
(1) There is a certain kind of experience which is absolutely necessary to seeing, so that if
someone did not have this kind of experience at a certain time he would not be seeing
anything then. (2) This experience is not the whole of what we mean when we say we see
something, because ordinarily we mean also to imply that that thing is before us. (3) This
kind of  experience must be such as can help explain,  in some way or other,  why we
believe we are seeing one thing at one time and another thing at another. (Wolgast 1960,
165-6)
Wolgast describes the relevant experiential component as a necessary but
non-sufficient  ingredient  of  visual  perception.  When  we  reflect  on  the  latter
phenomenon,  we  are  typically  interested  in  the  perceptual  awareness
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underpinning the informational transaction between a perceiver and her visible
surroundings. And yet it does not follow that a subject perceives a worldly item or
state of affairs if she is conscious of it: after all, the possibility of hallucination
suggests  that  we may be  (or  seem to  be)  aware of  things  which do not  exist.
Furthermore,  perceptual  experiences,  Wolgast  claims,  have  a  substantive  role
within our overall psychological and epistemic economy: among other things, they
causally and rationally ground the content of our beliefs. Wolgast's description is
by  no  means  uncontroversial,  but  it  constitutes  a  reasonable  sketch  of  the
psychological items philosophers of perception have speculated about over the past
few decades. 
Having said that, this dissertation is mainly concerned with the question
what kind of psychological items perceptual experiences are. In other words, what
do  we  talk  about  when  we  talk  about  perceptual  experiences?  Although  this
ontological  question received some attention by post-Wittgensteinian and post-
Rylean philosophers such as Wolgast herself, it fell out of fashion during the final
three decades of the Twentieth Century. At least since Helen Steward's influential
1997 book, The Ontology of Mind, things have fortunately changed. In particular,
the ontology of perception has slowly made its come-back into the philosophical
mainstream by means of  the work of  Brian O'Shaughnessy,  Matthew Soteriou,
Thomas Crowther, among others. The present dissertation is an attempt to explore
a bit farther into the field opened by these philosophers. 
In  reply to  the  question as  to  what  we talk  about  when we talk  about
perceptual experiences, writers like O'Shaughnessy and Soteriou have argued that
perceptual experiences involve a key processive element: more specifically, they
have  argued  that  perceptual  experiences  are  fully  or  partially  constituted  by
processes  of  a  phenomenally  conscious  kind.  In  broad  lines,  these  processive
theorists,  as  I  shall  call  them,  highlight  paramount  features  of  perceptual
phenomena, such as their dynamic and phenomenological character, so as to hold
that  the  ontological  category  of  process  is  the  best  candidate  to  account  for
psychological items endowed with such features. Although a  processive view of
perceptual  experiences  has  become  the  orthodox  view  in  the  ontology  of
perception,  the  goal  of  this  dissertation  consists  in  exploring  an  alternative
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position. On the assumption that there is a substantive distinction to draw between
processes  and  states,  I  shall  outline  and  partially  defend  a  stative  view  of
perceptual experiences, that is, a view according to which perceptual experiences
are mental states as opposed to mental processes.
The present project is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 unpacks and
critically assesses the main target of this dissertation, a processive view or a view
according to which processes of a phenomenally conscious kind are essential to
our understanding of perceptual awareness. Chapter 2 formulates the ontological
stance I advocate, namely, a stative view. By formulating the main positions I shall
be  concerned  with,  I  intend  to  show  that  a  processive  view  is  not  obviously
compulsory, on the one hand, and, on the other, that a stative view is internally
coherent.  The  following  two chapters  turn  to  a  positive  defense  of  the  stative
stance.  Chapter  3  argues  that  the  stative  conception  is  better  suited  than  a
processive view to account for the identity of perceptual experiences over time.
Chapter  4  turns  to  what  is  known  as  the  assertive  character of  perceptual
experiences: in a nutshell, the thought is that, when a subject is perceptually aware
of her surroundings or undergoes perceptual hallucinations, she does not passively
entertain a complex mosaic of worldly items; instead, her experiences present her
with  such  items  as  being  the  case.  The  assertive  character  of  perceptual
experiences  is,  I  think,  a  feature  best  accommodated by a  stative  view than a
processive one.  Finally,  chapter 5 explores how a stative view may specify the
difference between perceptual experiences and beliefs: in this context, I argue that
a stative view seems to vindicate state nonconceptualism, that is,  the view that
perceptual states need not be concept-dependent.
Many people helped me to bring this modest project to fruition. To begin
with, I am certainly indebted to all my supervisors throughout the different stages
of  this  process:  Ian  Phillips,  Christopher  Peacocke,  Rory  Madden,  and  M.G.F.
Martin. Paul Snowdon deserves special mention here: he oversaw the project from
its very beginning to its final draft; his encouragement was not only philosophical,
but also personal. I am also indebted to Mrs. Snowdon and Molly the Cat for their
moral and emotional support. Matthew Soteriou has been very generous with his
time and his  writings have been inspiring.  Throughout  my four  years at  UCL,
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friends and generous acquaintances helped me, in many different ways, to polish
this work. They include but are not limited to: Solveig Aasen, Henry Clarke, Alex
Geddes, Alec Hinshelwood, Ed Lamb, Chrissy Meijns, Ed Nettel, Helen Robertson,
Marteen Steenhagen, Tom Williams. Living in Oxford would not have been the
same without  the  philosophical  and personal  support  of  Elena Cagnoli,  Zoltan
Istvan Zardai, Sungwoo Um, Erasmus Meier, and Peter Kail. Bits and pieces of this
dissertations have been presented in London, Oxford, Cambridge, Coventry, Texas,
Rome, and Santiago of Chile. I have always benefited from the feedback kindly
provided by these audiences, including: David Bain, Tim Crane, Fred Dretske, Matt
Keeler, Fiona MacPherson, Antonia Peacocke, Carlo Rossi,  among many others.
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents.     
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CHAPTER 1 
A PROCESSIVE VIEW OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
Philosophical  discussions  about  the  nature  of  perception  are  currently  in  good
shape. Over the past three decades, a great deal of attention has been devoted to
questions such as: whether perceptual experiences have representational content,
and,  if  so,  how  perceptual  content  should  be  understood;  how  veridical  and
hallucinatory experiences are phenomenologically and epistemologically related;
what rational role perceptual experiences have within our psychological economy;
how different sensory modalities should be distinguished from each other; and so
on. But a basic ontological question has been comparatively overlooked, namely,
what we talk about when we talk about perceptual experiences, or, in other words,
what  kind  of  items  or  entities  they  are.  A  stative  view  holds  that  perceptual
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experiences should be conceived as mental states, that is, as instantiated properties
or relations over periods of time. By contrast, a processive view argues that being
perceptually aware of the world involves an additional component over and above
mental states, namely, processes of a phenomenally conscious kind. Although this
position has recently been defended by Brian O'Shaughnessy, Matthew Soteriou,
and Thomas Crowther (cf. O'Shaughnessy 2000, ch. 1; Soteriou 2007, 2011, 2013;
Crowther 2009a, 2009b, 2010), my goal is to argue that mental processes need not
be invoked in order adequately to describe perceptual experiences. 
This chapter is devoted to unpacking the subject-matter of this dissertation
and outlining a processive view of perceptual experiences as a potential answer to
the ontological question I am concerned with. In particular, I partially aim to show
that  contemporary  formulations  of  the  processive  view  fail  to  motivate  the
introduction of perceptual processes into our ontology. This task is divided into
five sections. First, I turn to Zeno Vendler's seminal discussion of the ontology of
seeing in order to illustrate the ontological question I am concerned with, on the
one hand,  and,  on the other,  to outline the problematic  relationship between a
stative and a processive view of perceptual experiences. At this stage, I rely on the
broad understanding of states and processes which Vendler himself exploits. The
following  three  sections  are  devoted  to  a  critical  assessment  of  the  processive
stances developed by O'Shaughnessy, Soteriou, and Crowther, respectively. This
survey aims to specify the notion of process essential to my targets and critically to
assess their motivations for positing such items. Finally, I summarize the foregoing
discussion and briefly describe how my defence of a stative view will unfold. 
 
I. VENDLER ON PERCEPTUAL STATES AND PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES 
The import of a stative and a processive view of perceptual experiences will fully
emerge only as I specify the notions of mental state and mental process throughout
chapters 1 and 2. In this section, my aim is to introduce a stative and a processive
view of perceptual experience in the context of their problematic relationship. At
this level of generality, the main point is to highlight how a processive conception
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threatens the intuitive and ontologically austere picture of perception provided by
the stative view.
For the sake of simplicity, I shall only deal with perceptual experiences in
their visual modality. Again, I shall use Zeno Vendler's remarks on the analysis of
seeing (cf. Vendler 1957) as the backdrop of this discussion. To begin with, then,
let's consider an example inspired by the closing lines of Vendler's essay. Imagine
that a vigilant sailor (call him Jim) stands on deck and looks out for a particular
star on a cloudy night: as the sky clears up, Jim spots the celestial body, and, as a
result  of  that,  his  gaze remains fixed on it  from t1 to t10;  more specifically,  he
watches the star during that period of time. To watch the star from t1 to t10, he has
to see it from t1 to t10, or at least during considerable stages of that temporal span.
Again, if Jim uninterruptedly sees a star from t1 to t10, he must visually experience
it or be aware of it during that period of time: if his visual field remains fixed
during that time, the relevant star will look or visually appear a certain way to
him. This description of Jim's conscious life is no doubt schematic, but it highlights
the sort of situation where perceptual experiences play an important role.
The previous scenario involves at least three important perceptual notions,
namely,  watching,  seeing,  and  experiencing.  In  this  dissertation,  I  follow
Crowther's distinction between watching and seeing (cf. Crowther 2009a, 2009b).
Activities like watching and listening are forms of perceptual attention. They are
things  a  subject  may  willingly  do:  as  such,  a  subject  may  watch  or  listen  to
something carefully,  intently,  carelessly,  absent-mindedly,  and so on. Watching
and listening are active or agential, at least in the minimal sense that 'such goings-
on are things that agents do, rather than things like digestion or resuscitation that
merely go on in agents or that merely happen to them.' (Crowther, 2009b, 173)
Meanwhile,  perceiving  is  passive  insofar  as  it  merely  happens  to  a  subject:  as
Crowther succinctly puts it, 'in perception we are passive and at the mercy of our
immediate environment' (Crowther, 2009b, 173) It is natural to think that watching
piggybags  on  perception  proper:  while  a  subject  may  perceive  things  without
attending to them, she has to perceive something in order to attend to it.1 This
dissertation is fundamentally concerned with the basic conscious or experiential
1 Although I take it more or less for granted here, the idea of perception without attention is not
wholly uncontroversial.
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phenomenon at the heart of perception, as opposed to the more cognitive-laden
phenomenon of perceptual attention: for this reason, although they tend to play an
important  role  in  perceptual  scenarios  such  as  the  one  above  described,  I  set
watching and other forms of perceptual monitoring aside.
Turning now to the relationship between seeing and experiencing, Vendler
draws  an  important  distinction  between  two  senses  of  seeing:  while  seeing
sometimes  refers  to  an  instantaneous  or  durationless  happening  –  that  is,  an
achievement which consists in a subject's spotting or making perceptual contact
with the world; it may also refer to temporally extended occurrences, to relations
of perceptual awareness between a subject and her surroundings over a period of
time (cf. Vendler 1957). The above example readily illustrates this distinction. First,
durationless  seeing  figures  as  Jim's  spotting  the  star:  as  durationless  or
instantaneous, that achievement does not occupy an instant of time. But, secondly,
there is a sense of seeing in which Jim does see the bright star during a period of
time, that is, t1-t10. Of course, the difference between both kinds of seeing concerns
their respective temporal structures, the way in which they fill time: in the first
sense, seeing is an instantaneous or durationless occurrence; in the second one, it
is  temporally  extended.  Vendler  suggests  a  natural  way  of  understanding  the
relationship between both senses: whereas temporally protracted seeing is a form
of  perceptual  awareness  proper,  instantaneous  seeing  stands  for  the  very
achievement  of  becoming perceptually aware of  something.  They are no doubt
intimately related: after all, standing in a relation of perceptual awareness to the
world for a period of time typically presupposes the perceptual achievement of
coming to be in such an experiential relation. 
The previous distinction helps to clarify the relationship between seeing
and  experiencing.  To  begin  with,  I  take  it  to  be  more  or  less  clear  that
instantaneous  seeing  and  experiencing  are  not  equivalent:  becoming  aware  of
something is not a way of being aware of something2, more or less in the same way
that  starting  to  walk  is  not  walking,  or  that  to  figure  out  the  solution  to  a
mathematical problem (in the 'Eureka!' sense) is not to believe that such-and-such
a problem has such-and-such a solution, etc. When Jim spots a bright star, t1 is the
2 A  terminological  note:  in  this  dissertation,  I  use  'experiencing'  and  'being  aware  of'  as
equivalent.
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first moment of time at which he is visually aware of it, not an instant at which he
makes  contact  with  it  –  after  all,  spotting  or  making  contact  with  the  star  is
durationless. Within the temporal dimension, achievements like spotting an object
or winning a race are analogous to the spatial limits of an object: just as the spatial
limits of an item do not occupy space, durationless occurrences or achievements do
not  occupy  time  (cf.  Crowther  2011).  Although  achievements  may  be  said  to
happen or occur at times (e.g. 'I scored a goal at 5pm'), they do not take time.
By  contrast, seeing  the  world  during  a  period  of  time  involves  being
visually aware of it during that time. Thus understood, seeing is closely related to
experiencing. But there is also an important difference to bear in mind: while a
subject only sees items which exist in her surrounding, she may have perceptual
experiences of actual as well as merely possible objects.3 The thought behind this
distinction is that visual experiences constitute a necessary but non-sufficient part
of  seeing:  a  necessary  part  because  they  pick  up  on  the  distinctive  conscious
component of  perceptual phenomena;  a non-sufficient  one,  meanwhile,  because
experiences  could be either veridical  or hallucinatory.  Seeing is  by definition a
veridical  or  successful  informational  transaction  between  a  subject  and  her
surroundings.4 As such, every case of seeing involves experiencing, but not every
case of experiencing entails seeing: although visual awareness is not identical to
seeing, it plays a crucial role in our understanding of what it means to see the
world.5 
So much for the relationship between watching, seeing, and experiencing.
As previously anticipated, this dissertation is mainly concerned with the notion of
perceptual experience: more specifically, I am concerned with the basic ontological
question what we talk about when we talk about perceptual experiences – that is,
what kind of items perceptual experiences are. In addition to illustrating the sort of
3 For distinctions along similar lines, cf. Wolgast 1960; Lowe 1996, 92ff.; Crane 2005/2011.
4 I  take  an  informational  or  causal  understanding  of  perception  to  be  something  of  a
commonplace in the philosophical  literature.  For  statements  and  discussions,  cf.  Armstrong
1968, 209, 255; Pitcher 1971, 64, 113-30; Dretske 1981; O'Shaughnessy 2000, 38. This stance is
not equivalent to a causal theory of perception (cf. Grice 1961), at least in the sense that it is not
committed to a reductive analysis of perception in purely causal terms.
5 Compare here Michael Tye's remark on the relationship between visual experiences, seeing, and
looks: 'Seeing something entails the presence of a visual experience. I cannot see  X unless  X
looks some way to  me;  and for  X to look  some way to me,  it  must  cause  in me a  visual
experience. So, to return to the example of the wine taster, since he is seeing the wine in the
glass, he must be subject to a visual experience.' (Tye 2003, 34-5) 
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scenario where perceptual experiences play a crucial role, the example of Jim the
sailor also helps sketching two prominent views on this matter. Vendler himself
would,  I think, endorse a stative ontology of  perceptual experiences,  a position
which may be seen as a natural extension of Wittgenstein's and Ryle's critiques of
thoughts, among other mental items, as shadowy or ghostly entities6: indeed, a key
motivation behind this analysis of seeing is Vendler's belief that nothing needs to
happen in a subject's mind when she is perceptually aware of her surroundings, in
the sense that no mental processes need to be invoked to describe the mental life of
someone like Jim during t1-t10  (cf. Vendler 1957, 159-60). My overall case against
the processive view may likewise be framed within this historical tradition: after
all, the main worry I seek to press against theorists like O'Shaughnessy, Soteriou,
and  Crowther,  is  that  they  burden  a  stative  understanding  of  perceptual
experiences with a problematic and unnecessary mental ontology.
As previously noted, when Jim spots a bright star, he is not visually aware
of it: from t1 onwards, he is aware of it; but the spotting itself is a durationless
occurrence – that is, an achievement or an instantaneous event – which draws a
line between what Jim's experiential life is like at t0 and what it is like from t1 on.
Visual awareness kicks in only when Jim sees the luminous object during t1-t10:
during this period of time, Jim visually experiences the star. That said, what is
involved in Jim's being so aware? What exactly happens or obtains when Jim is
perceptually conscious of his surroundings? Or again, to put the same question
more bluntly, what kind of things (in the broadest possible sense of the term) are
Jim's visual experiences? Vendler directly addresses this issue:
A sailor on deck looking ahead remarks, “It is pitch dark, I don't see anything.” After a
while, “Now I see a star.” We ask him, “What has happened?” “The cloud's gone.” “But
what else happened?” “Nothing else.” Of course many things happened in the world and
in the sailor. But his seeing is not one of them. (Vendler 1957, 160)
      
In this passage, Vendler explicitly recognizes the existence of very complex
physical and neuro-biological stories behind every simple perceptual scenario. To
describe what happens when Jim perceives a star, it will not merely do to identify
6 On this point, the loci classici are of course Ryle 1949 and Wittgenstein 1953. For subsequent
statements of these critiques, cf. Ayer 1963; Kenny 1989; Travis 2001. 
15
what material substances and properties are involved in the relevant case, namely,
Jim himself, a star, the latter's luminous quality, etc. It is also necessary to provide
a  physical  story  concerning  how  information  about  an  object  far  away  and
possibly long gone may reach our planet in general and Jim in particular. Again, a
neuro-biological description should specify how that information is processed by
Jim's eyes  down into  the primary visual  cortex.  Vendler  does  not deliver  such
stories, but it is not his philosophical responsibility to do so. In the present context,
his  main  concern  is  our  understanding  of  conscious  perception  as  a  mental
phenomenon,  not  as  a  physical  or  a  neuro-biological  one:  that  is,  our
understanding  of  such  a  phenomenon  in  terms  of  those  general  metaphysical
categories familiar to philosophers (e.g. substance, property, process, state, etc.).
When he says that nothing happens in the sailor's mind while perceiving the star,
Vendler is by no means denying the existence of perceptual awareness: what he
contests is the propriety of conceiving Jim's (or anybody's) perceptual experiences
as mental happenings of a processive kind – in other words, as mental processes. 7
According to Vendler,  temporally extended seeing – that  is,  being perceptually
aware of worldly items or states of affairs – should be understood as the obtaining
of a mental state (cf. Vendler 1957, 155-7). To get a grip on the antagonistic views
thus introduced by Vendler, it is necessary to pause on the metaphysical notions of
process and state.8 
In broad lines, processes and states pick up on worldly items with different
temporal structures: that is, items which persist or fill time in different ways (cf.
Vendler 1957, 143-9; Steward 1997, 73). To a first approximation, this temporal
7 It is worth noting here that, although unpopular, an eliminativist view of perceptual experiences
has been endorsed in the past (cf. Farrell 1950; Wolgast 1960; Hacker 1987; and Byrne 2009). A
comparison of Vendler and Byrne is specially instructive: while Byrne denies the existence of
perceptual experience because the idea of perceptual events of a processive kind is problematic,
Vendler more lucidly appreciates that a successful critique of mental processes does not, strictly
speaking, undermine the notion of perceptual experience – such a critique would only show that
perceptual experiences ought not to be conceived in processive terms.  
8 Apart from Vendler's discussion, these notions have a venerable history in the philosophical
literature. There is a precedent at least in Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and Nichomachean
Ethics (cf. Barnes 1984). In modern times, interest in the process-state divide has been renewed
by the seminal contributions of Ryle, Vendler, and Anthony Kenny in the philosophy of mind
and the philosophy of action (cf. Ryle 1954; Vendler 1957; Kenny 1963, ch. 8). Since then, there
has been a wave of contributions in the interface of linguistics and philosophy (cf. Comrie 1976;
Taylor 1977; Mourelatos 1978; Dowty 1979; Rothstein 2007; among many others). Meanwhile,
the  distinction  has  slowly  made  its  come-back  into  hard-core  philosophies  of  mind,  of
perception, and action (cf. Steward 1997; Soteriou 2007, 2011, 2013; Crowther 2009a, 2009b).     
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distinction may be expressed as follows: whereas processes occur or unfold, states
only obtain; whereas there are only parts of a process at each moment before its
completion, states exist wholly present, not only as parts, throughout the moments
of time they obtain. Vendler illustrates this distinction by comparing the processes
of running and writing, on the one hand, and, on the other, the state of knowing:
[…] running, writing, and the like are processes going on in time, i.e., roughly, that they
consist  of  successive  phases  following  one  another  in  time.  Indeed,  the  man  who  is
running lifts up his right leg one moment, drops it the next, then lifts his other leg, drops
it, and so on. But although it can be true of a subject that he knows something at a given
moment or for a certain period, knowing and its kin are not processes going on in time. It
may be the case that I know geography now, but this does not mean that a process of
knowing geography is going on at present consisting of phases succeeding one another in
time. (Vendler 1957, 144-5)
Indeed, running and writing are uncontroversially processes: they are not
instantaneous, but temporally protracted; again, they go on or unfold. This point
may also be put by saying that such processes have temporal phases or parts: when
a subject runs or writes, her running or writing is not given as a whole at each of
the  instants  throughout  which  she  runs  or  writes;  such  processes  come  into
existence progressively until they reach an end when the subject stops running or
writing.  States,  by contrast,  do not share the same mode of  existence.  Vendler
grants that they are temporally protracted:  'one can know or believe something,
love or dominate somebody, for a short or long period.' (Vendler 1957, 146) Hence,
the distinction between processes and states is not a matter of temporal duration:
the crucial point is that, although instances of both categories persist over time,
only  processes  go  on.  Vendler's  suggestion  seems to  be  that,  unlike  processes,
states exist in time by being wholly present at each moment they obtain: '“A loved
somebody from  t1 to  t2” means that  any instant between  t1 and  t2 A loved that
person.' (Vendler 1957, 149).9 
With  the  previous  distinction  in  place,  the  view of  seeing  endorsed  by
Vendler may be formulated as a position according to which perceptual awareness
9 Throughout the philosophical literature, processes and states tend to be described in different
ways by different philosophers. That said, Vendler's framework nicely dovetails with the one
invoked by David Armstrong (cf. Armstrong 1968, 130-1). I shall say more about Armstrong in
the next  chapter,  since  I  take  his  theory  of  perception as  a  template  for  a  stative view of
perceptual experiences. 
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should be conceived as a condition instantiated by a subject for a certain period of
time:  perceptual  experiences  do  not  go  on,  they  only  obtain.  Correspondingly,
instantaneous seeing should be understood as a subject's acquiring of a particular
kind of mental state (cf. Vendler 1957, 158). By contrast, a processive conception
models perceptual experiences as mental processes: they have temporal parts, they
unfold or go on. If this view is along the right lines, instantaneous seeing would
accordingly refer to the beginning of a mental process. 
Vendler  takes  different  stances  on  those  two  views  of  perceptual
experience: he endorses a stative view and rejects a processive one. Now, when it
comes  to  specify  the  problematic  relationship  between  these  two  positions,
Vendler's discussion turns out to be of limited use at least for two reasons. First, it
presents the notions of process and state as exclusive ones: accordingly,  it  also
suggests  that  a  processive  and  a  stative  view  of  perceptual  experiences  are
mutually exclusive.  But,  as  it  will  become clear in the subsequent sections,  the
relationship  between  both  ontological  categories  is  more  complex  than  that.
Second, Vendler's case explicitly relies on a set of considerations intended to show
that perceptual experiences are not processes and, at the same time, that they are
states. However, such remarks fail to undermine a processive view. At a crucial
stage of his critique, Vendler writes:
But seeing cannot be a process. “What are you doing?” can never, in good English, be
answered by “I am seeing... .” Thus notwithstanding the fact that one might see something
for a long period, it does not mean that he “is seeing” that thing for any period, yet it
remains true that he sees it at all moments during that period. In addition, “deliberately”
or “carefully” fail to describe or misdescribe seeing, as no one can be accused of or held
responsible for having seen something, though one can be accused of or held responsible
for having looked at or watched something. Thus seeing is not an action which is “done”
or “performed” at all.  (Vendler 1957, 155-6)   
Vendler makes at  least two points:  first,  that  a claim of the form 'I  am
seeing...' does not suitably answer a question of the form 'What are you doing?';
and,  secondly,  that  such  claims  do  not  allow  for  adverbial  modifiers  such  as
'carefully', 'carelessly', and so on. Writing at the intersection between philosophy
and  linguistics,  he  often  brings  claims  about  linguistic  practice  to  bear  on
psychological  and  ontological  issues,  or  again,  formulates  psychological  and
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ontological  claims  in  terms  of  linguistic  usage.  But,  even  though  the  previous
remarks superficially concern the relationship between different types of linguistic
expressions, they do contain a non-linguistic, philosophical message, namely, that
perceptual phenomena should not be conceived as things we do or things we can
be  held  responsible  for  –  that  is,  as  actions.  In  saying  this,  however,  Vendler
overlooks the fact that a processive view is not obviously committed to the claim
that perceptual experiences are actions: as stressed by Crowther in relation to the
distinction between seeing and watching, one may argue that perceptual processes
are not agential, in the sense that they are not things a subject does, but things
which merely happen to her; after all, a processive view is primarily committed to
the  thought  that,  like  running (agential)  or  digesting (non-agential),  perceptual
experiences go on or unfold. A processive and an agential account of perceptual
experiences  are  clearly  different  philosophical  positions:  correspondingly,  a
critique of an agential stance does not automatically target a processive one.10     
Vendler, I think, suggests a better way of understanding the problematic
relationship between a processive and a stative view in remarks peripheral to the
above critique. In a passage I previously quoted, he claims that mental happenings
of a processive kind are not required in order to describe perceptual phenomena –
say,  the  case  where  Jim sees  a  star  for  a  period  of  time.  For  Vendler,  all  we
crucially need in order to describe Jim's experiential life is the notion of perceptual
state.  In  this  context,  I  suspect,  the  relevant  thought  is  not  that  the  notion of
perceptual  process  is  incoherent,  or,  again,  that  it  is  incompatible  with that  of
perceptual state. The crucial  point seems to be that,  when it comes to describe
everyday  experiential  scenarios,  we  need  not  invoke  perceptual  processes:  the
phenomenon  of  perceptual  awareness  is  suitably  captured  by  the  notion  of
perceptual state. According to this line of reasoning, perceptual awareness over
time is  a  temporally extended state  which subjects  realize  by  going through a
multitude of sub-personal (i.e. physical or neuro-biological) processes and states:
conceiving perceptual awareness itself as a mental process, however, threatens to
turn seeing into a mystery, just like a non-stative analysis of knowing threatens to
turn a knowledge-state into 'something ghostly' underpinning physical and neuro-
10 Vendler's mistake is similar to one which, according to Crowther, Ryle 1949 commits, namely,
to conflate agential process with process simpliciter (cf. Crowther 2009b, 176). 
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biological reality (cf. Vendler 1957, 158-9). The problem with perceptual processes
is thus that they involve an ontological commitment which seems unnecessary. An
obvious  reply  to  this  claim  is  that,  as  far  as  ontological  commitments  are
concerned,  perceptual  processes  are  not  any  more  demanding  than  physical
processes  (e.g.  digesting,  boiling)  or  characteristically  intentional  activities  (e.g.
running, writing). But, as I shall argue in the next section, this line of reply only
seems  plausible  because  we  have  not  fully  grasped  the  import  of  the  mental
processes thereby invoked: after elucidating the relevant notion of process a bit
further, it will become clear that the perceptual processes which O'Shaughnessy,
among others,  endorse,  constitute  significant  additions  to  our  general  ontology
over and above physical processes.              
The foregoing considerations suggest that a stative and a processive view
are not mutually exclusive: as far as I can see, a processive view could complement
a stative one, or vice versa. What Vendler's text hints at is a tension between an
ontologically austere and self-sufficient ontology of experiences, on the one hand,
and, on the other, a more robust and problematic one.  Even though perceptual
experiences  might  be  conceived  in  terms  of  mental  states  as  well  as  mental
processes, a stative theorist could argue that the ontological framework introduced
by  the  processive  theorist  involves  a  substantive  and  unnecessary  ontological
commitment.  In  a  nutshell,  the  stative  complaint  might  be  just  this:  even  if
perceptual processes turn out to be conceivable, why would we want to believe in
them? This worry is a key guiding theme of the present dissertation.  
In  this  section,  I  have  only  voiced  the  thought  that  a  stative  view  of
perceptual  experience  is  more  ontologically  austere  than  a  processive  one.  To
support it, I have to say more about perceptual processes and states, a task I spread
out over chapters 1 and 2. All I have intended to do here is to present a blue-print I
intend to flesh out throughout the following sections.      
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II. O'SHAUGHNESSY ON THE NECESSITY OF EXPERIENTIAL FLUX
 
In the remaining sections, I survey contemporary formulations of the processive
view,  and  partially  argue  for  the  claim  that  none  of  them  forces  perceptual
processes on us.  To begin with,  I  unpack and critically  assess O'Shaughnessy's
proposal. This step is crucial, for Soteriou and Crowther may be taken to gloss and
elaborate on that account. 
For O'Shaughnessy, perception and action are varieties of experience: as
such, he does not think that all experiences are perceptual. This dissertation is only
concerned with the perceptual variety, though. Within this context, a good-starting
point is the fact that, according to O'Shaughnessy, a crucial feature of perceptual
experiences  qua experiential  is  their  essential  or  necessary  dynamic  character.
Thus, he claims that, '[c]haracteristically the contents of experience are in flux,
and necessarily experience itself is in flux, being essentially occurrent in nature'
(O'Shaughnessy 2000, 43); or again, that '[i]t is not the mere existence of flux […]
in  the  case  of  experience  that  is  distinctive:  it  is  the  necessity of  flux.'
(O'Shaughnessy 2000,  44)  This  characterization highlights  two things:  first,  the
dynamic  or  changing  nature  of  perceptual  experiences;  and,  secondly,  the
necessity of that character. The dynamic component translates into a processive
conception of perceptual experiences, a view which O'Shaughnessy formulates as
follows:
Yet even when experience is not changing in type or content, it still changes in another
respect: it is constantly renewed, a new sector of itself is there and then taking place. This
is  because  experiences  are  events  (glimpsing,  picture-painting)  or  processes  (walking,
picture-painting), and each momentary new element of any given experience is a further
happening or occurrence (by contrast with (say) the steady continuation through time of
one's  knowing  that  9  and  5  make  14).  Thus,  even  if  I  am  staring  fixedly  at  some
unchanging material object, such staring is not merely a continuous existent across time,
it is an activity and therefore also a process, and thus occurrently renewed in each instant
in which it continues to exist. In short, the domain of experience is essentially a domain of
occurrences, of processes and events. (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 42) 
  
This statement aligns with what I have already said about the processive
view.  According  to  O'Shaughnessy,  perceptual  experiences  are  temporally
extended events or happenings: such events are temporally structured in the sense
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that they have a beginning, a middle, and an end; again, these happenings are of a
processive kind, that is, they go on for a certain period of time. Thus, if Jim sees a
bright  star  from t1 to  t10,  a  perceptual  event  takes  place  in  virtue of  a  mental
process extending from t1 to t10. 
In the previous quote, it is also clear that O'Shaughnessy takes the notion of
perceptual process to be intimately related to that of perceptual event: after all, he
claims  that  perceptual  awareness  may be  conceived in  terms  of  processes  and
events. Although both ontological categories are not equivalent, they are closely
related. A fairly popular take on this point is that  events are related to processes
via the notion of  constitution:  just  as  count-quantifiable,  spatial  entities  (e.g.  a
statue, a tree, etc.) are constituted by mass-quantifiable stuff (e.g. wood, bronze,
etc.),  certain  events  should  be  conceived  as  count-quantifiable,  temporally
extended items which are made of or constituted by mass-quantifiable processes
(cf. Armstrong 1968, 131; Steward 1997, 94-7; Crowther 2011). While temporally
extended events may be understood as temporal particulars – that is, they exist in
time and are count-quantifiable – processes may be conceived as the matter or
stuff out of which such particulars are constituted. This suggestion is attractive
because it captures intuitive contrasts between the notions of process and events:
processes,  not  events,  go  on;  process-talk  allows  for  adjective  or  adverbial
qualifications  which  event-talk  does  not  –  for  example,  the  humming  of  my
computer may be persistent or continuous (cf. Steward 1997, 95); unlike processes,
events do not stop but only come to an end (cf.  Steward 1997, 95);  events are
count-quantifiable – we can speak, for example, of one or two songs, of one or two
battles – whereas processes are only mass-quantifiable – there is not one or two
hummings, one or two runnings, but only more or less humming, more or less
running (cf.  Steward 1997, 96-7; Crowther 2011). More importantly, this line of
thought seems to be endorsed by O'Shaughnessy himself: 
[…] when a process  comes  to  a  halt  (at  whatever  point)  an  event  is  at  that  moment
realized (a dissolving, a skid, an ascent), so that we may say at each new instant t x of an
unfolding process that a potential event enduring from to–tx has occurred by the time tx.
[…] Thus, the process 'lays down' more and more of an event the same in kind as itself,
and may in this regard be taken to be the very stuff or phenomenal matter of events the
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same in kind as itself. (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 44)11
According to this passage, events come into existence only when processes
conclude:  whereas an ongoing process is only an incomplete event,  a complete
event is a process that has already concluded; in other words, these events are not
fully realized for as long as their corresponding processes go on. This suggests that,
although intimately related, events and processes constitute different ontological
categories.  Finally,  O'Shaughnessy  caps  the  previous  passage  by  saying  that
perceptual processes are 'the very stuff or phenomenal matter of events'.   
That said, the relevant processive view also contains a modal qualification
which is crucial for understanding what kind of perceptual processes, and hence
events,  are  at  stake.  O'Shaughnessy  claims  that  perceptual  experiences  are
necessarily or essentially dynamic: in other words, they are 'occurrent to the core'
(O'Shaughnessy  2000,  49).  To  highlight  this  point,  he  draws  a  line  between
experiences, on the one hand, and, on the other, non-experiences or 'the sector that
encompasses the relatively stable unexperienced mental foundation (e.g. cognitive,
evaluative, etc.) upon which experience occurs.' (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 42-3) The
relevant contrast is not one between a dynamic and a static sector of the mind.
After all, changes can take place among non-experiential states: for example, our
beliefs  or memories can change over time. Hence,  the crucial  point is not that
perceptual experiences involve change, for non-experiential states do so as well:
rather, the thought is that experiences are processive down to their ultimate parts:
no matter how you go about analysing perceptual awareness, you always end up
with processes.  By thus  glossing the processive view,  O'Shaughnessy  comes to
share a claim suggested by Vendler, namely, that perceptual processes constitute a
substantive addition to a stative ontology of perceptual experiences.  
As previously mentioned, Vendler fails  to show that a processive and a
stative view are mutually incompatible, but only that a stative theorist need not
commit  herself  to  the  existence  of  perceptual  processes.  Now,  throughout  the
11 A bit  earlier,  he  also  writes:  'when a  process  terminates,  an  event  of  the  same type  is  its
necessary residue. If I have been looking steadily at a painting for ninety seconds, if for ninety
seconds such a processive activity was going on, then at the end of that interval it became true
that I had looked at that painting, it became true that an act-event of that type and duration had
occurred.' (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 43)
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defence  of  his  processive  stance,  O'Shaughnessy  raises  the  question  whether
perceptual experiences could allow for a dual ontological analysis, that is, whether
they could be analysed in stative as well as processive terms (cf. O'Shaughnessy
2000,  46).  This  possibility  is  suggested  by  the  fact  that  physical  as  well  as
psychological  albeit  non-experiential  processes  may  be  so  analysed  (cf.
O'Shaughnessy 2000, 44-7). For example, certain movements across space may be
conceived  as  processes  constituted  by  objects  standing  in  certain  states:
'constituting a process like moving out of states like being at a position in space at
a particular time, is not in competition with constituting such a process out of parts
the same in kind as itself.'  (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 45) The point is not just that
either analysis is acceptable: the thought is that it may be necessary to invoke both
process-parts and state-parts in order to capture the kind of events or changes that
certain  movements  across  space  are.  Again,  some  non-experiential  phenomena
(e.g. certain instances of forgetting, coming to understand, or deciding) may be
processes  with  states  at  their  core.12 Of  course,  physical  and  non-experiential
change will not always be processive: for, while O'Shaughnessy takes a process to
be the kind of change which exhibits a certain form of continuity or homogeneity
among its constituting parts,  he also thinks that changes like movement across
space,  forgetting,  and  deciding,  may  be  discontinuous.  Physical  and  non-
experiential changes involve a processive and a stative analysis only when they are
temporally continuous. 
But  what  about  experiential  processes?  Could  they  also  be  analysed  in
terms of process-parts as well as state-parts? According to O'Shaughnessy, they
could not: he argues that psychological states cannot be constitutive components of
perceptual experiences (cf. O'Shaughnessy 2000, 44, 47), and it should be relatively
clear that this negative claim is related to the necessary character of experiential
flux:  after  all,  if  experiences  are  irreducibly  processive  –  that  is,  if  they  are
12 Here is the template for the analysis of non-experiential processes: 'In all such cases we are able
to single out a psychological state which lies at the heart of the process. Indeed, the guiding
principle seems to be, that if  we are to so much as specify a non-experiential psychological
process,  the way to go about the task is first  by specifying a particular psychological state,
second positing an event consisting in the change of that state over an interval of time, and
finally through positing continuity as the mode in which the change is realized.' (O'Shaughnessy
2000, 47) Again, since temporally extended events and processes are closely related and states
may be understood as instantiations of properties or relations, the present understanding of
processes is germane to a conception of events as property-exemplifications (cf. Kim 1976).
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processive by necessity or occurrent to the core – they could not be analysed into
stative components;  in other words,  mental  states  cannot  underpin experiences
because these psychological phenomena are necessarily processive. O'Shaughnessy
goes as far as saying that the absence of such underpinning states constitutes 'a
fundamental differentia of the whole experience genus' (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 44):
indeed, states may lie at the heart of physical and non-experiential processes, but
that  is  so  only  because  such changes  are  not  processive  through and through.
According to this position, meanwhile, there are no experiential states.  
Two remarks are in order here. First, O'Shaughnessy's perceptual processes
would constitute a substantive addition vis-à-vis a stative ontology, in the sense
that his processive view is committed to the existence of items a stative framework
would  not  automatically  capture  –  after  all,  the  relevant  processes  cannot  be
reduced into experiential states. Secondly, this version of the processive view is to
some extent more radical than the one derived from Vendler's discussion. In the
last section, I noted that Vendler attempts to drive a wedge between a processive
and a stative view of seeing: all he manages to do is, however, critically to assess
an agential view of seeing, that is,  a conception according to which temporally
extended seeing is something we do rather than something which merely happens
to us. Having said that, I went on to develop a suggestion hinted at by Vendler,
namely, that a processive and a stative view may be thought of as complementary
positions: more specifically, the thought is that, since perceptual processes are less
ontologically austere than perceptual states, the processive view may build on the
stative view. Now, if Vendler's understanding of the relationship between these
two ontologies is  taken to be defined by his  most explicit  line of  reasoning,  it
would  thereby  cohere  with  O'Shaughnessy's  intentions:  in  that  case,  both
philosophers would seek to frame the stative and the processive view as mutually
exclusive  options.  But,  as  already  pointed  out,  Vendler's  oficial  take  on  that
relationship  is  defective.  If  what  he  thought  is  instead  informed  by  his  more
peripheral  remarks,  it  should  be  clear  that  O'Shaughnessy  follows  a  less
ecumenical path. Vendler apparently thinks that the processive ontology of seeing
unnecessarily builds on a stative one: so, although these positions stand in a rather
delicate relationship, they are not mutually exclusive. By contrast, O'Shaughnessy
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clearly  pursues  a  route  where  perceptual  processes  are  not  reducible  into  or
otherwise related to perceptual states: according to him, there are no such states.
In other words, he thinks that a processive and a stative view are not compatible
with  each  other.  This  is,  I  think,  a  notable  difference  between  Vendler's  and
O'Shaughnessy's  understandings  of  the  relationship  between  the  two  relevant
mental  ontologies.  In  the subsequent sections,  I  shall  argue that  Soteriou's  and
Crowther's takes on the same issue are ecumenical ones, even though they are to a
significant degree different from Vendler's. For the time being, the crucial point is
that O'Shaughnessy endorses a relatively extreme version of a processive view:
hence, it is necessary to determine whether the reasons behind his position are
good ones. 
As far as I can see, O'Shaughnessy is mainly driven by two motivations: on
the  one  hand,  he  thinks  that  a  head-on analysis  of  the  concept  of  experience
vindicates  experiential  processes  over  experiential  states;  and,  on the other,  he
invokes a thought-experiment – viz. a case of 'total mental freeze' – the purpose of
which is to highlight the necessary dynamic character of perceptual phenomena
and,  accordingly,  the  obvious  appeal  of  a  processive  view.  In  both  cases,
O'Shaughnessy thinks that the correctness of his processive view counts against a
stative position. By critically assessing these motivations, I aim to show that he
neither proves his own view right, nor undermines the notion of perceptual states.
To  begin  with,  then,  O'Shaughnessy  argues  that  perceptual  experiences
could  not  be  conceptually  analysed  or  anatomized  in  terms  of  temporally
continuous transitions from state to state, but only in terms of processes. To the
extent that he focuses on undermining the stative view, his critical strategy is by
and large negative. He writes:
[…]  one is inclined to believe that (say) hearing a sound consists in the obtaining of a
relation, that of awareness, between a mind and a sound. Accordingly, one might suppose
that there exists an experience which is the realization in time of a state, viz. the relation
of awareness between a mind and a sound. This is to strictly model ‘He hears the sound’
upon ‘He touches the wall’. But ‘He touches the wall’  is ambiguous between an event
consisting in the establishing of a relation,  and the relation itself. By contrast, ‘He hears
the  sound’  exhibits  no  such  ambiguity:  it  describes  an event,  and  never  designates  a
relation.  A fortiori  the event of hearing a sound does not consist in the realization at or
over a time of a relation of hearing the sound. This event occurs at an instant if the sound
is instantaneous, and over an interval if the sound is temporally extended; then in the
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latter  case it  will  need to be renewed instant by succeeding instant,  as happens when
listening is going on. (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 49)
In the present context, O'Shaughnessy conceives 'relations of awareness' as
states in which subjects may stand relative to their surroundings: this is, I suspect,
why he denies that perceptual experiences pick up on such relations. The question
I thus have to evaluate here is whether O'Shaughnessy conclusively shows that the
notion of perceptual experience should necessarily be analysed in terms of mental
processes. My answer will be negative, and, as a result of that, I conclude that the
present motivation is unsatisfactory. 
Turning to the previous question, it is helpful to examine constructions of
the following form:
  (i) S perceives O (as F),
where 'perceives' could be replaced by 'sees', 'hears', 'smells', etc.
  (ii) O appears to S (as F),
where 'appears... (as F)' could be replaced by 'looks (like)', 'sounds
(like)', 'smells (like)', etc. 
If there are any linguistic constructions we use to pick up on perceptual
experiences, (i) and (ii) seem good candidates.  
O'Shaughnessy specifically tries to drive an asymmetry between statements
about hearing and touch. According to him, the reference of a perceptual statement
like
  (i*) He touches the wall,
 
is  ambiguous  between  an  instantaneous  event  –  the  touching  of  a  wall  at  an
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instant – and a state – that is, the state in which a subject stands vis-à-vis the
object (i.e. the wall) he is in direct contact with. The general suggestion is then that
one could apply a similar analysis to statements about perceptual phenomena of
different sensory modalities. To undercut this move, O'Shaughnessy argues that a
statement of auditory perception, such as
  (i**) He hears the sound,
    
is  not  ambiguous:  on  the  contrary,  it  unequivocally  points  to  a  single  reading
where the subject's hearing should be understood in processive terms. Although
O'Shaughnessy  does  not  generalize  this  claim  to  statements  of  other  sensory
modalities, one would expect him to do so for the sake of the processive view. 
The previous line of reasoning, however, does not seem convincing enough
at least for three reasons. First, by conceding that statements of tactile perception
and  those  of  auditory  perception  could  be  analysed  in  different  ways,
O'Shaughnessy  suggests  that  different  conceptual  analyses  could  in  principle
underpin  each  sensory  modality:  but  if  that  is  the  case,  it  is  unclear  whether
statements  of,  say,  visual  perception  mirror  that  of  tactile  perception,  that  of
auditory perception, or a completely different model. O'Shaughnessy himself does
not throw any lights on this matter. As such, even if his analysis of (i**) is correct
and  thereby  supports  a  processive  view,  it  does  not  follow  that  one  could
automatically infer a processive view of visual, gustatory, or olfactory experiences. 
Secondly, it is not obvious that O'Shaughnessy's analysis of (i**) is correct.
In  particular,  it  is  unclear  why  statements  of  hearing  lack  different  readings.
Vendler's and Ryle's influential works suggest that statements about seeing may
identify: on the one hand, an instantaneous event, e.g. the spotting of an object in
one's surroundings; or, on the other, a state (what O'Shaughnessy calls a relation of
awareness) of the perceiver relative to the objects  of perception (cf.  Ryle 1954;
Vendler 1957). Thus, it is natural to advance the same sort of analysis for (i*) and
(i**). 
Finally, one could also target O'Shaughnessy's swift inference to the claim
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that statements about auditory experiences refer to experiential processes. In the
above quote, statements of auditory perception refer to experiential processes only
thanks to a principle according to which the temporal structure of mental attitudes
mirrors  that  of  their  respective  objects.  According  to  this  principle,  perceptual
experiences  are  instantaneous  or  protracted  depending  on  whether  what  is
perceived has that temporal structure: 'the event of hearing a sound […] occurs at
an  instant  if  the  sound  is  instantaneous,  and  over  an  interval  if  the  sound  is
temporally extended'. This claim, however, rests on a controversial principle to the
effect  that  features  of  represented  items may be  ascribed to  the  corresponding
vehicles of representation: as Daniel Dennett has persuasively argued, it is far from
clear  whether  the  temporal  structure  of  what  a  subject  perceives  shapes  the
temporal structure of her perceptual attitudes (cf. Dennett 1991). This is certainly a
delicate issue on which I cannot elaborate here. But, for present purposes,  it  is
enough to flag the complication: this alone, I think, shows that O'Shaughnessy's
reliance on perceptual processes is controversial.   
In  short,  O'Shaughnessy's  conceptual  analysis  of  perceptual  experiences
does  not  seem  compulsory.  A  second  motivation  behind  his  processive  view
concerns the alleged difference between 'the characters and conditions of identity'
(O'Shaughnessy 2000, 44) of experiences and non-experiences. The main point is
expressed  by means  of  a  thought  experiment  which  O'Shaughnessy  repeatedly
exploits:
[…] the domain of experience is essentially a domain of occurrences, of processes and
events. In this regard we should contrast the domain of experience with the other great
half  of  the  mind:  the  non-experiential  half.  That  is,  the  sector  that  encompasses  the
relatively stable unexperienced mental foundation (e.g. cognitive, evaluative, etc.)  upon
which experience occurs.  While many of  the non-experiential  contents of this domain
could continue in existence when all mental phenomena had frozen in their tracks, say
(fancifully) in a being in suspended animation at 0º Absolute, those in the experiential
domain could not. (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 42-3)  
In this thought experiment, the mental life of a subject is frozen in a way
which is intended to highlight different circumstances or conditions under which
experiences  and non-experiences  may exist:  unlike  experiences  (e.g.  perceptual
experiences), non-experiences (e.g. beliefs) could exist in a frozen mental life, that
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is,  a  life  where  no mental  changes  take  place.  In  the  light  of  their  distinctive
dynamic character, experiences are naturally classified as processes. As stressed by
O'Shaughnessy, the relevant psychological contrast is one between a sector of the
mind that is necessarily occurrent or dynamically irreducible and a sector of the
mind that is ultimately reducible to non-dynamic elements (i.e. state-parts). 
An initial worry about this fiction is whether it is actually obvious that one
could  ascribe  non-experiential  states  (say,  beliefs)  to  a  subject  in  total  mental
freeze – after all, in the realm of imaginable possibilities, this fiction comes close to
a case of brain death, where it is not implausible to deny cognitive states to the
relevant subject. Furthermore, the uses of 'can'-terms are complex enough to raise
the question whether the sense in which a subject in total mental freeze could have
cognitive  states  is  the  same  sense  as  that  in  which  a  sleeper  or  otherwise
unconscious person  could.  I admit,  though, that this line of attack is extremely
delicate, so I present it only as a tentative suggestion.
I  shall  focus  here on a relatively simpler  objection.  For  the sake of  the
argument, I grant that a subject in mental freeze could have a non-experiential life
while  lacking  an  experiential  one.  Now,  even  if  that  is  the  case,  it  does  not
necessarily show that perceptual experiences are mental processes. This thought
could  be  supported  in  two  ways.  First,  one  could  hold  that  O'Shaughnessy's
thought experiment does not show that experiences are ultimately processive, but
only that experiences and non-experiences constitute different kinds of states –
that  is,  kinds  of  states  which  have  different  identity  conditions.  One  would
certainly have to motivate this line of reasoning, but it seems a live option.
Secondly, one could hold that O'Shaughnessy's fiction does not show that
experiences are mental processes, but only that they somehow depend on processes
of  different  kinds.  In  a  slogan,  the  relevant  case  only  shows:  no  changes
whatsoever, no experiences. But it fails to show, first, that there is a one-on-one
mapping  between  experiences  and  processes,  and,  secondly,  that  the  relevant
processes  are  of  a  specific  mental  kind.  To  secure  a  processive  conception,
O'Shaughnessy needs to secure these two points: since his thought experiment fails
to do so, it also fails to secure a processive conception. 
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To illustrate the previous remarks, let's assume that perceptual experiences
are  mental  states, and  then  determine  whether  one  could  still  make  sense  of
O'Shaughnessy's mental-freeze case. The subjects of these experiences have bodies
which, in turn, implement sensory systems from which perceptual experiences will
ensue:  as  such,  one  could  reasonably  suppose  that  a  complex  number  of
physiological processes take place in the relevant perceivers. On the basis of these
stipulations,  the  suggestion  is  that  the  case  of  total  mental  freeze  could  be
accommodated by a stative understanding of perceptual experiences. The reason
why this is so is that, although perceptual experiences would not be processes, they
could be states that in turn depend on processes of a different kind. The idea of a
process-dependent  state  is  not  really  exotic,  for  there are  familiar  examples  of
mental states which depend on physiological processes: for instance, being in pain
or feeling anxious are mental states that depend on physiological changes. In these
cases, no mental processes (say, pain- or anxiety-processes) are involved. Since the
possibility of total freeze would not only obliterate subjective processes, but also
subjective process-dependent states, a subject could thereby fail to have perceptual
experiences not only when the latter are conceived as processes, but also when
conceived as  process-dependent  states.  Although the  general  notion  of  process
would still  have a role to play in the relevant scenario,  it  does not follow that
experiences  have to  be  happenings  of  a  processive kind.  In  short,  I  grant  that
O'Shaughnessy may illustrate a significant difference by means of the discussed
thought experiment, but I do not think it forces a processive view of experience on
us.
To sum up. In this section, I turned to O'Shaughnessy's view of perceptual
experience, for it constitutes one of the most systematic and radical defences of the
processive stance. After unpacking it, I went on to examine the motivations behind
that position. In principle, pure conceptual analysis and reflection on the case of
total mental freeze are intended to convince us that perceptual experiences can
only  be  mental  processes,  not  mental  states.  But,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  such
considerations are far from unproblematic. At one point throughout his discussion,
O'Shaughnessy himself claims that that the notion of experience is not a provider
of  ontological  or  categorial  status  to  whatever  falling  under  that  concept  (cf.
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O'Shaughnessy 2000, 41-2). He should, it seems to me, have made more of this
tenet. 
III. SOTERIOU ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TEMPORALLY EXTENDED EXPERIENCE
Soteriou  endorses  what  is  to  an  important  extent  a  processive  account  of
experience, but he also takes some distance from O'Shaughnessy's radical stance.
In  very  broad  lines,  he  holds  that  perceptual  experiences  are  mental  states
constituted by phenomenally conscious processes. This version of the processive
view  is  driven  at  least  by  two  motivations:  on  the  one  hand,  a  number  of
phenomenological facts about temporally extended experiences, and, on the other,
a problematic understanding of mental states. After unpacking Soteriou's position,
I shall argue that the bearing of temporal phenomenology on ontological matters is
much  weaker  than  what  Soteriou  suggests.  Since  a  discussion  of  the  way  he
understands perceptual states will clarify the key notion behind the stative view, I
postpone it until the next chapter (cf. chapter 2.3).13     
As just noted, processes as well as states play a crucial role in Soteriou's
view of perceptual experience. He writes as follows:
My suggestion is that we need to appeal to the obtaining of 'occurrent' perceptual states in
an account of the ontology of experience–perceptual states whose obtaining constitutively
depends on the occurrence of processive phenomenally conscious experiential happenings.
These occurrent perceptual states obtain over intervals of time. They do not unfold over
time. But they are not homogeneous down to instants. Their obtaining over an interval of
time depends  on the  occurrence  of  something  that  takes an interval  of  time–i.e.,  the
unfolding of phenomenally conscious experiential happenings. (Soteriou 2011, 497)
Like Vendler and O'Shaughnessy, Soteriou acknowledges a basic distinction
between  processes  and  states:  whereas  the  former  unfold  or  go  on,  the  latter
obtain.  Processive  and  stative  items  persist,  but  they  do  so  in  different  ways.
13 Although Soteriou's most recent and comprehensive account of this position figures in Soteriou
2013, I shall mostly focus on Soteriou 2011. Soteriou's most recent work is an elaborate and
complex discussion where the relevant stative-cum-processive view is defended in a piecemeal
way throughout several chapters. To tackle that work, it would be necessary to address each one
of the themes covered by Soteriou, a task I confess myself unable to tackle here. For this reason,
my critical assessment focuses on the much more manageable paper from 2011.
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Again,  he  recognizes  that  both  ontological  categories  ground  different
understandings  of  perceptual  experiences.  Soteriou  nevertheless  parts  company
with his predecessors by taking perceptual states to be constituted by perceptual
processes. This position primarily conceives perceptual experiences along stative
lines, but also incorporates a processive framework: the relevant perceptual states
are  constituted  by  or  made  of  perceptual  processes  –  that  is,  unfolding
'phenomenally  conscious  experiential  happenings'.  Thus,  Soteriou  outlines  an
intimate connection – namely, a constitutive one – between perceptual processes
and perceptual states: according to him, the role which perceptual experiences are
supposed  to  play  is  only  reflected  by  a  combination  of  the  two  ontological
categories at stake. What that role is, is an issue I touch on in a moment.
To  develop  the  previous  account  of  perceptual  experience,  Soteriou
naturally has to modify the ontological framework he borrows from Vendler and
O'Shaughnessy: whereas these two philosophers only acknowledged a fundamental
distinction between processes and states, Soteriou additionally invokes the notion
of states constituted by processes – or, to use a terminology I already introduced in
the last section, the notion of process-dependent state. The thought is that nothing
in the concept of a state rules out that there might be states the existence of which
depended on the existence of processes unfolding in the subjects of the relevant
states:  that  is,  one may conceive instances of certain mental  states which only
obtain when the object or subject instantiating such states also go through certain
processes. As Soteriou claims, it is conceivable that 'a series of events involving an
object can amount to that object being modified in some way or other, where the
object is in its modified state while, and because, those events occur, hence the idea
that some state of the object (the way in which it is modified) obtains in virtue of,
and for the duration of the occurrence of those events.' (Soteriou 2011, 496) Since
the  relevant  events  or  happenings  may  naturally  be  processive,  the  original
thought translates into the claim that there may states which obtain in virtue of,
and for  the duration of  the occurrence  of  certain processes.  In  support  of  this
claim, a number of familiar physical and mental examples may be invoked. The
temperature of a liquid is a physical state which depends on molecular processes: a
given amount of water will remain at a certain temperature in virtue of, and for as
33
long as those processes continue (cf.  Steward 1997;  Soteriou 2011).  Likewise,  a
subject often stands in somato-sensory states (a burning pain, say) which in turn
depend  on  several  neuro-biological  processes  (cf.  Soteriou  2007).  Although
Soteriou's notion of process-constituted states or that of process-dependent state
may  not  be  wholly  uncontroversial,  the  previous  examples  do  a  good  job  at
illustrating the general  thought,  namely,  that  there are certain kinds  of  mental
states which obtain in a subject S only if processes of a certain kind unfold in S.     
Having said that, it is worth pausing to consider the relationship between
the present view of perceptual experiences and those I unpacked in the last two
sections. Take Vendler's view first. Although Soteriou's position certainly echoes
the stative view of temporally extended seeing, it also invokes perceptual processes
as constitutive elements of perceptual states. I previously argued that Vendler hints
at two ways of understanding the relationship between a processive and a stative
view:  most  explicitly  but  rather  unsuccessfully,  he  took  both  of  them  to  be
incompatible;  alternatively,  he  suggested  a  more  ecumenical  path  according  to
which perceptual processes are ontologically robust entities which may, but need
not  to,  piggybag  on  more  ontologically  austere  perceptual  states.  Either  way,
Vendler's and Soteriou's views do not coincide: Soteriou certainly combines the
two relevant  ontological  categories within his  own account,  but  he does  so by
claiming  that  perceptual  processes  are  constitutive  elements  (necessary
ingredients, as it were) of perceptual states, not entities over and above a stative
ontology. The view of perceptual experience at hand is, I think, more germane to
O'Shaughnessy's  stance:  Soteriou  highlights  the  importance  of  unfolding,
phenomenally  conscious  experiential  happenings  for  our  understanding  of
perceptual  phenomena;  again,  his  claim to the effect  that  perceptual  states are
constituted  by perceptual  processes  is  in  principle  compatible  with the  idea  of
irreducible  perceptual  processes.  O'Shaughnessy's  and  Soteriou's  views  are  not
identical, but they may complement each other. Finally, the present conception of
perceptual processes also suggests that a processive view is committed to entities
over and above those required by a stative ontology of perceptual experiences. As
previously mentioned, the relevant processes are not physical, but phenomenally
conscious. Furthermore, such perceptual processes are supposed to be constitutive
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elements of perceptual states. This dependency relation suggests that experiential
processes  could  not  be  reduced into  experiential  states,  for  the  latter  precisely
depend on a processive analysis. Like Vendler and O'Shaughnessy, Soteriou takes
the relevant processes to be items over and above a stative ontology of perceptual
awareness.
Moving into the second stage of this section, a key motivation behind this
stative-cum-processive  account  is  that  it  allegedly  accommodates  certain
phenomenological  facts  about  temporally  extended  experiences.  Two  general
thoughts  underpin  that  claim:  (i)  that  the  previous  facts  are  non-negotiable
features of perceptual experiences, or at least of the way we think about them; and
(ii), that ontological views of perceptual awareness have a bearing on such facts.
Without (i), it would be unclear why the relevant facts should be accommodated at
all. Without (ii), it would be unclear why an ontological exploration of perceptual
experiences should take those facts into account, even if they are non-negotiable
features  of  what  it  means  to  be  perceptually  aware  of  the  world.  To  press
Soteriou's  line  of  reasoning,  one  could  naturally  challenge  either  assumption.
Although I say something about (i) towards the end of this section, I mostly focus
on (ii).   
The  key  phenomenological  facts  are:  first,  the  temporal  properties  of
perceptual  experiences  are  transparent;  secondly,  certain  objects  of  perception
appear to be temporally continuous; and, thirdly, when a subject is perceptually
aware  of  such  objects,  her  perceptual  experiences  apparently  share  the  same
temporal continuity. I elaborate on each aspect next.
The general thought behind the idea of transparency is that reflection on
perceptual experiences is not sensitive to features of the experiences themselves,
but  only  to  features  of  the  worldly  items  or  states  of  affairs  our  perceptual
experiences are of. For example, if I reflect on my current visual experiences, I
cannot attend to the very mental phenomena opening the visible world to me, but
only to the items I see, e.g. a laptop, a table, a few DVDs, etc. - in this sense,
experiences themselves are 'invisible'  or 'transparent' to reflection. Again, when
Jim introspects his visual experiences during t1-t10,  he can only attend to a star,
clouds,  among  other  worldly  features:  the  experiences  in  virtue  of  which  the
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relevant  scene is  presented to him, however,  remains  elusive to his  attentional
capacities. As  illustrated  here,  the  idea  of  transparency  involves  two  specific
claims: first, that reflection on perceptual experiences refers to the worldly items
such experiences are of or about; and, secondly, that it refers to nothing more than
those  items  (cf.  Crane  2005/2011).  Thus  understood,  the  idea  of  experiential
transparency is controversial in virtue of the second or negative claim. 14 Soteriou,
however, identifies a 'weaker version' of the claim: 'when one attempts to attend
introspectively to what it is like for one to be having a perceptual experience it
seems to  one as  though one can only  do so  through attending to  the  sorts  of
objects, qualities and relations one is apparently perceptually aware of in having
the experience.' (Soteriou 2011, 488) This formulation is weaker precisely because
it constrains the negative claim behind the idea of transparency: instead of holding
that experiential features are wholly inaccessible to our attentional capacities, it
subordinates  the  introspective  awareness  of  mental  items  to  the  possibility  of
attending to the relevant experienced items. This subtle qualification is crucial, for,
as I shall explain in a moment, it carries over into Soteriou's formulation of the
temporal transparency of perceptual experiences. 
Given the previous considerations, Soteriou goes on to unpack the idea of
temporal transparency as follows:
[...] the temporal location of one’s perceptual experience seems to one to be transparent to
the temporal location of whatever it is that one is aware of in having that experience.
When  one  introspects  one’s  experience,  the  temporal  location  of  one’s  perceptual
experience seems to one to be transparent to the temporal location of whatever it is that
one is  aware  of  in  having  that  experience.  Introspectively,  it  doesn’t  seem to  one as
though one can mark out the temporal location of one’s perceptual experience as distinct
from the temporal location of whatever it is that one seems to be perceptually aware of.
(Soteriou 2011, 589)
This  formulation  does  not  deviate  from  a  traditional  understanding  of
experiential transparency: when we introspect or reflect on our own perceptual
experiences, the latter's temporal properties are not obviously manifest to us; when
we exercise  our  introspective  capacities,  the  only  temporal  features  which  are
immediately salient to us belong to the worldly items or states of affairs we are
14 I discuss the temporal transparency of perceptual experiences a bit further in chapter 3.1.
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thus acquainted with. For example, when we decide to introspect our current visual
experiences of a person running across the park, it  is natural  to think that the
temporal  features we can attend to  in virtue of  attending to these experiences
correspond to the perceived runner or her current activity. This does not mean that
we or our experiences would be immune to temporal modifications: but, although
we and our perceptual occurrences are no doubt subject to physical time, it does
not follow that we can access any of such modifications via pure introspection. 
So  far,  so  good.  Immediately  after  the  above  quote,  however,  Soteriou
relates  the  temporal  transparency  of  perceptual  experiences  to  a  somewhat
different thought:
Furthermore, it seems to one as though the temporal location of one’s experience depends
on, and is determined by, the temporal location of whatever it is that one’s experience is
an experience of. So, for example, when one perceives an unfolding occurrence (e.g., the
movement  of  an  object  across  space),  it  seems  to  one  as  though  one’s  perceptual
experience has the temporal location and duration of its object, and it seems to one as
though the temporal location and duration of each temporal part of one’s experience is
transparent to the temporal location and duration of each temporal part of the unfolding
occurrence one seems to perceive. (Soteriou 2011, 589)
This  remark  constitutes  a  substantive  addition  to  the  previous  line  of
reasoning:  for,  while  the  initial  thought  about  transparency  presses  the
inaccessibility of perceptual experiences via introspection, Soteriou now draws a
link  between  the  temporal  properties  of  perceived  objects  and  those  of  the
corresponding perceptual experiences; in particular, he claims that the 'temporal
location' of the items we perceive governs the 'temporal location' of our perceptual
experiences. This claim, I think, qualifies the negative component behind the idea
of transparency, for it suggests that reflection on what we are perceptually aware
of reveals something about the temporal character of our perceptual experiences.
Although Soteriou does not make the point explicit, I think this deviation should be
read  in  the  light  of  his  'weaker  version'  of  experiential  transparency:  if  the
background thought is  not that perceptual experiences are inaccessible through
first-person  introspection,  but  only  that  the  possibility  of  so  accessing  them
depends on attending to the worldly items we experience; it would be reasonable
to  hold that  the  temporal  structure of  perceptual  experiences  is  introspectively
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revealed by attending to the temporal structure of what is thus experienced.  
The second phenomenological  aspect  Soteriou picks up on concerns 'the
apparent temporal extent of the objects of perceptual experience.' (Soteriou 2011,
489) To illustrate this  point,  he turns to the perception of  temporally extended
events:  related to the fact  that such happenings have temporal parts intimately
related to each other, subjects may only experience them by being aware of their
parts. True: it  is possible to perceive durationless events or parts of temporally
extended  ones.  But  what  Soteriou  intends  to  reject  here  is  the  possibility  of
perceiving  temporally  extended  events  without  perceiving  temporally  extended
parts of them. As he also puts it, '[i]f one tries just to attend to an instantaneous
temporal  part  of  the  occurrence,  without  attending  to  a  temporal  part  of  the
occurrence that has temporal extension, then one will fail.'  (Soteriou 2011, 489)
The third phenomenological aspect is closely related, for it also concerns the idea
of  temporal  extension:  whereas  the  second  fact  highlights  the  continuity  or
temporal  extension  of  perceived  items,  Soteriou  next  invokes  'the  apparent
continuity of conscious experience over time.' (Soteriou 2011, 490) Just as certain
objects of perception seem to have temporal parts intimately related to each other,
subjects undergo perceptual experiences constituted by closely connected temporal
parts: 'when one undergoes a conscious perceptual experience that fills an interval
of time, each sub-interval of that interval of time is filled by some successive phase
of that experience, and each successive phase of the experience shares a temporal
part with some prior phase of experience.' (Soteriou 2011, 490) For example, when
a subject stares at the second-hand of a clock during a period of time, she also
observes a temporally extended event or at least part of one. But, in addition to
that, the continuity of the perceived event also seems to transpire into the temporal
structure of the very experience she goes through: when she observes the second-
hand, her visual experiences do not seem to bundle together as a set of temporally
discrete  items,  but  to  coalesce  into  one  continuous  experiential  stream.  The
remaining  two  phenomenological  facts  are  thus  closely  related:  while  one
highlights the temporal continuity of perceived items, the other stresses that of
perceptual experiences themselves.  
This phenomenological picture underpins the processive-cum-stative view
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of perceptual experiences. As I previously noted, Soteriou thinks that an ontology
of perception should be capable of accommodating the previous facts. That being
the case, he goes on to develop the following difficulty: whereas only a processive
view could capture the transparency and the continuity of temporally extended
experiences,  a  stative  stance  is  best  equipped  to  incorporate  the  apparent
continuity of perceived objects. In short, the problem is that neither ontology of
perception  accommodates  on  its  own  the  previous  phenomenological  picture:
while a processive view does not recognize the continuity of perceived objects, a
stative  view  fails  reflecting  the  temporal  transparency  and  continuity  of
experiences.  To  address  this  difficulty,  Soteriou  develops  an  ontological  view
which relies on perceptual states as well as perceptual processes: in particular, he
pursues  a  conception  of  perceptual  experiences  as  occurrent  states,  that  is,  as
perceptual states constituted by phenomenally conscious processes. In virtue of its
dual nature, this account apparently has the necessary resources to embrace all the
aforementioned phenomenological facts.
There are no doubt commonalities between the position I defend in this
dissertation and Soteriou's stance: for example, I also defend a stative conception,
and, in doing so, invoke a notion of process-dependent state germane to that of
occurrent  state.  That  said,  these  two  views  are  incompatible  at  least  for  the
following reasons: first, the processes I rely on are not phenomenally conscious,
but merely physical; and, secondly, the specific way in which I think of perceptual
states is not the same as Soteriou's. Since the latter issue depends on clarifying
how mental states could be conceived, it will be discussed in the next section. For
the time being, I shall focus on the first point. More specifically, I move on to show
that the notion of phenomenally conscious process is problematic for two reasons:
on the one hand, its bearing on the phenomenology of perceptual experiences is far
from obvious; and, on the other, the phenomenological facts by means of which
Soteriou motivates the notion are themselves controversial.
The first issue concerns the fact that, according to Soteriou, a processive
ontology  accommodates  the  transparency  and  the  apparent  continuity  of
temporally extended perceptual experiences. A processive view, he thinks, could
incorporate the first phenomenological fact because, on such a view, 'one might
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maintain that each momentary temporal part of an experiential occurrence that
unfolds over some interval of time presents some aspect of the environment as
concurrent  with  it.'  (Soteriou  2011,  492)  According  to  the  processive  view,
perceptual experiences are temporally extended happenings of a processive kind:
more specifically,  such events are  temporally structured insofar as  they have a
beginning, a middle, and an end; and such parts in turn consist in the different
parts of the processes which constitute the relevant events. Soteriou's point seems
to be that, if perceptual experiences are conceived along processive lines, one could
save the idea of transparency by taking each sub-interval of a perceptual process to
be transparent:  in particular,  one could argue that each part  of  such a process
presents  a  subject  with  different  aspects  of  a  temporally  unfolding  world,  and
hence,  make such worldly items accessible to introspection. The thought seems
initially  sound,  but  it  does  not  prove  much:  it  does  not,  for  example,  unveil  a
necessary link between temporal transparency and perceptual processes; or, again,
it fails to clarify how such processes implement that phenomenological feature. As
far as I can see, it only shows that they are mutually compatible. To vindicate the
processive view, Soteriou must assume that a stative account fails to accommodate
the idea of temporal transparency on its own. The next chapter, however, precisely
challenges that assumption: relying on perceptual states does not, I think, interfere
with the relevant phenomenological trait (cf. chapter 2.3). 
But Soteriou also resorts  to another phenomenological  fact,  namely,  the
apparent continuity of perceptual experiences. Thus, he writes as follows:
This view accommodates the idea that when one undergoes a conscious experience that
fills  an  interval  of  time,  each  sub-interval  of  that  interval  of  time  is  filled  by  some
successive phase of that experience, and each successive phase of the experience shares a
temporal part with some prior phase of experience–e.g., it can accommodate the idea that
experience one undergoes from  t1 to  t10 can share a temporal part with experience one
undergoes from t5 to t15, and it can do so without needing to commit to the idea that there
is some one perceptual state of the subject that continues to obtain from t1 to t15. (Soteriou
2011, 491)
 
The background thought is that ascribing different temporal structures to
processes and states partly amounts to conceiving of the internal relationship of
their sub-parts in different ways. Process-parts are intimately connected insofar as
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they jointly constitute a whole – that is,  a determinate process or event – and
necessitate  each  other:  Soteriou  and O'Shaughnessy  think  that  each successive
phase of a process shares a temporal part with a prior phase of the same process.
Meanwhile, states exist wholly at each moment of time they obtain: hence, there is
a sense in which their parts are not internally related to each other; each state-part
is complete on its own. In the quote at hand, Soteriou simply applies the previous
distinction to a processive view of perceptual experiences: conceived as processes,
these  psychological  items  would  be  such  that  their  temporal  sub-parts  are
intimately intertwined; sucessive experience-parts are mutually connected – that
is, each successive phase of an experience shares a temporal part with some prior
phase of the same experience – so as to constitute an organic whole. 
Having said that,  it  is  unclear  to me how the previous remarks help  to
motivate a processive view. As far as I can see, Soteriou has only established that,
conceived as processes, the constituting temporal parts of perceptual experiences
are  intimately  related  to  each  other.  But  this  ontological  point  has  no
phenomenological implications: in particular, it does not automatically show that
perceptual  experiences  seem  to  be  temporally  continuous  to  their  respective
subjects.  For example, one could imagine a world where temporally continuous
perceptual experiences are presented to their owners as successive snapshots, that
is, as temporally discrete items. To rule out this possibility, it is necessary to invoke
a controversial principle along the lines of Hume's 'all the actions and sensations of
the mind […] must in every detail appear to be what they are, and be what they
appear.' (Hume 1739-40/2000, 1.4.2.7, SBN 190) However, Soteriou has not secured
a principle along those lines: and, as long as this issue remains pending, he cannot
assume  that  the  previous  ontological  remark  accommodates  part  of  his
phenomenological picture. 
Let's  take  stock.  Soteriou's  reliance  on  perceptual  processes  is  to  an
important extent fuelled by a phenomenological motivation: unlike a stative view,
a processive ontology manages to accommodate the temporal transparency and
apparent continuity of perceptual experiences. This section, however, aimed to put
some pressure on that claim. In relation to the first aspect, Soteriou outlines how a
story combining a processive view and temporal transparency could run, but does
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not  show  how  or  why  perceptual  processes  exactly  implement  such  a
phenomenological feature. More importantly, the negative thought that a stative
ontology fails to capture the same aspect relies on an understanding of perceptual
states which I challenge in the next chapter: if my line of attack turns out to be
persuasive,  the idea of temporal transparency should not force us to endorse a
processive stance. In relation to the apparent continuity of perceptual experiences,
Soteriou only secures the ontological point that the successive parts of perceptual
processes are intimately related to each other: unless he prove that such processes
have to appear to their owners the way they are – something which is by no means
obvious – it is unclear how his ontological considerations show that a processive
view accommodates the relevant feature. In short, I do not think that Soteriou's
phenomenological case for perceptual processes has enough traction. 
In addition to the previous issue, one could also put some pressure on the
very  phenomenological  picture  which Soteriou  uses  to  motivate  the  processive
stance:  in  particular,  there  might  well  be  a  tension  between  the  temporal
transparency and the apparent continuity of perceptual experiences.  Since such
experiential items are transparent, reflection or introspection on them primarily
latches onto the worldly items a subject is aware of rather than the experiences
themselves. In an intuitive sense, perceptual experiences are not manifest to our
introspective capacities. But Soteriou then goes on stressing an important feature
about the nature of perceptual awareness, namely, that the successive sub-parts or
sub-intervals  within  a  temporally  extended  experience  seem  to  be  intimately
intertwined. And, at this point, I suspect one may envisage the relevant tension:
while  the  idea  of  transparency  suggests  that  perceptual  experiences  are  not
introspectively  manifest  to  their  subjects,  the  fact  concerning  the  apparent
continuity  of  perceptual  awareness  presupposes  that  an  experiential  feature
becomes manifest to us whenever we attend to our own experiences. This contrast
naturally raises the question whether both phenomenological facts are mutually
compatible. I suspect that Soteriou implicitly acknowledges a problem here, for he
endorses only a weaker version of the transparency claim: instead of saying that
experiences or their properties are inaccessible via introspection, he only holds that
such an introspective access is dependent on our awareness of worldly items. On
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the basis of considerations along the lines of Dennett's remarks on transparency
(cf. section 2 of this chapter and chapter 3.1), I think that a stronger version of the
thought that the temporal properties of perceptual experiences are transparent is
intuitively  appealing.  For  the  time  being,  my  main  point  is  just  that  the
phenomenological  picture  from  which  Soteriou  takes  off  is  far  from
uncontroversial: that is, one could challenge not only his phenomenological case in
favour of perceptual processes, but also the very picture he uses in order to invoke
such items. 
To  sum  up.  Soteriou  presents  us  with  an  account  where  perceptual
experiences  are  conceived  in  terms  of  mental  processes  and  states:  while  he
expands on O'Shaughnessy's processive account, he also makes room for a stative
understanding of perceptual awareness. After introducing this position, I went on
to  discuss  its  underpinning  phenomenological  motivation.  In  this  context,  the
overall aim of this section was to show that Soteriou's view does not force the
relevant  notion  of  perceptual  process  on  us.  Although  my discussion  is  not  a
complete refutation of that position, it hopefully encourages us to take seriously
the stative account I shall defend. Throughout the next chapter, I shall return to
elements and issues unpacked in this section. 
    
IV. CROWTHER ON PERCEPTION AND PERCEPTUAL ACTIVITIES
In a number of recent papers (cf. Crowther 2009a, 2009b, 2010), Thomas Crowther
explores  the  relationship  between  perception  and  closely  related  attentional
activities: in this context, he endorses a processive view of attentional activities
such as listening and watching, on the one hand, and, on the other, an ontology of
perceptual awareness very similar to that developed by Soteriou. This section will
be brief: after all, since he is mainly concerned with the attentional component of
perceptual  phenomena,  Crowther  does  not  really  argue  for  the  underpinning
ontology of experiences. As such, the present survey only aims to complement the
processive picture I have already outlined throughout this chapter.
As previously pointed out, Crowther acknowledges a distinction between
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perception (e.g. hearing, seeing) and perceptual forms of attention (e.g. listening,
watching):  whereas  hearing  and  seeing  are  passive  mental  phenomena,  in  the
sense  that  they  are  things  which  merely  happen  to  their  respective  subjects;
listening and watching, among other attentive activities,  are agential  insofar as
they  are  things  subjects  do.  This  divide  naturally  raises  the  question  how the
passive and agential components involved in perceptual phenomena are related to
each other. In a discussion focused on the auditory modality, it is relatively clear
that Crowther rejects a causal (or, to use his terminology, instrumental) view of
the relevant relationship: for example, cases of hearing should not be conceived as
causally resulting from episodes of listening. If  I understand his positive stance
right, he draws a constitutive link between both components: although a subject
may hear something without listening to it, listening is intimately connected to
hearing because it  precisely  consists  in  maintaining an aural  relation  with the
world in order to acquire knowledge about it. As Crowther puts it, 'listening entails
hearing because to listen to O is to agentially maintain aural perceptual contact
with (i.e. hearing of) O throughout a period of time with the aim of knowing what
it is doing.' (Crowther 2009b, 186) Indeed, listening is something a subject does,
not something which merely happens to her: in particular, it is to preserve auditory
links with the world so as to obtain updated information of one's own audible
surroundings. According to this picture, listening entails hearing not because there
is a causal link or a productive relationship between both, but because listening
constitutively depends on hearing: by hearing her surroundings, a subject manages
to  stay  in  perceptual  contact  with  surrounding  items,  and,  hence,  to  generate
knowledge about them. As far as I can see, a story about the relationship between
seeing and watching may be developed along similar lines. 
Why Crowther takes certain forms of perceptual attention to be processes
and how such a processive view is related to the agential aspect of listening and
watching, are delicate issues I do not tackle here: for present purposes, this section
is  only  concerned  with  the  underpinning  view  of  perceptual  phenomena.  In
relation to hearing, Crowther writes:     
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[...]  hearing  O  is  not  agential.  Here,  we  can  agree  with  both  Vendler  (1957)  and
O'Shaughnessy (2000) as we distinguish between different senses of ‘hearing O’. On the
one hand, we might take ‘hearing O’ to be the name of a state or condition of a subject, a
way that the subject can be. [...] On the other hand, ‘hearing O’ might be understood as a
perceptual occurrence. In this sense, we take hearing to be a processive constituent of the
stream of consciousness. To distinguish it from the stative notion we might refer to such a
process  as  ‘aurally  apprehending  O’  or  the  ‘aural  apprehension  of  O’.  Aurally
apprehending the  fireworks  exploding  is  not  a  state  but  a  processive  occurrence  that
unfolds over time. (Crowther 2009b, 185)
Building on the conceptual framework provided by Vendler, Crowther thus
suggests that perceptual experiences – that is, phenomena of perceptual awareness
over  time  –  may  be  understood  in  terms  of  mental  states  as  well  as  mental
processes.   Although he does not elaborate  on this  view any further,  a  related
footnote (cf. Crowther 2009b, 186n.28) makes at least two things relatively clear.
First, that this stative-cum-processive view of perceptual experience relies on the
notion of process-dependent state. In this respect, Crowther's stance is practically
identical  to  Soteriou's.  And,  secondly,  that  the  relevant  notions  of  perceptual
process,  event,  or  occurrence,  are  motivated  by  O'Shaughnessy's  case  of  total
mental freeze. Since I have addressed this thought experiment in section 2, I shall
not pause to consider it again. 
Crowther thus combines a processive view of perceptual activities with an
experiential ontology structurally similar to that developed by Soteriou. To defend
the previous account of perceptual awareness, he does not advance any additional
considerations vis-à-vis those I have already examined throughout the preceding
sections. In the present context, Crowther is of course not hard pressed to provide
such credentials, for, unlike O'Shaughnessy and Soteriou, he is mainly interested in
vindicating a theory of perceptual attention. But, as far as I can see, there is no
necessary  connection  between this  theory  and the  aforementioned  ontology of
perceptual  experiences:  accordingly,  this  dissertation  will  remain  silent  on  the
question how forms of perceptual attention should be ontologically categorized. In
principle,  attention could be processive even if  perceiving  is  not.  For  the time
being,  what  I  particularly  want  to  stress  is  how  much  Crowther's  working-
hypothesis  about  perceptual  experiences  owes  to  the  views  defended  by
O'Shaughnessy and Soteriou. It should be clear by now why this position belongs
to the family of views I aim to take distance from: it relies on a category of items I
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ultimately deem unnecessary and problematic,  namely,  phenomenally conscious
processes.  Whereas  the  previous  sections  aimed  to  challenge  the  motivations
behind the belief  in such perceptual processes,  the next chapter will  show how
perceptual experiences may be accommodated within a stative framework.  
   
V. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND THE WAY AHEAD
To conclude,  I  shall  sum up what  came before  and  what  will  come after  this
section. 
This chapter aimed to introduce the question what kind of items perceptual
experiences  are,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  to  survey  a  number  of
prominent  answers  I  shall  resist.  In  section  1,  I  examined  Zeno  Vendler's
influential work on the analysis of seeing, so as to illustrate the main views I shall
be concerned with. Faced with the question what we talk about when we talk about
perceptual experiences, at least two ontological alternatives emerge: according to a
processive  view,  those  psychological  items  should  be  conceived  as  mental
processes; according to a stative view, perceptual awareness ultimately consists in
mental states. Of course, this picture is far from exhaustive: although Vendler is
keen to endorse a stative view of seeing, I only take his discussion to provide a
general framework I intend to flesh as we go along. Section 2 begins descending
into the  finer  details  by  presenting one of  three  contemporary versions  of  the
processive stance: according to O'Shaughnessy, perceptual experiences should be
conceived as occurrent to the core.  In section 3,  I  explain that Soteriou's work
draws almost in equal measures from Vendler and O'Shaughnessy: the resulting
view  is  a  stative-cum-processive  stance  of  experience  according  to  which
perceptual awareness consists in mental states obtaining in subjects, states which
nevertheless depend on the occurrence of  phenomenally conscious,  experiential
processes.  As briefly  explained in  section  4,  Crowther's  position  is  structurally
similar  to  that  endorsed  by Soteriou.  The line of  thought  this  survey has  thus
intended to illustrate is that perceptual experiences have to be understood in terms
of irreducible mental processes. Throughout this chapter, I have been keen to stress
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that  these perceptual processes constitute a substantive addition to our general
ontology: conceived along such lines, perceptual experiences are not subsumed by
an  ontological  framework  which  embraces  objects,  properties,  relations,  states,
dispositions, capacities, or physical processes analysable into state-parts; according
to the processive theorist,  perceptual experiences are happenings of a particular
processive kind – namely, a phenomenally conscious kind – and, as such, cannot
be explained away in terms of the preceding categories. This view may not be
mutually  exclusive  with  a  stative  stance,  but  its  ontological  weight  raises  the
question  whether  it  is  necessary  to  invoke  mental  processes  in  order  to  save
perceptual  experiences.  My  critical  assessment  of  the  motivations  behind
O'Shaughnessy's and Soteriou's positions partially suggests a negative answer: that
is, I think that conceptual analysis, the thought experiment of total mental freeze,
and a number of facts about temporal phenomenology do not force a processive
view on us. If,  in addition to that, a stative account turns out to be capable of
accommodating  the  notion  of  perceptual  experiences,  the  aforementioned
processes would be somewhat pointless.
Having said that, let me sketch the itinerary I shall follow throughout this
dissertation.  Chapters  1  and  2  aim  to  show  that  an  ontology  of  perceptual
processes is unnecessary:  while this chapter has done so by fixing on different
versions of the processive view and targeting their motivations; the next one turns
to a more detailed formulation and defence of the stative view. Chapters 3 and 4,
meanwhile, pursue a stronger claim, namely, that perceptual processes are not only
unnecessary, but problematic. I proceed in a piecemeal way: on the one hand, I
seek to show that the individuation of temporally extended perceptual experiences
is best accommodated by a stative conception rather than a processive one; on the
other, I argue that perceptual states are better suited than perceptual processes to
deal with an essential  feature of perceptual experiences,  namely,  their assertive
character. This piecemeal defence may be partial, but it is by no means arbitrary.
Conceived  as  mental  states,  perceptual  experiences  would  share  an  important
ontological commonality with the paradigmatically stative category of belief: the
next chapter highlights this similarity by using a belief-theory of perception as a
template against which I specify a stative view. Within this context, chapters 3 and
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4 are natural  steps in a comparison of perceptual experiences and beliefs.  I  do
believe  that  discussions  about  the  individuation  of  temporally  extended
experiences have much to learn from the general way in which doxastic states are
individuated. Again, the feature of assertive character is a commonality between
the  relevant  psychological  categories:  just  as  beliefs  present  a  subject  with
propositional  contents which seem to be true,  perceptual  experiences present a
subject  with  things  which  seem  to  be  the  case  –  in  short,  both  beliefs  and
perceptual experiences have assertive force. The same psychological comparison
underpins the final  chapter of this  dissertation: in chapter 5,  I discuss different
takes on the distinction between perceptual experiences and beliefs; then, I explain
how a stative view may accommodate a criterion of experience-belief distinction
based on a nonconceptualist view of perceptual states. If successful, this line of
reasoning shows that a stative view of perceptual experience may still honour the
intuitive  divide  between  perceiving  and  believing.  As  such,  it  also  makes  a
significant  contribution  to  the  general  claim chapters  1  and 2  aim to  support,
namely,  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  invoke  perceptual  processes  in  order  to
understand perceptual awareness.      
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CHAPTER 2
A STATIVE VIEW OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
This dissertation is concerned with the question what we talk about when we talk
about  perceptual  experiences.  In  the  last  chapter,  I  introduced  two ontological
options, namely, a stative and a processive view of perceptual experience. On the
assumption that  there is  a  significant  distinction between states  and processes,
both positions may be briefly expressed as follows:
  (S) Perceptual experiences are mental states.
  (P) Perceptual experiences are mental processes.
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A key motivation behind chapters  1  and 2  is  that,  relative  to  a  stative
ontology of perceptual experiences, perceptual processes involve a substantive and
unnecessary  ontological  commitment.  While  the  previous  chapter  sought  to
support that claim by unpacking and critically assessing (P), I shall now strive to
show  that  perceptual  states  are  more  ontologically  austere  than  perceptual
processes. To pursue this task, Vendler's work might seem a natural starting-point:
after all, a stative ontology lies at its core. That discussion is, however, of limited
use here at least for two reasons. First, it builds on a conflation between processes
simpliciter  and  agential  processes:  although  Vendler  shows  that  perceptual
experiences are not actions of a processive kind, he has not yet undermined the
thought that they could be passive, that is, processes which merely happen to a
subject (cf. chapter 1.1). Secondly, the ontological framework on which it rests is
too  schematic  to  illuminate  (S).  Vendler's  account  should  thus  be  seen  as  a
blueprint in need of further clarification. Among the different sources from which I
shall draw, a prominent one is the work of David Armstrong and George Pitcher:
traditionally known for defending a belief-theory of perception, they argue that
perceptual phenomena should be analysed in terms of belief-states. Although this
dissertation goes  nowhere close to suggest  that  perceiving is  believing,  or  that
perceptual experiences are simply a special kind of beliefs, a stative view does set
both psychological categories on the same side of the state-process fence. Since a
belief-theory is indeed stative, its general structure may be used in order to model
perceptual experiences as non-doxastic states.   
The present task is divided into five parts. Section 1 turns to Armstrong's
and Pitcher's work, from which I extract the template for a stative account. In this
context,  I  highlight  two  facts:  first,  that  the  constitutive  characterization  of
perceptual experiences crucially relies on a functionalist analysis – a point I make
much  of  in  chapters  4  and  5  (cf.  chapters  4.2-3  &  5.4);  and,  secondly,  that
perceptual  experiences  may  still  be  conceived  as  events  when  construed  as
process-dependent states. Section 2 shows how perceptual states involve a more
austere  ontological  commitment  than  perceptual  processes:  for  this  purpose,  I
invoke Michael Thau's distinction between internal and instantial states, and then
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claim that perceptual states should be conceived as instantial. In section 3, I tackle
the apparent similarity between my stative position and Soteriou's: after all, he also
vindicates a stative analysis of perceptual experience, and, more importantly, uses
a notion of occurrent state structurally similar to the notion of process-dependent
state I have put to work in chapter 1. To address this point, I highlight the fact that
my process-depending states dispense with processes of a phenomenally conscious
kind. Then, I show that my stative position could accommodate a great deal of the
phenomenological picture which Soteriou seeks to vindicate. Section 4 addresses
an  objection  traditionally  associated  to  belief-theories  of  perception:  on  the
assumption that perceptual states can only be doxastic propositional attitudes, one
could argue that a stative view over-intellectualizes perceptual experiences. The
general thought is that my stative position ultimately collapses into a traditional
belief-theory of perception. To meet this charge, I show that neither Armstrong
nor Pitcher over-intellectualize  perceptual  phenomena.  As far as  I  can see,  the
main role of the doxastic notions they use is to provide an informational story of
perception. Finally, section 5 examines whether a stative view obscures a venerable
distinction between perceptual experiences as episodes manifest to consciousness,
on the one hand, and, on the other, beliefs as states which may be but need not be
so. I argue that (S) can perfectly accommodate that divide.      
I. ARMSTRONG AND PITCHER ON PERCEPTUAL STATES
Discussing Vendler's work (see chapter 1.1), I outlined the basic import of a stative
view: according to this position, perceptual experiences exist in time, and do so not
by unfolding or going on, but by obtaining. Among other things, this means that
those psychological items lack the sort of temporal parts or temporal structure that
events of a processive kind have: as states, they are wholly present or complete at
each moment throughout which they obtain. When Jim sees a bright star from t 1 to
tx, he is visually aware of that object during t1-tx, where this relation of perceptual
awareness should be understood as the obtaining of a certain kind of state in Jim
during that period of time. In this section, I shall flesh out this basic picture a bit
further, and, to do so, I heavily draw from the work of Armstrong and Pitcher (cf.
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Armstrong 1968 and Pitcher 1971). This choice is by no means arbitrary. Since
beliefs are paradigmatic forms of mental states, (S)'s core claim amounts to arguing
that,  from an ontological  point  of  view,   perceptual  experiences  are  similar  to
beliefs. In this context, Armstrong's and Pitcher's proposals are relevant, for they
are  traditionally  taken  to  assimilate  perceiving  and  perceptual  experiences  to
believing and beliefs, respectively.15 Hence, I think that their positions provide a
good blueprint for developing (S). Among other things, this method of presentation
will help me to highlight,  first,  that perceptual states are functionally specified,
and, secondly, that a stative view does not undermine an intuitive understanding
of perceptual experiences as events.    
 In  broad  lines,  a  belief-theory  of  perception  holds  that  perceptual
experiences  are states  acquired by means of  certain informational  channels  (in
particular, certain sensory organs): thanks to these states, subjects are capable of
behaving in different ways vis-à-vis their surroundings. According to Armstrong, 
[…] to say that A perceives that p is to say that A comes to be in a certain state, a state
which can only be described in terms of its possible manifestations. Now if we want to
give an analysis of the concept of perception which is compatible with (without entailing)
a  Materialist  view of  man,  we shall  have  to  say  that  these  manifestations  are simply
certain sorts of purely physical behaviour. (Armstrong 1968, 245-6) 
The ontological significance of this passage may not be fully appreciated:
after all,  as Alex Byrne correctly notes, philosophers of mind often use 'mental
state' as an umbrella term for conditions, events, phenomena, among other items
(cf.  Byrne  2009,  432).  But,  in  the  present  context,  Armstrong does  rely  on  an
ontological framework similar to Vendler's (cf. Armstrong 1968, 130-1, 213-4): as
such,  the  previous  quote  indicates  a  serious  commitment  to  a  stative  position.
Pitcher also seems to acknowledge the ontological significance of a stative view,
for he introduces the notion of perceptual states as belief-states, where 'to have a
belief of this kind is to have a complex disposition to act (or behave) in certain
ways  under  certain  specifiable  conditions.'  (Pitcher  1971,  71)16 To  specify  the
15 It is worth noting that the belief-theory of perception is not as unpopular as one may initially
think. Writers who develop this position include Roxbee Cox 1971, Sibley 1971, Craig 1976, Heil
1984, Glüer 2009, among others.
16 Using the notion of disposition in this context is a rather delicate matter, for it may suggest a
behaviourist account of  perceptual experiences.  To avoid this difficulty,  Armstrong specifies
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notion of perceptual state, Armstrong and Pitcher resort, on the one hand, to the
way in which subjects are perceptually affected, and, on the other, to the way in
which they are responsive to their surroundings. Since these features seem to pick
up on constitutive components of the relevant states, it is necessary to say a bit
more about them.   
To  begin  with,  perceptual  states  cannot  result  from  any  random
informational transaction between a subject and her surroundings: on the contrary,
the specific kind of states they are seems to be determined by the informational
channels they result from. According to Armstrong and Pitcher, a perceiver stands
in  a  certain  visual  state  only  when  her  eyes  are  informationally  affected  (cf.
Armstrong  1968,  211-3;  Pitcher  1971,  65).  The  suggestion  is,  I  think,  that
perceptual states are partly defined by the sensory organs, in particular, or the
sensory systems, more generally, they are causally related to. Admittedly, what
form this organic constraint takes will vary from species to species. Again, I am
even willing to concede that, across different possible worlds, one and the same
species  could  implement  the  same  perceptual  states  through  different  sensory
systems. It would be natural to expect all of this from psychological phenomena
contingently  shaped  by  evolution.  These  possibilities  are,  however,  compatible
with the fact that, in the world we happen to inhabit, our perceptual states are
constitutively dependent on their  corresponding informational channels:  from a
functional point of view, the latter channels define the input side of the relevant
mental states.               
On their  output side,  perceptual states are constitutively related to their
behavioural manifestations. In the present context, the notion of behaviour should
be understood in a very liberal way.17 For Armstrong, discriminatory behaviour – a
form of  covert  behaviour  –  is  a  paradigmatic  way  in  which  perceptual  states
manifest  themselves.  When  a  baby  faces  blocks  of  different  colours,  visual
that, by dispositions, he understands actual states of a subject (cf. Armstrong 1965, 69-75; 1968,
85-8). It is much less clear, however, whether Pitcher seeks to avoid a behaviourist stance. 
17 I suspect that, at least implicitly, this understanding is familiar in the philosophical literature.
B.A. Farrell noted long ago that, discussing the distinctive character of conscious experience,
philosophers and scientists tend to 'stretch the word “behaviour” to cover, at least, the covert
verbal and other responses of the person, his response readinesses, all his relevant bodily states,
and all the possible discriminations he can make to' presented worldly items (cf. Farrell 1950,
177).   
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experiences are often ascribed to it on the basis of its capacity systematically to
discriminate  different  shapes  or  different  colours  with  the  help  of  its  eyes  (cf.
Armstrong 1968, 245ff.).18  From this case, Armstrong generalizes as follows:
If, under certain conditions, a blue block acts on the baby's eyes, and if the baby follows
this with one or many patterns of behaviour, b, which involve certain definite relations, r,
to the blue block: and if, under the same conditions, when a green block acts on the baby's
eyes, it does not follow this with behaviour of the sort,  b, then this is a manifestation of
perception of the difference between the blue and green blocks. That is to say, if the baby
behaves towards the blue and green blocks in a systematically different way, then it has
shown that it can perceive their difference. (Armstrong 1968, 248)
    Since  the  open  variables  may  be  replaced  by  fairly  different  forms  of
behaviour, this passage suggests that behaviour should not be restricted to a few
forms of overt response. 
Pitcher, in turn, takes movement across space as a paradigmatic way of
behaviour  triggered by perceptual  states.  To  illustrate  the  point,  he  asks  us  to
consider  an  example  of  a  normal  perceiver  (say,  an  unimpaired,  adult  human
being) staring at a straight line in more or less optimal conditions: in this case, the
subject sees the line and the latter looks straight to her. For this individual, being
perceptually aware of the line is to an important extent defined by the possibility
of interacting with that object in numerous ways: to reach for it with a hand, to
walk closer to or away from it, etc. According to Pitcher, a subject S manifests the
instantiation of a visual state about an item O when she proves to be capable of
navigating  her  surroundings  and  of  spatially  interacting  with  O in  a  complex
number of ways – that is, when S's movement across space suggests that she is
sensitive to O (cf. Pitcher 1971, 153). Pitcher himself acknowledges that this sort of
description is bound to be schematic, as it 'is not possible to list the indefinitely
many different movements that would be relevant', even in the most simple cases
of  visual  perception  (Pitcher  1971,  153).  But  even  though  it  is  impossible  to
catalogue all the ways in which perceptual states may manifest themselves, I think
that the relevant analysis would partially be vindicated by conceding two things:
first, that there is a constitutive relation between perceptual states and behaviour;
18 For the sake of simplicity, I shall avoid mentioning the organic component from now on: unless
otherwise  stated,  I  shall  assume  that  the  relevant  behaviour  depends  on  informational
transactions occurring via the relevant sense-organs. 
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and, secondly, that, given a certain token of behaviour, it is possible to determine
whether  it  could  be  related  to  perceptual  states  of  a  certain  kind  or  not.
Furthermore,  while  Pitcher  takes  locomotion  to  be  a  paradigmatic  form  of
responsive  behaviour,  he  does  not  assume  that  it  exhausts  such  behavioural
manifestations.  
To generalize from the previous remarks, the behavioural manifestations of
perceptual states could in principle take multiple shapes. That is, there are not only
many ways of discriminating and moving around one's own surroundings: there
are also many forms of behaviour in addition to discrimination and locomotion. As
far as I can see, the effect that perceptual states may have on other psychological
states or events (e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.) counts as a covert form of behaviour.
Again,  when the relevant subject is a language-user, then her perceptual states
could affect her linguistic performances. As previously mentioned, the relationship
between perceptual states and their possible forms of behavioural manifestation is
a constitutive one: that is, such forms of behaviour are constitutive components,
not extrinsic evidence – in Wittgenstein's terminology, symptoms (cf. McDowell
1984)  –,  of  the  relevant  states.  True:  it  would  be  naïve  to  expect  that  a
philosophical  account  of  perception could  do anything more than to  provide  a
general sketch of such constitutive links. But one could extrapolate and apply here
a point made by Davidson in relation to beliefs (cf. Davidson 1982, 322): to identify
or ascribe perceptual experiences, it is not necessary to observe a very complex
pattern of behaviour, but only to observe evidence pointing to the existence of such
a pattern.19       
The idea the foregoing considerations partially intend to support is that the
type-specification and ascription of perceptual states heavily relies on the role that
such  psychological  items  play  within  a  larger  psychological  and  epistemic
economy. The second theme this section is concerned with is the compatibility
between (S) and an episodic view of perceptual experience, that is, one according
to which perceptual experiences  are events.  To address this  point,  recall  that  I
19 By means of the foregoing remarks, I do not mean to suggest that only a stative conception
captures the logical link between perceptual experience and behaviour: I am tempted to think
that any adequate view of perceptual experience should be capable of doing so. In chapter 3,
however,  I  suggest  that  it  is  unclear how a processive conception could  secure that  logical
connection (cf. chapter 3.2).  
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associated  the  notion  of  event  to  those  of  occurrence  and  process.  To  a  first
approximation, events and occurrences refer to happenings or changes. While it is
often clear what the object or the subject of change may be, it need not always be
so: even though an explosion may uncontroversially involve a particular house or
car, it is by no means obvious what the subject/object of the constant expansion of
the  universe  or  WWII  is.  Again,  events  or  occurrences  are  either  temporally
protracted or durationless.  Suitable answers to the question 'What happened to
Jim' include 'He saw a star from t1 to tx' (temporally extended) and 'He spotted a
star' (durationless or instantaneous). Indeed, these replies refer to happenings or
changes which take place in Jim. 
Of  course,  O'Shaughnessy  binds  the  notion of  event  to  that  of  process:
according to him, all temporally extended events are processive, and experiential
events are necessarily or irreducibly so (see chapter 1.2). In that context, however,
I argued that it is not obvious why experiential events are irreducibly processive.
Related to  this  point,  one could also  claim now that  a  broad understanding of
events as happenings or changes does not specify whether temporally extended
events are processive or stative: for all we know, such changes or happenings may
be described in terms of states. Jaegwon Kim espouses an episodic view along such
lines (cf. Kim 1976). According to him, events are primarily changes which obtain
in a subject: as such, it is possible to think of a given event as a function of three
constitutive elements – a subject, an instantiated property, and a time. Since it is
natural to understand states as instantiated properties or relations, Kim's position
seems to be such that it accommodates the categories of event and of state. For
example,  while  being  feverish  or  being  in  pain  are  states  in  which  a  living
organism may be, they are also happenings or changes taking place in a subject. In
principle,  I  think  one  could  use  the  same model  in  order  to  argue  that  being
perceptually  aware  of  one's  own  surroundings  –  that  is,  having  perceptual
experiences – is stative as well as episodic. 
In  fairness  to  O'Shaughnessy,  Kim  is  not  absolutely  clear  on  how  the
notions of property, state, and condition capture the dynamic import of events. But
at this point one may invoke a notion I introduced in the last chapter, namely, that
of process-dependent states. Soteriou exploits it in order to defend a hybrid theory
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of  perceptual  experiences:  according  to  him,  perceptual  awareness  should  be
understood in terms of experiential states constituted by phenomenally conscious
processes. Again, discussing O'Shaughnessy's motivations to defend (P), I argued
that mental states the existence of which depends on the existence of sub-personal
processes could accommodate the case of total mental freeze. Thanks to this notion
– about which I say more in the next section – it should be relatively clear how the
obtaining of states does not cancel the dynamic aspect of events. 
Hence,  even  if  perceptual  experiences  are  not  conceived  as  protracted
happenings of a certain processive kind – more specifically, if they are conceived
as mental states –  there are still two senses in which they entail mental events.
First, events may be understood as durationless happenings or changes (that is, as
Vendler's 'achievements'), as the coming to be or passing away of a state, or as the
initiating or terminating of a process. In this sense, perceptual states do involve
mental events, for they tend to be punctuated by durationless occurrences marking
the coming to be an the passing away of such states: in general, a perceiver will
have moved to a state of perceptual awareness from a state in which she is not so
related to her surroundings, as when Jim spots a bright star. Armstrong highlights
this  point  by  drawing  a  distinction  between  perceptual  experiences  and
perceptions:  resigned  to  accept  that  perceptual  experiences  –  that  is,  the
instantiation of perceptual states over a period of time – are not events, he goes on
to claim that perceptions – that is, the very acquiring of the relevant states – are
episodic (cf. Armstrong 1968, 214). However, pace Armstrong now, I do not think
that (S) has to abandon an episodic stance: if events primarily pick up on changes
or happenings, there is a natural sense in which perceptual experiences, conceived
as  process-dependent  states,  constitute  changes  (i.e.  events)  taking  place  in  a
certain subject. By pursuing this line of thought, one could save the episodic status
of Jim's spotting the star as well as of his temporally protracted seeing. A stative
view  is  thus  capable  of  accommodating  the  thought  that  temporally  extended
perceptual experiences are events.       
To wrap things up, let's revisit the main example I used throughout chapter
1. On a cloudy night, a vigilant sailor, Jim, stares at the dark skies. What does he
see? He answers: 'I don't see a thing'. A bit later, it clears up and we ask the same
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question again: now he claims 'I see a star'. Jim spots the star, and, after that, he
stands in a relation of perceptual awareness with the luminous object from t1 to tx.
According  to  the  stative  conception,  Jim  is  the  subject  of  a  durationless  or
instantaneous event when he spots the star, when he engages in an informational
link with it: before t1, he was not consciously sensitive to the star; from t1 onwards,
he stands in a certain state for as long as he instantiates the relevant informational
relation. According to (S), the experience in perception is an instantiated mental
state.  Jim has  thereby acquired  a  state  in  virtue of  which he can behave in  a
number of different ways in relation to the star: he can discriminate it from other
objects; he can tell us about it; he can stir the ship towards or away from it; and so
on. While seeing the star, in the spotting sense, is an instantaneous event, seeing a
worldly item during a period of time involves a temporally extended experience,
the  latter  being  an  episodic  mental  state  thanks  to  which  Jim  is  or  could  be
responsive to the star. The stative conception by no means assumes that nothing
else occurs while he is in that state. As Vendler notes, 'many things happened in
the world and in the sailor' (Vendler 1957, 160). In the world, clouds moved across
the sky, star-light travelled through space and time, and so on. In the sailor, his
eyes engaged in numerous saccadic movements, complex physiological processes
downstream  of  his  visual  system  took  place,  sub-personal  and  personal
mechanisms came into operation, and so on. A stative conception of perceptual
experiences only holds that Jim's visual experience is not itself fundamentally a
process. Neither spotting nor temporally extended seeing are mental processes: the
former refers to an achievement;  the latter,  to a mental  state  obtaining over a
period of time. 
Summing up,  this  section  introduced a  general  framework  for  a  stative
conception of perceptual experiences. To do so, I borrowed several elements from
Armstrong's  and  Pitcher's  belief-theories  of  perception:  without  endorsing  that
position,  I  extracted  a  general  template  from it,  so  as  to  articulate  the  stative
framework  I  defend  throughout  this  dissertation.  Within  this  context,  I  have
stressed two specific points: first, that a functional analysis is crucial for the type-
specification and ascription of perceptual states; and, secondly, that a stative view
may accommodate the episodic character of temporally extended experiences. Of
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course,  this discussion is by no means exhaustive.  In the next section, I  throw
further light on the ontological significance of (S) by saying more about the notion
of perceptual state just outlined.   
II. THAU ON INSTANTIAL AND INTERNAL STATES
A  guiding  claim  of  this  dissertation  is  that,  although  (S)  and  (P)  are  not
incompatible positions, (P) posits a category of experiential items we need not and
should not commit to. Ultimately, I wish to hold that a stative view of perceptual
experiences is more ontologically austere and less problematic than the processive
stance. In pursuit of this general goal, chapter 1 argued that the relevant perceptual
processes do constitute a domain of entities irreducible into mental states. That
said, it is yet unclear how perceptual states are less ontologically demanding than
perceptual processes. I address this issue next: to throw light on the ontological
status  of  the relevant  states,  I  shall  specifically  invoke  the  notion of  instantial
states. 
In an attempt to move away from neo-Fregean accounts of perception and
belief, Michael Thau draws a line between instantial and internal states. From an
ontological point of view, the distinction presupposes that there are properties and
relations,  both  being  understood  as  abstract  entities  instantiated  by  groups  of
particular items. For my present purposes, I shall assume that we live in a world of
substances, properties, and relations; but remain neutral on what metaphysics of
properties and relations we should endorse. That said, Thau describes instantial
states as follows:
[…] there is trivially a state whenever something has a property or whenever two (or
more) things bear a relation to one another because there being a state, in one sense of the
term, just amounts to the thing's or things' instantiating the property or relation. The state
of the tomato's being red is not some second thing distinct from the tomato in virtue of
which it is red; rather, it's nothing more than the tomato's being red. The state of Ben and
Marie being married is not some third thing distinct from Ben and Marie in virtue of
which they are married; rather, it's nothing more than their being married. And the state
of Joe and Mike's being the same height isn't some third thing distinct from Joe and Mike
in virtue of which they are the same height; rather, it's nothing more than their being the
same height. [...] Let's call those states that are nothing over and above some thing's or
things' instantiating a property or relation instantial states. (Thau 2002, 60-1)
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The main thought seems to be that there is a sense in which states are
ontologically austere items: once substances, properties, and relations are taken for
granted, states should not be conceived as items over and above the combination of
substances, properties, and relations. For example, being red is a state in which a
tomato stands when it instantiates the property of redness: it is not a third item
which somehow glues the property of redness to a particular tomato.  Likewise,
Ben's being married to Marie is a state which obtains in virtue of an instantiated
relation, with Ben and Marie as the relevant relata: it  is not a further element
alongside the relation of marriage, Ben, and Marie. Instantial states are thereby
defined as the instantiation of properties or relations by a single individual or by a
number of them. If we live in a world of substances, properties, and relations, the
existence of instantial states does not involve a robust ontological commitment: as
Thau dramatically puts it, such states 'are nothing over and above some thing's or
things' instantiating a property or relation'. Thus phrased, the notion of instantial
states might seem to give way to a reductive or eliminativist analysis of states in
terms of substances, properties, and relations. This need not be the case, though:
the  thought  may  just  be  that  states  are  ordered  sets  of  objects,  properties  or
relations, and times.20 Instantial states may not stand at the same ontological level
as objects, properties, relations, and times: this does not, however, mean that they
are unreal. By contrast, internal states are ontologically robust, for they pick up on
'a proper part, or the condition of some proper part, of an individual.' (Thau 2002,
61) Thus understood, states do not obtain merely when a thing or a group of things
instantiates a property or a relation: they are either sub-parts of a given object or
properties/relations instantiated by objects or their sub-parts.   
According to Thau, a notable fallacy in the philosophy of mind concerns
the above distinction: for, while philosophers tend to model beliefs and perceptual
experiences as mental states, it is often unclear whether such states are instantial
or internal ones. There is a harmless sense in which those psychological items are
indeed  states:  beliefs  and  perceptual  experiences  do  involve  relations  between
subjects and propositional or experiential contents; as such, the relevant subjects
20 I thank Henry Clarke for stressing this point.
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instantiate relations in virtue of which they come to be in certain states. Beliefs
and perceptual experiences may simply pick up on such instantial states. However,
Thau  goes  on  to  stress  that,  since  the  instantial-internal  distinction  is  often
overlooked,  the  previous  commitment  is  easily  confused  for  a  commitment  to
internal states. Thus, the fallacy he purports to identify is the mistake of taking
evidence in favour of instantial states for evidence in favour of internal states. This
mistake,  termed by Thau the  particularizing fallacy,  springs from a generalized
failure to appreciate  the different  ontological  imports  of  instantial  and internal
states. 
Whereas  I  do  not  intend  to  pursue  Thau's  non-Fregean  philosophical
project or, more specifically, his diagnosis of the particularizing fallacy, I shall use
the notion of instantial states to throw light on the ontological difference between
perceptual  processes  and  perceptual  states.  According  to  O'Shaughnessy  and
Soteriou, perceptual processes could not be captured by an ontology of substances,
properties/relations,  and  states:  according  to  them,  phenomenally  conscious
perceptual  processes  constitute  a  substantive  and  irreducible  addition  to  our
ontological framework. With Thau's distinction at hand, it is now possible to spell
out  the sense in  which perceptual  states  are  ontologically  austere vis-à-vis  the
previous  category  of  processes:  perceptual  experiences  may  be  understood  as
mental states, the latter being in turn understood as instantiations of properties or
relations by certain subjects at times. Thus understood, perceptual experiences are
functions or ordered sets of subjects, relations, and times. Experiential items would
not thereby be reduced or eliminated in favour of its constitutive components: an
ordered set  of  constituents  is  not  the same as  their  disconnected sum. But the
notion of instantial  states does constrain the ontological  impact that perceptual
experiences would otherwise have on our ontology if conceived as phenomenally
conscious processes: such psychological items constitute only a small addition to
an ontology already containing  perceivers  and informational  relations  between
these subjects and their surroundings. 
If perceptual experiences are modelled as instantial states, which specific
relations do they depend on? It  is  natural  to think that  perceptual  experiences
depend on the instantiation of relations by perceivers at times: more specifically, of
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informational  relations  between  perceivers  and  their  surroundings.  Recall  that
chapter 1 took off from a distinction between perceiving and experiencing. In a
nutshell, the thought was that perceptual experiences should be understood as a
component – a crucial one, but a component nevertheless – by means of which
philosophers  and  psychologists  describe  the  conscious  dimension  of  perceptual
phenomena like seeing, hearing, smelling, and so on. At this point, it should be
clear  that  the  instantiated  relation  I  am  looking  for  is  just  the  informational
relation established between a perceiver and her surroundings when she perceives
(i.e. sees, hears, smells) her surroundings. Indeed, Armstrong is not alone when
stressing that '[p]erception is a flow of information, a flow that goes on the whole
time that we are not completely unconscious.' (Armstrong 1968, 226) As far as I
can see, this is one of the few fundamental points about perceptual phenomena on
which the philosopher and the psychologist alike agree. One could thereby specify
the relationship between perceiving and experiencing as follows: perception may
be  understood  as  the  informational  interaction  between  a  subject  and  her
surroundings, an interaction in virtue of which the relevant subject comes to be in
a  particular  state  vis-à-vis  her  environs;  perceptual  experiences,  meanwhile,
correspond to such states, the latter being understood as the instantiation of the
aforementioned informational relation.21
Summing up, this section focused on specifying the ontological import of
perceptual states. To do so, I invoked Thau's notion of instantial state. With this
resource at hand, I went to argue that the mental states at the core of the position I
defend  here  should  be  conceived  as  instantial  ones.  It  seems  to  me  that  this
qualification throws light on the way in which the relevant notion of state relates
to the more familiar categories of properties and relations: but, more importantly,
it clarifies the sense in which (S) commits us to an ontology of perception far more
21 Granted: the model just outlined in this paragraph cannot be extrapolated to the now classical
cases of hallucinatory experiences: when Macbeth sees a bloody dagger, there is an obvious
sense in which he fails to stand in the relevant sort of informational relation with a worldly item
– there is nothing but thin air where he seems to see the dagger! Although this dissertation does
not  tackle  the  delicate  relationship  between  veridical  and  hallucinatory  experiences,  the
previous difficulty does not seem damning.  As far as I can see,  one could explore different
suggestions: for example, denying that there are perceptual experiences such as those envisaged
by philosophers in cases of perfect hallucination (cf. Fish 2009); or, less radically, conceding that
there  are  hallucinatory  experiences,  but  then  highlighting  their  'parasitic'  nature  vis-à-vis
veridical experieces (cf. Hinton 1967, 1973; Snowdon 1980-1).   
62
austere  than  the  one  underpinning  (P).  In  a  world  where  there  are  already
substances – among them, subjects of thoughts and experiences – and instantiated
properties and relations, there is much less at risk when one postulates instantial
states than when one postulates phenomenally conscious processes. Of course, this
is not on its own a reason to reject a processive ontology, but it sets the ground for
the line of criticism I pursue throughout this dissertation. 
          
III. PERCEPTUAL STATES AND TEMPORAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Now  I  turn  to  the  relationship  between  perceptual  states  and  the  temporal
phenomenology  of  perceptual  experiences.  To  access  this  theme,  recall  that  a
crucial motivation behind Soteriou's ontology of perception is phenomenological
(cf.  chapter  1.3).  In  a  nutshell,  the  thought  is  that  the  notion  of  occurrent
perceptual states – that is, the notion of perceptual states constitutively dependent
on processes of a phenomenally conscious kind – accommodates three claims: first,
that  the  temporal  features  of  perceptual  experiences  are  transparent  to
introspection; secondly, that certain objects of perception seem to be temporally
extended; and thirdly, that temporally extended perceptual experiences seem to be
continuous. To capture the phenomenological picture resulting from these claims,
Soteriou builds his own account of perceptual experiences around the notion of
occurrent  (or  process-dependent)  perceptual  state.  But  what  happens  if  one
dispenses with phenomenally conscious processes? This is the question I address
here.  The  section  will  move  in  two  stages:  to  begin  with,  I  stress  the  main
difference between my and Soteriou's version of the stative view; then, I show how
this  difference  affects  our  allegiances  towards  the  aforementioned  claims.  My
overall  position  is  that  the  most  important  elements  of  Soteriou's
phenomenological picture are accommodated within my framework.
Chapter 1 distinguished two antagonist  ontologies of  perception:  on the
one  hand,  Vendler's  work  suggests  a  view  according  to  which  perceptual
experiences should not be conceived as happenings of a processive kind, but as
mental states; on the other, O'Shaughnessy formulates and defends precisely the
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sort of processive stance that Vendler would have rejected. By integrating a stative
as well  as  a processive component into one ontological  view, Soteriou opens a
middle course: according to him, perceptual experiences are mental states, where
such states constitutively depend on processes of a phenomenally conscious kind.
As  I  previously  explained,  a  key motivation  behind  this  position  concerns  the
phenomenological  limitations  of  the  more  radical  approaches:  while  Vendler's
perceptual  states  do  not  seem to  accommodate  the  temporal  transparency and
apparent  continuity  of  perceptual  experiences;  O'Shaughnessy's  perceptual
processes could not capture the fact that certain objects of perception seem to be
temporally extended. Against this problematic background, the notion of occurrent
(i.e.  process-dependent)  perceptual  state  is  intended  to  save  the  best  parts  of
Vendler's and O'Shaughnessy's views without their corresponding limitations. 
Although  both  Soteriou  and  I  rely  on  the  notion  of  process-dependent
states, our views and motivations also differ in important respects. To begin with, I
think that the processes on which perceptual states rest do not have to be of a
phenomenally  conscious  kind.  Pace  O'Shaughnessy,  I  argued  that  perceptual
experiences  need  not  be  processes:  they may simply  be  related  to  them via  a
relation of constitutive dependence. But, pace Soteriou, the processes perceptual
experiences thus depend on need not be phenomenally conscious: they could just
be the neuro-biological occurrences in virtue of which perceivers stand in certain
informational relations to their surroundings. As Vendler nicely puts it: when Jim
sees a bright star during a period of time, many things go on in the world and in
his head; a perceptual experience is not one of them. Of course, the point is not to
deny  the  existence  of  perceptual  experiences,  but  to  suggest  that  such
psychological  items may fall  into the non-processive category of  mental  states.
And Vendler is not alone on this position. Daniel Dennett, for example, hints at a
similar  view  when  he  writes  that  '[c]onscious  experience,  in  our  view,  is  a
succession of states constituted by various processes occurring in the brain, and
not something over and above that is caused by them.' (Dennett 1998, 136)22
22 According  to  Soteriou,  Dennett's  rejection  of  phenomenally  conscious  events/processes  is
fuelled by an attempt to specify perceptual contents relative to temporally extended experiences,
not relative to experiences at a given time: 'Dennett's objections to the notion of a stream of
phenomenally conscious experience appear to be premised on the idea that the relevant notion
of a stream of conscious experience should be understood on the model of a successive series of
events with determinate personal-level contents, according to which it is possible to identify, at
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In  short,  a  key difference  between my position and Soteriou's  is  that  I
dispense with processes of  a phenomenally conscious kind in order to describe
perceptual experiences. But how does a stative view along these lines deal with the
phenomenological  picture  which  Soteriou  aims  to  accommodate?  The  relevant
facts were three: the temporal transparency of perceptual experience, the apparent
temporal  extension  of  certain  objects  of  perception,  and  the  continuity  of
temporally extended experiences. Since Soteriou concedes that the second fact is
compatible with non-occurrent perceptual states, I shall assume here that it poses
no  difficulties.  The  temporal  transparency  and  the  temporal  continuity  of
perceptual  experiences  are,  however,  a  different  matter,  for  they  seem  to  fall
beyond  the  ken  of  (non-occurrent)  perceptual  states:  this  is  the  reason  why
Soteriou conceives  perceptual  experiences  as  states  constitutively dependent  on
phenomenally  conscious  processes:  the  latter  processes  would  accommodate
temporal  transparency  and  temporal  continuity.  While  I  also  invoke  process-
dependent states, I do so for a different reason, namely, to express the dynamic
character of perceptual experiences (cf. chapter 1.2 and section 1 of this chapter).
As previously mentioned, the notion I thus use does not rely on phenomenally
conscious  processes.  Furthermore,  I  have  also  put  some pressure  on  Soteriou's
attempt to ground perceptual processes on a phenomenological basis (cf. chapter
1.3). To complete this line of reasoning, it is time to address how my stative view
fares with the problematic elements of Soteriou's phenomenological picture.  
Let's first consider why Soteriou thinks that perceptual states cannot on
their  own deal  with  the  temporal  transparency and the apparent  continuity of
perceptual  experiences.  Assuming that  both  perceptual  experiences  and certain
objects of experience are temporally extended, he poses the following problem:
If we appeal to the obtaining of some perceptual state of the subject in order to account for
the fact that it seems to him as though he is perceptually aware of an occurrence O with
temporal extension, rather than an instantaneous temporal part of O, then this might be
thought to be in tension with the phenomenological claim that each temporal part of O
a time, the content of a particular mental occurrence in the stream of conscious experience that
occurs at that time.'  (Soteriou 2013, 146) Although Soteriou is right on this local point, it is
important  to  stress  another  theme  at  work  here:  one  of  Dennett's  overarching  goals  is  to
account for conscious experience without the need of invoking suspicious items such as sense-
data  or  qualia  (cf.  Dennett  1991).  I  suspect  that,  for  Dennett,  phenomenally  conscious
events/processes fall within the category of such entia non grata.   
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seems to be concurrent with his awareness of it. Since a perceptual state of the subject–its
seeming to him as though he is aware of an occurrence O with temporal extension–is not
something that unfolds over an interval of time, t1 to tn, one might think that it continues
to obtain throughout the interval of time t1 to tn. In which case, it looks as though we do
not  then capture the idea that what  seemed to the subject to  be the case during sub-
intervals of that interval of time was different. It looks as though he was merely aware of
a temporal part of O, during the sub-interval t2-t3 it seemed to S as though he was aware of
a different temporal part of O, and so on. In which case it looks as though we do not
capture the temporal transparency of experience. (Soteriou 2011, 494; also cf. 495) 
Although  Soteriou's  objection  is  rather  delicate,  it  apparently  concerns
perceptual states' inability to reflect our awareness of a changing world. Let me
expand on this issue.
As  the  previous  quote  makes  it  clear,  Soteriou  assumes  that  perceptual
experiences as well as some of the things we experience are temporally extended.
In addition, I suspect there is another crucial premise at work here, namely, the
fact that, whether we perceive temporally extended items or not, our perceptual
experiences tend to be about many different things. From the moment we wake up
in the morning to the moment we fall  asleep at  night,  our conscious lives are
usually stormed by a succession of worldly items. In other words, change pervades
the content of temporally extended experiences. This point is crucial, for Soteriou's
intention is, very crudely put, to drive a wedge between the changing character of
the  things  we  perceive  over  time  and  the  unchanging  character  of  perceptual
states. As stressed in the above quote, states obtain at a time or continue to obtain
over a period of time: unlike processes, they do not unfold or progress. After Susan
Rothstein's work (cf. Rothstein 2004), Soteriou takes this to mean that there is a
natural  sense  in  which  non-occurrent  perceptual  states  exclude  change.
Furthermore, he also takes it to mean that the content of perceptual states is fixed
in  a  way  that  excludes  the  sort  of  change  we  are  normally  aware  of  when
perceiving the world: after all,  perceptual states result from the instantiation of
informational relations between a subject and certain worldly items, and what it
means for them to persist is simply to continue to obtain, that is, to sustain the
same informational  bridge  between that  subject  and  those  worldly  items.  Let's
consider a specific perceptual scenario to illustrate this point. From the moment
you open your eyes in the morning to the moment you close them at night, you see
a great deal of things. For the sake of simplicity, however, imagine that a subject
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opens her eyes in order to encounter a simple drawing of a banana on a white
background from t1 to t5,  the banana being replaced by a simple drawing of an
apple from t6 to t10.  With this case at  hand, Soteriou's objection might read as
follows: if a subject stands in one and the same perceptual state from t1 to t10, this
means that she stands in an informational relation to the same worldly items, that
is, a banana or a more complex set which may be expressed by the conjunction
[banana & apple]; either way, this understanding of perceptual experiences would
not capture the dynamic character of what we are perceptually aware of, that is,
the fact that the relevant subject sees a banana from t1 to t5 and an apple from t6 to
t10. Since this line of reasoning assumes that the relevant subject stands in one and
the same mental state from t1 to t10, one might try to counteract Soteriou's point by
arguing that temporally extended perceptual experiences should not be thought as
one  and  the  same  state  obtaining  over  a  sustained  or  continuous  period  of
consciousness,  but  as  a  succession  of  states  defined  by  their  corresponding
contents. That being the case, the above example would not involve a single token-
state ranging over a banana and an apple from t1 to t10, but two token-states: one
obtaining from t1 to t5 and concerning a banana, and another obtaining from t6 to
t10 and concerning an apple. But Soteriou foresees this potential reply and correctly
recoils by saying that, if temporally extended perceptual experiences are conceived
as a succession of different token-states, a stative view could not accommodate the
fact  that  certain  objects  of  perceptual  experiences  appear  to  be  temporally
extended (cf. Soteriou 2011, 494).  
In a nutshell, the key difficulty may be expressed as follows: what we are
perceptually aware of shows change or variation over time; but, to the extent that
they  obtain  or  continue  obtaining  (as  opposed  to  unfolding),  perceptual  states
could not accommodate the worldly variations thus presented to us. How does this
tension  relate  to  the  question  whether  non-occurrent  perceptual  states  could
accommodate the temporal transparency and the temporal continuity of perceptual
experiences? In relation to temporal transparency, recall its positive component:
introspective reflection of our perceptual experiences makes the worldly items our
perceptual  experiences  are  about  manifest.  Since  perceptual  experiences  and
certain objects of perception are temporally extended, introspective reflection of
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our perceptual experiences should pick up on the worldly items concurrent with
such  experiences.  According  to  Soteriou,  something  like  Vendler's  ontology  of
experiences fails  to capture the latter phenomenological  fact,  for non-occurrent
perceptual states are not suitably related to the worldly items concurrent with our
temporally extended experiences. Again, since non-occurrent perceptual states do
not unfold or progress, but only obtain or continue to obtain, it is unclear how they
could  capture  the  fact  that  temporally  protracted  experiences  seem  to  be
continuous.    
With  Soteriou's  charge  in  place,  I  now  move  on  to  argue  that  it  is
unpersuasive.  As I  have already mentioned,  Soteriou thinks  that  non-occurrent
perceptual states fail to accommodate temporal transparency because they do not
reflect the diversity of those worldly items we are perceptually aware of over time.
But the latter claim could well be rejected: in particular, one could simply build the
aforementioned  variety  within  the  content  of  perceptual  states.  Although
perceptual states do not unfold over time, one could argue that a stative view still
captures the diversity of the things we perceive to the extent that the contents of
perceptual states incorporate that dynamic dimension. In other words, although I
do recognize that perceptual states do not change, in the sense that they do not
unfold or they fail to be processive, Soteriou provides no reason to think that their
'static'  character  determines  or  otherwise  transpires  into  their  corresponding
contents.23 As far as I can see, a subject could stand in one and the same sort of
relation to different items in her environment. 
To throw further light on the present suggestion, let's consider what I take
to be one incorrect way of implementing it. Elaborating on the line of criticism at
stake, Soteriou compares perceptual experiences and beliefs:
In a case in which a subject believes that p from t1 to t10, and then believes that q from t10
to  t20, we do not regard these belief states as temporal parts of some further belief that
obtains from t1 to t20. For example, we do not regard this as a case in which the subject has
23 This line of thought owes to Michael Tye's one-experience view (cf. Tye 2003). After arguing
that  there  is  a  single  temporally  extended  experience  for  every  period  of  uninterrupted
conscious stream, Tye addresses the question why we seem to have many experiences instead of
one  over  time  and  across  different  sensory  modalities:  in  reply,  he  builds  the  apparent
differences  into  the  content  of  experiences.  My  suggestion  is  structurally  similar  to  Tye's
proposal.     
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a belief that  p & q from  t1 to  t20.  Similar considerations may lead us to think that the
distinct, successive perceptual states that obtain during a period of time that a subject is
conscious should not be thought of as different temporal parts of one experience. (Soteriou
2011, 493-4)               
The target of this passage is precisely the idea that a temporally extended
perceptual  experience  could  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  single,  temporally
protracted perceptual  state,  the content  of  which ranges  over  different  worldly
items or states of affairs. For that purpose, Soteriou asks us to imagine its doxastic
counterpart: it is simply implausible to think that a subject's cognitive life, when
she believes p from t1 to t10 and q from t11 to t20, could be analysed in terms of the
possession  of  a  single  belief  ranging  over  p and  q.  Likewise,  it  would  be
implausible  to analyse a temporally extended perceptual  experience concerning
different worldly items in terms of  a single mental  state,  the content of which
ranges  over  a  conjunction  of  worldly  items.  Hence,  this  line  of  reasoning
apparently  undermines  the possibility  of  building the  diversity of  what  we are
perceptually aware of into the content of non-occurrent perceptual states.
Soteriou is right in rejecting the previous way of implementing a stative
analysis of experiences. But his target is a bit crude: one could definitely improve
on  it.  When  a  temporally  extended  perceptual  experience  is  conceived  as  a
temporally extended state ranging over a sucession of worldly items, its content
should not be conceived as a mere conjunction of the relevant worldly items, but as
an ordered set of worldly items or states of affairs indexed to the intervals of time
at which they exist. So, to build on Soteriou's remarks, one should not think of the
subject in my previous example as one who stands in the same type of perceptual
state from t1 to t10, a state with the content [banana & apple]: instead, one should
think of it as one where the relevant subject stands in a state with a more complex
content, a content which might roughly be expressed as [(banana, t1-t5) & (apple,
t6-t10)]. The point of this reformulation is to incorporate temporal features into the
content  of  perceptual  states:  of  course,  not  temporal  properties  of  the  very
perceptual state – they are transparent, after all – but features of the worldly items
that the relevant subject is aware of. Hence, although non-occurrent perceptual
states  do not  unfold or  progress,  a  stative view could  still  accommodate  those
temporal  variations  manifest  to  introspection  as  features  of  the  world  we  are
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perceptually conscious of.     
With the foregoing considerations in place, how would a stative view deal
with  the  temporal  transparency  and  the  apparent  continuity  of  perceptual
experiences?  As  far  as  I  can  see,  a  stative  ontology  accommodates  the
transparency claim. Even if temporally extended perceptual states do not unfold or
progress, the things we are aware of could still do so. That is, we could instantiate
one and the same type of informational relation to an ever-changing reality: the
fact that such a reality changes all the time does not mean that our awareness of it
concurrently changes, but only that the contents of our perceptual experiences are
indexed to times. What a subject is aware of – that is, the content of the relevant
perceptual state – is not only a function of the worldly items she is related to, but a
function of such items and certain times or intervals of time to which such items
are  specifically  related.24 For  example,  when  the  above  subject  stands  in  a
perceptual  state  from  t1 to  t10,  this  does  not  mean  that  he  is  perceptually  or
introspectively aware of a banana and an apple at each moment of this interval of
time: since the content of her temporally extended state is temporally indexed, she
can be aware of a banana's existing during t1-t5, and of an apple's existing from t6-
t10. Thus understood, perceptual states seem to accommodate the idea of temporal
transparency:  introspection of such states could make the diverse succession of
worldly items over time manifest to a subject, and it could do so in such a way that
the temporal properties of these perceptual states are transparent or diaphanous to
a subject's introspective capacities.           
Since non-occurrent perceptual states  obtain or continue to obtain,  they
cannot  accommodate  the  phenomenological  fact  to  the  effect  that  perceptual
experiences seem to be continuous over time. And yet a stative ontology could
capture a similar intuition: perceptual states do not unfold, and hence, apparently
lack the sort of temporal continuity invoked by Soteriou; but temporal features,
such as succession and continuity over time, could still be features of the world
presented to a subject of experiences. When Jim sees a star from t 1 to tn, his visual
experience  of  that  object  seems to  be continuous over  that  period  of  time.  To
accommodate  this  phenomenological  fact,  Soteriou  holds  that  Jim's  visual
24 Also cf. Campbell 2011 for a similar point on perceptual content.
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experience  is  temporally  continuous.  By  contrast,  my  suggestion  is  that  the
temporal structure of this temporally protracted experience may to a good extent
be constituted by the temporal  structure of  the worldly items combined within
Jim's  field  of  sight.  The  foregoing  remarks  on  temporal  transparency  and  the
present proposal thus follow a similar strategy: after setting the temporal structure
of perceptual experiences apart from the temporal structure of the things we are
perceptually aware of, I went on to argue that a stative view could accommodate
the  manifest  temporal  structure  of  perceptual  experiences  as  properties  which
feature in the content of perceptual states.  
Before  moving  on,  two  points  of  clarification  are  in  order.  First,  the
foregoing remarks  may suggest  that  my stative  position  entails  an  implausible
stance  on the question how perceptual  experiences  should  be ascribed to  their
respective  subjects.25 I  previously  stated  that  temporally  extended  experiences
could be understood as perceptual states, the content of which incorporates not
only a wide range of  worldly items, but  also  the temporal intervals  relative to
which such items are indexed. As such, my stative position apparently makes room
for the possibility of  saddling a subject  with experiences,  the content of  which
involve items that the relevant subject has already perceived in the past or, even
worse, items that she has not perceived yet. For example, if a subject perceives a
banana from t1 to t5 and an apple from t6 to t10, my position seems to ascribe to her
an experience concerning a banana and an apple at a time when she has not yet
perceived the apple  – say,  at  t3 or  t4.  Again,  Jim instantiates  an informational
relation vis-à-vis a bright star from t1 to tn in virtue of which, at t3,  one could
ascribe to him a state about how the star looks like at some later time, tx, where 3 <
x  <  n.  Since  the  stative  view  I  previously  sketched  allows  for  such  ascriptive
practices, it might be deemed far too strange or implausible.
In  reply,  it  is  unclear  to  me why a  stative  view would  have  any  such
consequences.  The  proposal  I  have  made  throughout  this  section  concerns  the
nature of perceptual states: after all, (S) answers to the question what perceptual
experiences are. Within this context, I have argued that perceptual states could
range over temporally indexed contents. By contrast, the ascription of perceptual
25 I thank Professor Soteriou for pressing this worry in conversation.  
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experiences relates to specific linguistic and social practices in which we engage:
as  such,  they  are  determined  by  what  we  know  about  subjects  and  their
surroundings  from our  very  particular  and limited  perspectives.  Although such
practices concern perceptual experiences, the ways in which we think and speak
about such psychological items need not mirror an answer to the question what
perceptual experiences are. Since we lack foreknowledge, it is clearly impossible to
ascribe experiences about things yet to be perceived to our fellow human beings.
But  this  is  perfectly  compatible  with  the  thought  that  temporally  extended
experiences themselves (that is, as opposed to the ways in which we think and talk
about them) are mental states, where such states continue obtaining over a period
of time and concern temporally indexed items or states of affairs. As far as I can
see,  the  temporal  structure  and  the  content  of  perceptual  experiences  are
components  of  a  philosophical  story  about  perceptual  awareness,  not  starting-
points from which philosophical reflection takes off: as such, I think they need not
answer to our ordinary understanding of perceptual phenomena. 
Secondly,  it  might  also  be  tempting  to  think  that  my stative  view is  a
version  of  Tye's  one-experience  view,  that  is,  a  position  according to  which a
subject undergoes a single perceptual experience for every uninterrupted interval
of conscious, perceptual awareness. I admit that there is a loose sense in which one
might indeed claim that a single perceptual state obtains for every uninterrupted
period  of  perceptual  awareness.  However,  it  is  crucial  to  note  that,  just  like
properties and dispositions, states are not countable in the same way substances or
temporally extended events of a processive kind are so. Asking whether Jim has
one or more visual states during t1-tn is just as misplaced as, say, asking how many
tokens  of  being-redness  obtain  in  a  ripe  apple  ripe  over  time.  I  return  to  this
conceptual point in chapter 3 (cf. chapter 3.2-3), where I exploit it to motivate a
case for the stative view over a processive one.  
In short, the notion of perceptual state could accommodate what I take to
be the most important elements of Soteriou's phenomenological picture. The latter
picture cannot be a reason to endorse or reject either ontology of perception. 
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IV. OVER-INTELLECTUALIZING EXPERIENCE
To clarify the notion of perceptual state at stake, the remainder of this chapter will
address  two potential  objections  against  the  ontological  stance  here  advocated.
Both difficulties are related insofar as they exploit the fact that (S) comes close to
assimilate perceiving to believing. 
To begin with, let's turn to what may be called an  over-intellectualizing
objection. Belief-theories of perception such as those developed by Armstrong and
Pitcher faced the charge of reducing perceptual experiences into beliefs, and hence,
of over-intellectualizing perceptual phenomena. The unwelcome result is not the
reductionist bit as such – after all, reductionist projects in philosophy have thrived
over the past decades – but the attempt to analyse perceptual experiences in terms
of the far more sophisticated category of belief. This complaint does not directly
affect  my  stative  position:  as  stressed  earlier  on,  I  do  not  seek  to  vindicate
Armstrong's or Pitcher's position; in the present context, a belief.theory is only
intended to constitute a template or general framework I use tor develop a stative
view  further.  Thanks  to  a  natural  assumption,  however,  the  previous  line  of
objection could also target my own stative ontology: one might think that every
version of the stative view is a belief theory; in other words, one might be inclined
to  believe  that  perceptual  states  are  always  doxastic  or  cognitive  states.  If  the
suggestion is  along the right lines,  the position I  defend here would also over-
intellectualize  perceptual  phenomena.  One  way  of  addressing  this  objection
consists in attacking the aforementioned assumption: that is, one could insist that
there are versions of (S) which do not collapse into a belief theory of perception.
Within this context, the present chapter might be seen as an attempt to deliver
such a non-doxastic version of (S). This section, in turn, explores a different line of
response: I shall assume that the position I advocate does indeed collapse into the
sort of position espoused by Armstrong and Pitcher (worst possible scenario!), so
as to argue that not even their views over-intellectualize perceptual experiences.
The  section  will  thus  proceed as  follows:  after  expanding  a  bit  further  on the
relevant  objection,  I  show that  Armstrong's  and Pitcher's  belief-theories  fail  to
over-intellectualize perceptual experiences, insofar as they rely on notions of belief
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and concept way too undemanding to misrepresent perception. 
Armstrong and Pitcher nominally defend belief-theories of perception: that
is,  they do spell  out  perceiving and having perceptual  experiences  in  terms of
belief-acquisition and belief-possession, respectively. Thus, Armstrong holds that
'perception is  nothing but  the acquiring of  true or  false  beliefs  concerning the
current state of the organism's body and environment. […] Veridical perception is
the  acquiring  of  true  beliefs,  sensory  illusion  the  acquiring  of  false  beliefs.'
(Armstrong  1968,  209)  Likewise,  Pitcher  claims  that 'sense  perception  is  the
acquiring of true beliefs concerning particular facts about one's environment, by
means of or by the use of,  one's  sense organs.'  (Pitcher 1971, 65)  Both writers
crucially invoke the term 'belief' in order to illuminate the nature of perception.
Again, I have also exploited this conceptual connection between perception and
belief in order to present these theories as examples of (S): after all,  a doxastic
theory of perceptual experiences is one specific form that (S) may take.     
Of course, Armstrong's and Pitcher's views are deemed to be problematic:
on the face of it, it seems counter-intuitive to think that perceiving the world is
anything as sophisticated as being in cognitive states like beliefs; very crudely put,
having beliefs is a more psychologically sophisticated affair than having perceptual
experiences.26 Gareth Evans, for example, 'cannot help feeling that this gets things
the wrong way round. It is as well to reserve 'belief' for the notion of a far more
sophisticated  cognitive  state:  one  that  is  connected  with  (and,  in  my opinion,
defined in terms of)  the notion of  judgement,  and so, also,  connected with the
notion of reasons. The operations of the informational system are more primitive.'
(Evans  1982,  124)  For  Evans,  perceiving  is  an  operation  of  a  more  primitive
informational system: as such, its analysis should avoid using what he takes to be
more  sophisticated  cognitive  terms.  In  his  characteristic  style,  John  McDowell
provides a gloss on Evans saying that 'we should reserve the idea of belief  for
something that can be understood only in the context of the idea of spontaneity,
the idea of an active undertaking in which a subject takes rational control of the
26 Very crudely put, indeed: on closer inspection, it is far from clear what it means for belief-
possession to be more sophisticated than experience-possession, this being partially a matter of
what conditions a living organism must satisfy in order to possess concepts, and thereby, beliefs.
For the sake of simplicity, I dodge this issue here.
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shape of her thinking.' (McDowell 1994, 60) Although specifying exactly why an
analysis of perception could not rely on the cognitive notion of belief is a delicate
matter, I shall assume that Evans voices an intuitive concern. Notions like belief
and judgement are closely related to the possibility of ascribing concepts to the
relevant cognitive subjects: in other words, belief-possession necessitates a more or
less developed conceptual repertoire.  Since conditions  of concept-possession are
traditionally taken to  be more stringent  than those of  experience-ownership,  it
seems  intuitively  misplaced  to  characterize  perceptual  experiences  in  terms  of
concept-dependent  states  like  beliefs.27 In  principle,  it  is  not  hard  to  think  of
perceiving organisms which fail to qualify as subjects of propositional attitudes.
Armstrong and Pitcher also highlight the connection between beliefs and concepts
(cf.  Armstrong  1968,  210;  Pitcher  1971,  94).  Hence,  the  resulting  theories  of
perception  seem  intuitively  unappealing:  while  they  characterize  perceptual
experiences in terms of beliefs and concepts, it is much more natural to think that
perceivers  need  not  satisfy  the  conditions  for  the  possession  of  concepts  and
beliefs. 
Should I thus avoid using Armstrong's and Pitcher's views as templates for
a  stative  view  of  perceptual  experiences?  I  do  not  think  so,  for  both  writers
understand  belief  and  concept  as  notions  far  too  rudimentary  to  over-
intellectualize perception. Although they undeniably use the term 'belief' in order
to clarify the notion of perceptual experience, it does not follow that the Evans
objection applies to them. The key issue is not whether both philosophical camps
invoke terms like 'belief' and 'concept' – this is merely a terminological issue – but
whether they wield such terms in the same heavy-duty way. And the motivation
behind  my  answer  to  the  above  question  is  that,  in  the  specific  context  of
developing a philosophical story of perception, Armstrong and Pitcher do not use
the relevant terms as Evans suggests. Let me expand on this point. 
A  telling  if  rather  circumstantial  piece  of  evidence  is  that  both  belief-
theorists are not blind to the Evans objection. Armstrong, for example, notes that
the 'word 'belief' is a stumbling-block. To talk of beliefs may seem to be to talk in a
27 Of course,  specifying the exact nature of  the relationship between beliefs and concepts is a
delicate issue (for discussion, cf. Crane 1992). I remain silent here on the question what the
requirements of concept-possession are. 
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very  sophisticated  and  self-conscious  way,  quite  unsuited  to  such  an
unsophisticated  thing  as  perception.'  (Armstrong  1968,  209)  He  nevertheless
continues using that word for two reasons: first, 'belief' is less inappropriate than
other terms; and, secondly, this word is exchangeable with the term 'information'
(cf.  Armstrong 1968, 209-10).  Pitcher,  in turn,  tries  to circumvent the threat of
over-intellectualizing  perceptual  experiences  by  distinguishing  conscious  beliefs
(i.e.  sophisticated cognitive states)  from nonconscious ones (i.e.  unsophisticated
ones):  the  divide  is  precisely  intended  to  set  the  cognitive  connotations  of
sophisticated states aside. 
More  to  the  point,  both  philosophers  explicitly  outline  the  relevant
cognitive notions in ways which do not match Evans's use. Although Armstrong
claims that perceiving should be understood as the acquisition of perceptual beliefs,
he also holds that perceptual beliefs are sub-verbal, that is, that such beliefs do not
presuppose linguistic abilities: 'since perception can occur in the total absence of
the ability to speak, we are committed to the view that there can be concepts that
involve no linguistic ability' (Armstrong 1968, 210). Again, he takes the conditions
of concept-possession underpinning the relevant beliefs to be much less demanding
than Evans would allow. Armstrong would, for example, ascribe concepts to a baby
interacting  with  blocks  of  different  colours  if  the  baby  is  taught  to  be
systematically responsive to blocks of different colours. 
Suppose that eventually the child reaches out for blue blocks, but never reaches out for
green blocks. […] Is not its behaviour a manifestation of a true belief, acquired by means
of its eyes, that there is a difference in colour between the blue and the green blocks? And
could it not be said to possess the concepts of blue and green, or at any rate the concept of
the difference between blue and green, even if in a very primitive form? (Armstrong 1968,
246; also cf. Smith & Jones 1986, 104)      
    
For  Armstrong,  a  subject  possesses  a  concept  C  if  she  is  capable  of
behaving in systematic ways vis-à-vis worldly items which instantiate C and those
which fail  to  do  so:  since  acts  of  perceptual  discrimination  count  as  forms  of
behaviour, he is prepared to ascribe C to an organism if the latter is capable of
discriminating  C-instances  from  non-C-instances.  In  the  above  quote,  a  child
shows mastery of colour concepts because it is capable of discriminating blue from
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green objects. Although this constraint on concept-possession is not trivial, it is
relatively undemanding: it allows for concept-ascriptions (say, to babies or other
primitive creatures) which other theories of concept would forbid.  
As previously mentioned, Pitcher characterizes perceptual phenomena in
terms of beliefs, but specifies the relevant doxastic notion by means of a distinction
between conscious and unconscious beliefs.  While it  is  controversial  to classify
beliefs either as conscious or as unconscious (cf. Crane 2001), all Pitcher aims to do
here is to draw a line between mental states that differ in cognitive sophistication.
Thus,  conscious  beliefs  are  states  we  usually  associate  to  conceptually
sophisticated tasks, such as those 'of entertaining propositions and assenting to
them, of making (conscious) judgments, or anything of that sort' (Pitcher 1971, 71).
By  contrast,  having  unconscious  beliefs  does  not  involve  entertaining  and
assenting to propositions, or judging: 'to have a belief of this kind is to have a
complex disposition to act (or behave) in certain ways under certain specifiable
conditions.' (Pitcher 1971, 71) Like Armstrong, Pitcher aims to keep his notion of
perceptual belief apart from sophisticated cognitive connotations. To pull this off,
he characterizes perceptual experiences as unconscious beliefs.           
There is,  I  think,  enough textual  evidence to show that  Armstrong and
Pitcher do not understand the notion of belief in the traditional sense, that is, as
picking up on a cognitively sophisticated kind of state or propositional attitude.
One could say that there are two notions of concept at stake here: on the one hand,
the heavy-duty notion which most of us know and love (concept1, for short), that
is, a notion that sets fully developed adults apart from babies and snails; and, on
the other, a more rudimentary notion in relation to which even babies and certain
lower-level  creatures,  such  as  cats  and  dogs,  also  possess  concepts  (concept 2).
Correspondingly, two notions of belief could be identified: a subject has beliefs1
only if the latter presuppose the possession of  concepts1; or beliefs2, only if they
presuppose the possession of concepts2. With this pair of distinctions in mind, it
should  be  clear  that  Evans  is  not  really  addressing  Armstrong's  and  Pitcher's
views: while an analysis of perception in terms of beliefs1 may well be implausible,
Armstrong's and Pitcher's belief-theories do not rely on beliefs1,  but on the less
demanding beliefs2.  These theories do not seem as much to over-intellectualize
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perception as to set perceptual experiences within a stative framework.    
At this point, one could naturally object that, since the notion of belief used
by  Armstrong  and  Pitcher  is  so  idiosyncratic,  it  fails  to  illuminate  that  of
perceptual  experience.  Noting  precisely  such an  idiosyncratic  understanding  of
beliefs, Frank Jackson complains that the ontological significance of a belief-theory
of perception is unclear:
One of the main aims of any belief analysis of perception is to avoid the Sense-datum
theory's commitment to the existence of something F when something looks F to someone.
The belief analysis achieves this because, despite the considerable controversy over the
semantic  structure of  belief  statements,  we know enough about  them to know that  a
statement like 'I believe (am inclined to believe) that there is something F in front of me'
can be true without there being anything  F in front  of  me.  However,  if  the belief  in
question is not merely a common or garden one, but, rather, a special kind – a perceptual
belief, where a perceptual belief is defined in terms of looking F – then the whole question
of  ontological  commitment  to  there  being  an  F is  thrown back  into  the  melting-pot.
(Jackson 1977, 45)   
Jackson is correct about a number of things. To begin with, Armstrong and
Pitcher  aim  to  avoid  some  of  the  ontological  commitments  made  by  certain
subjectivist positions, e.g. sense-datum theories. Again, they do so by comparing or
assimilating perceiving to believing. For example, since believing p does not entail
that p is the case – a feature also known as the non-factive character of beliefs –
one could (mutatis mutandis) argue that having visual experiences of  o does not
necessarily  entail  o's  existence,  thus  undermining  a  key  assumption  behind  a
sense-datum  theory.  Finally,  Jackson  correctly  claims  that  Armstrong's  and
Pitcher's perceptual beliefs are not common or garden ones. But does it follow that
an idiosyncratic understanding of beliefs undermines the ontological significance
of belief-theories of perception?
In spite of the previous concessions, I think that Jackson's conclusion is too
drastic.  As far as I can see, the ontological significance of a belief-analysis turns
on a different axis. In general, what matters is the stative character of the relevant
perceptual beliefs: after all, no matter how exotic they may be, beliefs2 still stand
for  mental  states;  and what  a  belief-analysis  does  for  us  is  precisely  to  model
perceptual experiences as mental states rather than mental particulars (e.g. mental
events of a processive kind). More specifically, the ontological significance of a
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belief-analysis rests on the non-factivity of doxastic attitudes. As the above quote
itself shows, the effectiveness of a belief-analysis against sense-datum theories has
nothing to do with the fact that beliefs are relatively sophisticated cognitive states:
it has everything to do with the fact that those states are non-factive. Although
beliefs2 are not common or garden ones, they may still be conceived as non-factive.
In short, relying on beliefs2 does not affect the ontological advantages of theories
like Armstrong's and Pitcher's. 
To  sum  up,  a  stative  view  of  perceptual  experience  need  not  over-
intellectualize  perceptual  phenomena.  Although Armstrong and Pitcher  analyse
perception  in  terms  of  beliefs,  the  latter  states  are  understood  here  in  an
idiosyncratic way:  by conceiving perceptual  experiences as  beliefs,  they do not
commit themselves to a counter-intuitive position. Evans's challenge would affect
Armstrong and Pitcher only if the latter philosophers relied on beliefs1 in order to
spell out the notion of perceptual experience: since they resort to beliefs 2, however,
the previous objection does not apply to them. Even if my stative view collapses
into Armstrong's or Pitcher's position, it need not over-intellectualize perception.
  
V. THE ACTUALITY OF EXPERIENCES
              
A second line of objection also concerns (S)'s potential to assimilate perceiving to
believing. There is an intuitive sense in which, while perceptual experiences are
always  actual,  beliefs  need  not  be  so:  that  is,  whereas  it  is  natural  (if  not
uncontroversial) to think that a subject's belief could exist in a dispositional way, it
is unclear that perceptual experiences could be merely latent or anything less than
manifest in a subject's stream of consciousness. This divide does not seem to be
determined  by  the  fact  that  beliefs  are  more  sophisticated  than  perceptual
experiences, but by the fact that beliefs are mental states. Hence, the worry is that
a stative conception of perceptual experiences would obscure a distinction where
experiences intuitively stand out as actual or manifest to consciousness. To address
this difficulty, I shall describe it a bit further, and then, argue that, although the
aforementioned difference is a legitimate one, it does not speak against a stative
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ontology of perception. 
A suitable starting-point is Armstrong's description of what I take to be a
fairly traditional way of understanding beliefs:  
To say that A believes p does not entail that there is anything going on in A's mind, or
that A is engaged in any behaviour, which could be called a manifestation of A's belief. It
makes sense to say that A believes p, but that A is asleep, or unconscious. It is true that
there must be some difference in A's state of mind if he believes p from his state of mind if
he does not believe  p. But we need not know what that difference of state is, any more
than we need know what is the difference in state between brittle glass and glass that is
not brittle. Belief is a dispositional state of mind which endures for a greater or lesser
length of time,  and that may or may not manifest itself  (either in consciousness or in
behaviour) during that time. (Armstrong 1968, 213-4)
 
When  I  claimed  that  beliefs  need  not  be  actual,  I  just  meant  what
Armstrong states have: if a subject S has a belief B(p) – where B(p) stands for a
doxastic propositional attitude with content p – B(p) need not manifest itself in S's
consciousness  or  behaviour.  In  principle,  a  subject  could  be  sound  asleep  or
unconscious and still own the relevant belief. By contrast, perceptual experiences
seem to differ from beliefs precisely in that respect: in general,  they are actual
insofar as they are manifest to consciousness, if not in behaviour. For example, if
Jim sees a star from t1 to tn, he goes through a visual experience which exists in his
mind actually, not merely dispositionally – that is, not merely as a liability to do
something.  Jim could  not  have  the  visual  experience  he  has  was  he  asleep  or
unconscious. 
On the basis of the previous difference, it might be tempting to suppose
that perceptual experiences do not belong to the same ontological kind as beliefs.
In particular, it might be tempting to claim that beliefs are states, states being the
kind of items which need not be so manifest, whereas experiences are the sort of
items which are always manifest whenever they exist. Like O'Shaughnessy, one
might  then  develop  a  processive  view  of  experience.  For  present  purposes,
however, the crucial point is only this: on the assumption that beliefs constitute a
paradigmatic  form of  mental  states,  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs  do  not
belong to the same ontological category.    
I think the following argument, (i)-(iv), is a fair representation of the above
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line of reasoning: 
  (i) Perceptual  experiences  are  always  actual,  where  'actual'  means  being  
manifest in consciousness or behaviour.
  (ii) Beliefs need not be actual, where 'actual' has the same sense it has in (i). 
  (iii) Mental states need not be actual.
  (iv)    Hence, perceptual experiences are not mental states.
The question faced by the stative theorist is whether the intuitive difference
represented  by  (i)  and  (ii)  rules  out  the  possibility  of  conceiving  perceptual
experiences as mental states. In other words, the question is whether (iv) follows
from (i)-(iii). It is clear that it does not.
As just mentioned, I do not take issue with (i) and (ii). The problematic bit
is whether (iii) guarantees the transition from (i)-(ii) to (iv). Even if (iii) is true, it
does not follow that the feature of actuality is essential to every type of mental
state: in principle, there might be kinds of states which could not exist in a merely
dispositional or latent way. For example, if an object is red from t 1 to tn, being red
is not the kind of state which that object could fail to manifest during t1-tn. Again,
it is natural to suppose that a subject is in pain only when that state is somehow
manifest  to  her  conscious  life  or  her  behavioural  responses.  In  short,  it  seems
possible  to  conceive  physical  and mental  states  (e.g.  being  red,  being  in  pain)
which are manifest to consciousness or behaviour whenever they obtain:  a red
apple does not stop being red when nobody sees it or when it is in a dark room; a
person is not in pain when she is merely disposed to feel pain; and so on. The point
behind these remarks is that it is far from clear that a feature of a certain stative
type is necessary to every form of mental states. Granted:  (iii)  acknowledges a
feature which a wide array of stative types (e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.) may share: a
person could know that 2 + 2 = 4 even if she is not always thinking about that
particular sum; or again,  John may love Mary for four years even if  he is  not
always self-conscious of his affections. But, as far as I can see, it does not follow
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from this that every form of mental state behaves the same way: being in pain, for
example, is stative but behaves differently. (iv) still has to be argued for.  
Claims (i) and (ii) identify an intuitive difference – an intuitive ontological
difference, as it were – between perceptual experiences and beliefs. So far, so good.
Building on this divide, one may want to draw a substantive claim like (iv). The
thought behind this inference is that the possibility of existing in a non-manifest or
non-actual way is an essential trait of beliefs and other mental states: otherwise, it
is unclear why perceptual experiences could not be states only because they fail to
share the relevant feature. As Ryle suggests (cf. Ryle 1949, ch. 5), the category of
mental states could be heterogeneous, in the sense that different stative types share
different modal qualifications: some states may always be actual; others may, but
need not, be actual or manifest. To rule out a stative conception of experiences, it
is necessary (a) to pick up on ostensibly essential features of mental states, and (b)
to show that experiences fail to possess them. Argument (i)-(iv) fails on (a): it is
unclear  why  every  kind  of  mental  state  has  to  satisfy  the  above  discussed
condition; in fact, there are examples suggesting that (iii) cannot be generalized.
The suggestion is thus that the psychological divide captured by (i) and (ii) does
not support (iv): that is, the aforementioned divide is silent on whether perceptual
experiences and beliefs fall under different ontological categories. 
The present line of reasoning also fits in with the stative view I sketched
throughout  this  chapter.  To  address  the  charge  that  a  stative  view  over-
intellectualizes perceptual experiences, I drew a distinction between two notions of
belief.  On  the  one  hand,  beliefs1 are  those  mental  states  which  depend  on
concepts1, the latter having more or less stringent conditions of possession. Beliefs 1
stand for common or garden beliefs which cognitive organisms like us own. On the
other hand, beliefs2 rely on concepts2, where a subject has a given concept2 C only
if she is capable of systematically discriminating or otherwise behaving towards
instances of C in ways she would not towards instances of non-C. In accordance
with this  criterion of  concept-possession, beliefs2 are  fairly  rudimentary mental
states which may be had not only by normal adults, but also by babies and snails.
At  this  stage,  I  think  one  could  also  claim that  beliefs1 and  beliefs2 constitute
different kinds of mental states. How are they different? One clue emerged in the
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last section: beliefs1 are much more cognitively sophisticated than beliefs2. Another
one  came  up  in  this  section:  unlike  states  such  as  beliefs1,  beliefs2 are  actual
whenever a subject instantiates them. Once the two relevant senses of belief are
identified and their differences specified a bit further, it becomes manifest that a
stative view of perceptual experience need neither over-intellectualize perceptual
phenomena  nor  obscure  the  fairly  intuitive  psychological  differences  between
perceptual experiences and ordinary beliefs.            
To sum up,  I  turned here  to  the  thought  that  an obvious  psychological
distinction  between experiences  and beliefs  forces  us  to  set  both  psychological
kinds under different ontological categories. In response to this, I suggested that an
ontological  divide  does  not  necessarily  transpire  from  the  psychological  one.
Granted: while perceptual experiences are always actual, beliefs need not be so.
But this does not yet show that these psychological categories fall under different
ontological heads: in principle, it  could just mean that they constitute different
kinds of  mental  states.  Of course,  none of  what I  have said here settles  which
ontological stance one should prefer, (S) or (P). The latter issue is tackled within
the larger scheme of this dissertation, where I intend to show that a processive
view of perceptual experiences is not compulsory (chapters 1 and 2), and that there
are actually good reasons to endorse a stative view (chapters 3 and 4). 
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout this chapter, I have expanded on the notion of mental state relevant to
what I called a stative view of perceptual experiences. In a nutshell, the position
reads as follows: 
  (S) Perceptual experiences are mental states.
As explained in chapter 1, my overall goal is to articulate and partially to
defend (S). Within this larger context, chapter 2 was devoted to expand on the
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stative view already hinted at by Vendler's work.
In the picture I have thereby outlined, perceptual experiences are mental
states, where the latter satisfy the following conditions: 
  (a) Perceptual  states  are  process-dependent,  and  are  also  defined  by  the  
functional role they play within the broader psychological and epistemic  
economy of a subject.
  (b) Perceptual states are instantial (as opposed to internal) states: that is, they 
pick   up  on  the  instantiation  of  certain  informational  relations  by  
perceivers and their surroundings; as such, these states do not involve a  
substantive ontological commitment over and above our commitment to  
substances,  properties,  relations,  and  substances'  instantiation  of  such  
properties/relations. 
  (c) Perceptual  states  are  process-dependent,  but  need  not  rely  on  
phenomenally conscious  processes.  Thus  conceived,  they  also  
accommodate  the temporal  transparency of  perceptual  experiences,  the  
apparent  extension  of  certain  objects  of  perception,  and  the  apparent  
continuity of perceptual experiences. 
  (d) Perceptual states do not collapse into garden or ordinary beliefs: as such, a 
stative view does not over-intellectualize perceptual phenomena.
  (e) Perceptual states are such that they could accommodate an intuitive divide 
between  perceptual  experiences  and  belief,  namely,  that  perceptual  
experiences   are  always  actual  or  manifest  to  consciousness,  whereas  
beliefs may, but need not, be so. There is no obvious conflict here because 
perceptual and doxastic  states may be sui generis. 
Much more could be said about the mental states at the heart of (S). The
present statement of a stative view focuses on (a)-(e) only because these conditions
serve  specific  purposes  throughout  this  dissertation.  The  notion  of  process-
dependent perceptual states is intended to show how O'Shaughnessy's 'total mental
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freeze' thought experiment fits within a stative framework (cf. chapter 1.2). More
generally, what this notion does for us is to show how one could espouse a stative
ontology  of  perception  and,  at  the  same  time,  acknowledge  the  dynamic  or
episodic  character  of  perceptual  experiences  (cf.  chapter  2.1).  A description  of
perceptual states in terms of their functional roles will, meanwhile, be a prominent
piece of  my case for (S) in chapter 4 (cf.  chapter 4.2.2).  Conceiving perceptual
states as instantial completes a line of thought that cuts across chapters 1 and 2:
whereas chapter 1 aimed to show that a processive stance involves a substantive
ontological commitment – crucially, committing oneself to believe in the existence
of phenomenally conscious processes – (b) is intended to show that a stative view
only  need to  involve  a relatively  modest  ontological  commitment.  This  line  of
reasoning, in turn, sets up the ground to argue that, once we conceive perceptual
experiences  as  mental  states,  it  is  not  necessary  to  postulate  phenomenally
conscious  processes.  (c)  relates  a  stative  ontology  of  perception  to  the
phenomenology of  perceptual  experiences:  in  particular,  it  seeks  to  undermine
Soteriou's phenomenological motivation to espouse a version of (S) which heavily
relies on phenomenally conscious processes (cf. chapter 1.3). Finally, (d) and (e)
address two objections I often meet in conversation: on the one hand, I do not
think  that  perceptual  states  over-intellectualize  perception,  for  they  are  not
identical  to  garden  or  ordinary  beliefs;  and,  on  the  other,  the  actuality  of
perceptual  phenomena  in  the  stream  of  consciousness  is  not  overriden  when
experiences are conceived along stative lines. 
What I have said throughout chapters 1 and 2 does not constitute a positive
case for the stative view, of course. Thus far, I have intended to show at most three
things:  first,  that  a  processive view is  by no means compulsory;  secondly,  that
there is an internally coherent formulation of a stative view which does not depend
on phenomenally conscious processes; and thirdly, that there is suggestive (but still
defeatable) evidence in favour of the thought that a stative view is ontologically
more elegant or economic than a processive one. In a way, what I have aimed to
show  is  that,  at  the  level  of  pure  formulation,  a  stative  view  is  a  legitimate
alternative to the ontological options advanced by O'Shaughnessy, Soteriou, and
Crowther.  Now I have to provide persuasive reasons in favour of  (S).  I  take a
85
modest shot at this task in chapters 3 and 4.   
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CHAPTER 3
THE IDENTITY OF EXPERIENCES 
The present dissertation addresses the ontological  question what  we talk about
when  we  talk  about  perceptual  experiences.  In  chapter  1,  I  distinguished  two
prominent  (albeit  not  necessarily  exhaustive)  stances  on  this  issue,  namely,  a
processive and a stative conception. In a slogan, these positions read as follows:
  (P) Perceptual experiences are mental processes.
  (S) Perceptual experiences are mental states.
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As previously anticipated, the goal of this dissertation is to make a case for
(S):  thus,  whereas  the  previous  two  chapters  were  devoted  to  formulating  the
stative view, I  now proceed to defend it.  A natural  starting-point is,  I  think, a
discussion of the conditions governing the existence of perceptual experiences –
for short, their identity conditions: after all, to the extent that they rely on different
ontological categories, (S) and (P) are presumably bound to different accounts of
such  conditions.  In  particular,  it  seems  to  me  that  both  views  should  provide
different  accounts  of  temporally  extended  perceptual  experiences,  for,  as  I
previously  mentioned,  a  key  difference  between  processes  and  states  concerns
their diachronic existence – whereas processes occur or take time, states obtain or
continue to obtain. That said, the goal of this chapter is two-fold: on the one hand,
I challenge (P)'s ability to provide a story of diachronic perceptual experiences;
and, on the other, I argue that one of (S)'s virtues precisely consists in delivering
such an account. The key problem with a processive account is that it provides no
guide for individuating or 'counting' the temporal particulars it ultimately posits.
By contrast, since mental states are not (either spatial or temporal) particulars, the
stative view would pre-empt similar attempts to individuate or count perceptual
experiences.            
The present chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I explain why
a discussion of  experiential  individuation  should  focus  on  temporally  extended
experiences and why views like (P) and (S) have a bearing on this issue. Secondly, I
argue that (P) poses the question how perceptual experiences are individuated over
time, but fails to provide the necessary conceptual resources to settle it. Finally, I
show that (S) avoids that difficulty insofar as it does not raise the same question.
I. EXPERIENTIAL CONTENT AND EXPERIENTIAL VEHICLE
To  defend  (S),  this  chapter  turns  to  the  identity  conditions  of  perceptual
experiences over time. For this reason, I want to do two things in this preliminary
section: first, to spell out why temporally extended experiences are so important in
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this context; and, secondly, to motivate (S)'s and (P)'s bearing on the individuation
of perceptual experiences.  
To  illustrate  the  forthcoming  remarks,  I  shall  once  again  rely  on  the
example of a vigilant sailor's visual experiences.
Example 1
A sailor on deck, Jim, looks for a star during a cloudy night. At one point,
the sky begins clearing up a bit, and our vigilant subject suddenly sees a
bright star. Jim sees the star from t1 to tn,  over which time there are no
interruptions or conspicuous changes in his visual field, and the relevant
star looks or appears a determinate way, w, to him.
But now I shall also expand on this example along the following lines:
Example 2
Jim sees the same bright star from t1 to tn,  but now another sailor, Jack,
joins him, stands right next to Jim, and sees the same star. The star looks
the same determinate way, w, to both of them. Alternatively, one could try
a trans-world comparison. Imagine a possible world, W2, exactly like ours,
W1, where Jack, not Jim, does exactly the same thing that Jim does in W 1:
in this case, it is natural to suppose that things appear exactly the same
way, w, to Jim and Jack, each one inhabiting different possible worlds.    
These cases highlight a number of points. To begin with, both examples
remind us of the fact that perceptual experiences primarily play a role within a
story of perception or perceptual acts. Thus, when Jim and Jack see a bright star
('seeing' referring here to a temporally protracted experiential occurrence starting
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at t1), the notion of visual experience is intended to capture a crucial part of their
psychological lives. When a subject S perceives a certain worldly item X, and X
appears a certain way to S, S is perceptually aware or has a perceptual experience
of  X.  There  is  an  intimate  conceptual  and  ontological  relationship  between
experiences and their subjects: as noted by A.J. Ayer, '[i]n the ordinary way, we
identify experiences in terms of the persons whose experiences they are'  (Ayer
1963, 84; also cf. Peacocke 2012). Again, the notion of perceptual appearance is a
significant  component  in  a  description  of  a  perceiver's  experiential  life:  what
perceptual  experiences  a  subject  undergoes  depends  not  only  on  what
informational channels are established between a subject and her surroundings via
her  sensory  systems,  but  also  on  how  the  relevant  perceptual  information  is
conveyed. By disregarding how things appear (i.e. look (like), taste (like), etc.) to
perceivers at a time or over time, one would under-describe their experiential lives.
Jim and Jack will have different visual experiences if they see an item (say, a bright
star) which looks different ways to both of them (say, like a bright star to Jim, and
like a satellite to Jack). To have the same kind of perceptual experiences, subjects
must be affected the same way by the items they perceive.  Finally,  the second
example illustrates the possibility of conceiving different subjects standing in the
same relations of perceptual awareness vis-à-vis their surroundings. Thus, I take it
that Jack and Jim stand in a similar relation of visual awareness to the bright star:
how things look to Jack is identical or very similar to how things look to Jim; Jim
and Jack have visual experiences of the same type; or again, there is an intuitive
sense of 'seeing' in which Jack sees the same thing that Jim does. 
That said, I shall expand now on the importance of temporally extended
experiences  by  stressing the  ontological  dependence  of  synchronous  perceptual
experiences (experiences at a time) on diachronic ones (experiences over time).
Although one may uncontroversially distinguish both kinds of experiences, it is
important to bear in mind that non-protracted ones exist within a wider temporal
context. Like the above examples, descriptions of perceptual experiences in general
pick up on temporally protracted phenomena: for, while perceptual acts (that is,
achievements like spotting an object) get subjects in informational contact with
worldly  items  at  a  time,  perceptual  experiences  hold  such  informational
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transactions in existence; that is, perceptual experiences are temporally protracted
phenomena  because  their  role  is  precisely  that  of  reflecting  how  a  subject  is
perceptually  related  to  her  surroundings  over  an  extended  period  of  time.
Perceptual  experiences  are  not  the  kind  of  items  which  may  exist  for  a  mere
instant  of  time:  while  Jim  may,  for  example,  see  (as  Vendler  puts  it,  in  the
'spotting'  sense)  a  bright  star at  an instant,  he could not visually experience it
during  a  mere  instant  of  time.  Indeed,  it  is  possible  to  have  very  short-lived
experiences of objects and properties: say, a subject may be aware of a flash for
half or a quarter of a second. These are, however, not instantaneous experiences:
no matter how short-lived they may be,  they are temporally protracted. 28 I  am
tempted to think that, whenever one refers to perceptual experiences at a time, one
does not pick up on instantaneous experiential monads, but on a subject at a time
at which she undergoes temporally protracted experiences. For example, although
it is legitimate to ascribe a visual experience to Jim at t2, this amounts to saying
that Jim visually experiences worldly items during a period of time t1-tx and that t2
lies  within  t1-tx.  To  generalize  this  point  a  bit  further,  one  could  convey  the
dependency of synchronous experiences on diachronic ones as follows:
  (D) A subject S has a perceptual experience of O at t2 only if S perceptually  
experiences O during t1-tx and t2 is an instant within t1-tx.    
This  principle  is  compatible  with  the  existence  of  statements  about
perceptual  experiences  at  a  time  which  explicitly  fail  to  refer  to  a  temporally
protracted experience: after all, (D) is not a grammatical claim. The point is that, if
(D) is true, the analysis of perceptual experiences at a time explicitly or implicitly
relies on temporally extended perceptual experiences. This is the sense in which I
take synchronous perceptual experiences to depend on diachronic ones. 
In spite of our differences, the primacy of temporally extended experiences
is  a  point  on which I  coincide  with  O'Shaughnessy.  He secures  this  stance by
means  of  a  phenomenological  analysis  where  the  relevant  psychological
28 Of course, this claim would be false if, inspired by Hume, one assumed that there are temporally
indivisible experiences or impressions. This position is controversial, though.  
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phenomena capture a subject's recent past as well as her present:   thus, '[a] man
staring fixedly at a chair is as directly aware of the perceptual object of a few
seconds ago as is the perceiver of a movement across time. The individuation of
the perception of any instant requires that it be so.' (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 60) On
this view, perceptual experiences are not protracted phenomena developing out of
instantaneous  or  discrete  experiences:  instead,  they  are  fundamentally  or
constitutively extended in time. But, in addition to this phenomenological line of
reasoning, it is also important to appreciate that O'Shaughnessy's processive stance
demands the ontological primacy of diachronic experiences. As noted in chapter 1,
he holds that perceptual experiences are processive or occurrent to the core, in the
sense that they can only be analysed into process-stages – that is, processes of the
same kind. Suppose now that temporally extended experiences should be conceived
as  bundles  of  instantaneous  or  discrete  experiences:  the  latter  could  not  be
analysed in processive terms, for processes (even short-lived ones) could not occur
at single instants of time; hence, it would turn out that perceptual experiences are
not processive to the core, at least in the aforementioned sense. To guarantee his
processive analysis of perceptual experiences through and through, O'Shaughnessy
has to subordinate synchronous experiences to diachronic ones, not the other way
around:  that  is  the  only  way in  which he  can plausibly  claim that  perceptual
processes are always constituted by other processes of the same kind. 
I do think that the category of temporally extended experiences is more
fundamental than that of instantaneous ones. That said, neither this ontological
primacy nor (D) necessarily entail a processive stance. If perceptual experiences
are  conceived as  mental  states,  ascribing  them to  a  subject  S  at  a  time  t also
presupposes that  t falls within a period of time during which S goes through a
temporally extended experience. Indeed, the thought that a subject or an object
could instantiate a state (say, a belief, a wish, etc.) for only an instant of time is
extremely puzzling.  In relation to perceptual phenomena, this feature of stative
ascriptions could be accounted for by the fact that experiences are intended to set a
subject in informational contact with her surrounding over a given period of time.
Let's  take  stock.  As  previously  stated,  this  dissertation  examines  the
question what we talk about when we talk about perceptual experiences – in other
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words, what kind of psychological items they are. That being the case, it should be
more or less clear by now why the present discussion should say something about
temporally extended experiences: they constitute central cases of the psychological
category I am concerned with, and hence, a natural starting-point for this project.
Now, even if the foregoing remarks are along the right lines, it is unclear what
precise bearing something like (P) or (S) could have on the present subject-matter.
This is the second preliminary point I address here.     
Among other things, a theory of perceptual experiences should specify how
to  identify  or  'count'  perceptual  experiences  across  time:  say,  if  Jim  visually
experiences  a  bright  star  during  t1-tn,  such  an  account  should  be  capable  of
determining how many visual experiences he goes though during that time; or, if
the question is misguided, why it is so. I do not argue for this point, but simply
take it for granted. What features of temporally extended perceptual experiences
would, however, help us to individuate or count them? To address this question, I
shall  rely  on  a  very  general,  and  hence  uncontroversial,  distinction  between
content and vehicle of content:  that  is,  I  shall distinguish the things perceptual
experiences are of or about from perceptual experiences themselves. Although the
notion  of  content  may  be  understood  in  as  many  ways  as  the  notion  of
intentionality, I expect it to be clear that the sense in which I talk about it here is
not a heavy-duty one: whether ultimately analysed in representational or relational
terms,  perceptual  experiences  are  intuitively  about  or  of  things  other  than
themselves. For example, there is a more or less obvious distinction between Jim's
visual experience and what that experience is about, i.e. a bright star: the star is a
physical  object  which existed light-years from Jim and probably died long ago;
Jim's visual experience is, in turn, a mental phenomenon which exists in him alone
and shares none of the physical properties which a star might have – that is, it has
no  weight,  size,  degree  of  luminosity,  etc.  Although  a  visual  experience  is  no
physical object, it can be about one. The content-vehicle distinction thus provides a
framework  to  draw a  number  of  similarities  and  differences:  Jim and  Jack  go
through  the  same  kind  of  psychological  phenomenon,  namely,  perceptual
experiences as opposed to remembrances,  beliefs,  etc.;  in addition to this,  such
experiences  are  about  the  same  thing,  a  bright  star  which  looks  the  same
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determinate  way  to  both  subjects;  again,  these  experiences  stand  apart  from
experiences  endowed  with  different  contents  –  either  by  concerning  different
physical items or by presenting the same ones in different ways; and so on. 
With  this  general  distinction  at  hand,  the  previous  question  may  be
rephrased as follows: should the identification of perceptual experiences over time
be accounted for in terms of experiential contents or experiential vehicles? In a
nutshell, I think the content of perceptual experiences throws no lights on the issue
at stake: to settle questions of individuation, it is necessary to address perceptual
experiences themselves. This is the reason why (S) and (P) have a bearing on the
present discussion: after all, they precisely intend to take a stance on the nature of
experiential vehicles. Before diving into my positive position, let me pause on the
negative point concerning experiential content.
On  the  assumption  that  perceptual  experiences  may  be  analysed  into
experiential content and experiential vehicles, the thought is that their diachronic
identity could be fixed by the content which such psychological phenomena have:
that is, to specify how many experiences a subject has over time, one only has to
determine what and how worldly items are perceptually presented to her over the
relevant temporal span. According to this view, what visual experiences Jim and
Jack have depends on what items they are visually aware of (e.g. a star, clouds, sea,
etc.)  and how such objects  are  presented to  them, something  which is  in  turn
determined  by  a  complex  number  of  environmental,  perspectival,  and  neuro-
biological facts. Could one thereby expect experiential content, in this broad sense
of the term, to specify what experiences Jim and Jack have throughout a given
period of time? I do not think so. 
As previously mentioned, perceptual experiences are understood here as
relations  of  awareness  between  perceivers  and  their  surroundings.  If  such
experiences are temporally protracted, the relevant relations will also be indexed to
periods  of  time.  That  being  the  case,  a  story  of  experiential  individuation  is
accordingly  bound  to  convey  who  the  relevant  perceiver  is,  what  and  how
environmental  items  are  presented  to  that  subject,  and  how long  the  relevant
experience lasts. Experiential content, however, precisely fails to capture at least
two of those components: even if it captures what items a subject perceives and
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how they are presented to her, it is still silent on who the relevant subject is and
how much time the relevant  experience takes.  For example,  a  description of  a
visual experience of the kind introduced in example 2 leaves open whether the
relevant  subject  is  Jim  or  Jack.  Indeed,  an  ideal  description  of  the  relevant
experiential  content would incorporate facts  about the perceived items and the
specific  mode  of  presentation,  including  perspectival  facts  determined  by  the
physical location of the subject relative to the perceived scene. But even if such a
description established that the relevant experience was had by  some subject, it
would not settle who the exact subject is. In other words, Jim and Jack could have
visual experiences with the same content, where identity of content means that
they  have  experiences  of  the  same  kind:  they  may  have  the  same  sort  of
experiences  not  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  experiential  content  is  silent  on  the
question which subject undergoes the relevant experience, but precisely because of
that. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of transparency suggests that experiential
contents fail to fix the duration of its corresponding experiential vehicles. Derived
from a few esoteric remarks made by G.E. Moore (cf. Moore 1903)29, the general
thought is that reflection on perceptual experiences is not sensitive to features of
the  experiences  themselves,  but  only  to  features  of  the  worldly  items  our
perceptual  experiences  are  of.  For  example,  if  I  reflect  on  my  current  visual
experiences, I cannot attend to the very mental phenomena opening the visible
world to me, but only to the items I see, e.g. a laptop, a table, a few DVDs, etc. - in
this sense, experiences themselves are 'invisible' or 'transparent' to reflection. A bit
more specifically, experiential transparency involves two claims: on the positive
side,  that  reflection on perceptual  experiences  refers  to  the worldly items such
experiences  are about;  and,  on the  negative  side,  that  reflection  on perceptual
experiences refers to nothing more than those items. The positive claim is fairly
uncontroversial. And while it may not be immediately obvious why the negative
point is correct, I think one could partially secure it on a case-by-case basis: that is,
for any given feature of  experiential  vehicles as opposed to worldly items, one
could examine whether an introspective analysis of perceptual experiences latches
29 For a statement of the 'transparency' phenomenon which captures much better the point made
by contemporary philosophers, cf. Farrell 1950. 
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onto such a feature. Again, while examples of the transparency phenomenon often
concern spatial items, they could also refer to temporal features: on the assumption
that experiential content involves a temporal component, one could thus argue that
such  a  component  is  not  a  feature  of  experiential  vehicles,  but  of  the  scene
perceptually  presented  to  a  subject.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  Jim  is
uninterruptedly aware of a bright star for ten seconds. Let's also assume that these
ten seconds are somehow built into the content of Jim's visual experience. Now,
even if all of this is the case, transparency poses a threat: for, given the distinction
between features presented in experience and features of experiences, one could
argue  that  the  aforementioned  period  of  time  equivalent  to  ten  seconds  is  a
temporal feature of the scene experienced by Jim from a certain vantage point. So,
even if Jim stares at a bright star for ten seconds and the content of his experience
also incorporates an interval of ten seconds, the temporal properties specified by
such a content are properties of the things presented to Jim, not of anything in
Jim's mind. 
Michael Tye, I think, presses the negative part of the transparency thought
in relation to the experience of temporal features: when we perceive the world or
introspect our experiences, 'we are not aware of our experiences as unified or as
continuing through time or as succeeding one another' (Tye 2003, 96); instead, the
positive thought goes, we are primarily aware of worldly items as unified or as
continuing through time. 'Continuity, change, and succession,' temporal features
we are perceptually aware of, 'are experienced as features of items experienced,
not as features of experiences.'  (Tye 2003, 97) These remarks may be naturally
reinforced by the vehicle-content distinction. For example, Daniel Dennett stresses
that, to the extent that the temporal structure of psychological states or processes
may  be  quite  different  from  that  of  what  they  represent,  temporal  features
intervene in experience only as features of what experience presents us with, not
features of the experiential vehicles themselves (cf.  Dennett 1991,  ch.  6).  These
considerations thereby suggest that, in general, experiential content does not fix
the  duration  of  temporally  extended  experiences,  but  only  that  of  what  is
experienced by the relevant subject. 
In  short,  while  the  content  of  experiences  may  specify  what  type  of
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experiences subjects have, they would fail to settle what experiences perceivers
have during certain periods of time: after all, they do not really fix who undergoes
the relevant experience nor how much time they take. This is why one should turn
to the relevant experiential vehicles in order to individuate perceptual experiences,
at which point (P) and (S) become relevant. 
II. THE INDIVIDUATING ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES      
The individuation of temporally extended perceptual experiences cannot rest on
experiential content alone: to settle this issue, it is important to understand what
kind  of  psychological  items  they  are.  A  processive  and  the  stative  conception
provide different answers to this ontological question: whereas one view models
perceptual  experiences  as  mental  processes,  the  other  one  conceives  them  as
mental states. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that a prominent virtue of
(S)  over (P)  is  precisely its  ability  to deal  with the individuation of  temporally
extended  perceptual  experiences.  More  specifically,  this  section  takes  on  the
negative task of stressing (P)'s inability to handle, first, the very individuation of
experiences over time, and, secondly, the relationship between experiences and the
worldly items they present to a subject.   
Two preliminary remarks are in order, though. First, it is necessary to be
clear  on  what  kind  of  processes  are  invoked  by  a  processive  conception.  I
previously  mentioned  that  (P)  conceives  perceptual  experiences  as  processes
which,  once  concluded,  come  to  constitute  events  –  i.e.  temporal  particulars.
Furthermore,  the  relevant  processes  are  not  any  given  kind  of  processes,  but
specifically psychological or mental ones: as such, they are 'internal' at least in the
sense that they are not publicly accessible items – for example, you cannot see a
visual experience the same way you see a tree or a dog. Secondly, I mentioned in
the  previous  section  that  the  individuation  of  experiences  depends  on  fixing  a
number of components related to each token-experience, namely, perceived items,
mode of perceptual presentation, experiencing subject, and duration of experience.
I shall not be concerned here with the relationship between experiences, on the one
hand,  and,  on the  other,  subjects  and modes  of  presentation.  Processes  are  by
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definition things that a subject could do or that may happen to her: as such, there
seems to be a metaphysical (or at least conceptual) connection between perceivers
and the processes in terms of which (P) defines perceptual experience. Again, I
suspect  that  specifying  how  things  are  presented  to  a  subject  is  a  job  for
experiential contents, not experiential vehicles: that is, how things are presented in
experience  would,  at  least  ideally,  be  captured  by  a  description  of  what  your
experiences are of, not by a description of what your experiences are.30 So, the
most pressing task for an account of experiential vehicles (e.g. (S) or (P)) is that of
throwing some light on the relationship between perceptual experiences, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the worldly items they are about and time. As just
anticipated,  my  negative  goal  is  to  show  that  a  processive  view  does  not
appropriately deal with such conceptual connections.  
The decisive point against (P), it seems to me, concerns the way in which it
deals  with  the  relationship  between  perceptual  experiences  and  time.  The
importance of this point should be more or less clear: for, while there is a natural
sense in which mental phenomena should not be spatially categorized – a belief or
an emotion has no weight, it is not to the left or to the right of a physical object or
another  propositional  attitudes,  etc.  –  they  may  be  temporally  qualified  (cf.
O'Shaughnessy 1971, 2000; Steward 1997). After all, time seems to encompass both
the physical and the mental. Since perceptual experiences are temporal items, a
story of the conditions under which they exist should say something about their
temporal structure. As I take temporally extended experiences to be ontologically
primary, the present discussion shall focus on cases where a subject experiences
her surroundings for a non-instantaneous period of time.
As suggested by Dennett, the temporal structure of what our experiences
are about does not necessarily reflect  the temporal structure of the experiences
themselves: in other words, the temporal features of experiential vehicles need not
transpire in experiential contents (cf. chapter 1.2 and section 1 of this chapter).
That  being  the  case,  how else  could  one determine  the  duration of  perceptual
experiences?  If  these  psychological  items  are  temporally  protracted  events
30 Compare here Richard Wollheim's  remark on describing the subjective character  of  mental
states:  'we give the intentionality of  a  mental state and anticipate that the subjectivity will
convey itself.' (Wollheim 1984, 40)
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resulting  from  the  completion  of  perceptual  processes,  it  would  at  least  be
legitimate  to  ask  when  they begin  and  when they  end.  Although  he  does  not
specifically discuss a processive view of experiences,  B.A. Farrell  highlights the
difficulties faced by such questions of temporal individuation:
Surely, that is, we can say that it [i.e. the experience in perception] stands in “temporal
relations” to other events or processes? No–this will not do. For to say that “something or
other happens quite frequently” is to say that the something occurs at different times. To
say this is to say that this something is in principle datable. How now do we set about
dating the occurrence that is X's experience at any time? All  we can do is to date X's
responses. But suppose X, as subject-observer, sets himself the task of dating the onset of a
certain raw feel experience, for example, the one that is supposed to happen when he sees
two changing shapes as equally elliptical. When X times himself here, say by stopping a
stop watch,  all  that he  can time in his  “seeing”–e.g.,  his subvocal “Ah! That's  it”,  his
accompanying release of breath and muscular tension, and so forth. What, therefore, he
dates is the onset of his seeing the shapes as equally elliptical. Difficulties only multiply if
we now retreat and say “But we time the experience indirectly by timing the behaviour
that it accompanies?” E.g. What sort of “accompanying” does this ghost do? (Farrell 1950,
178)
Farrell's reasoning moves in two stages. First, the thought that perceptual
experiences are datable is,  he notes, profoundly problematic insofar as it is not
possible directly to trace perceptual experiences over time: in principle, one may
only track those behavioural inputs and outputs related to the relevant experiential
phenomena.  Second,  he  stresses  that  the  relationship  between  perceptual
experiences and their behavioural correlates is quite puzzling: indeed, this is the
issue at the heart of the mind-body problem. These remarks thereby suggest that a
subject's behavioural responses could hardly constitute a guide into the temporal
identification of perceptual experiences. According to Farrell, these psychological
phenomena are not the kind of things that can be timed. We can certainly keep
track of a subject's  behavioural  responses and of the things she is  perceptually
responsive to – whether the relevant subject is ourself or someone else – but the
duration  of  the  episodic  experience  underpinning  discriminatory  or  locomotive
behaviour would be bound to remain elusive.  
Now, whereas Farrell focuses on a generic experiential notion, I specifically
target  perceptual  experiences  conceived  as  mental  (more  specifically,
phenomenally  conscious)  processes.  Indeed,  I  do  think  that  the  temporal
individuation of  perceptual  experiences  is  bound to meet  the kind of  problems
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described by Farrell. However, this need not constitute an objection against the
notion of perceptual experience in general, for one could still hold that experiences
could not and should not be datable; that is, one could argue that it is conceptually
misguided to ask question such as 'When did it begin?' of items falling under the
relevant experiential notion. Farrell's line of reasoning, I think, presents a difficulty
for  the  mental  processes  posited  by  the  processive  theorist:  if  perceptual
experiences  are  conceived  as  events  constituted  by  phenomenally  conscious
processes,  they would have definite temporal boundaries;  or,  in other words,  if
perceptual  experiences  are  temporally  extended  events,  there  should  be  a
principled answer to questions such as 'When did her experience begin?'. At this
stage,  the  processive  theorist  might  opt  for  preserving  the  temporally  fuzzy
boundaries of perceptual processes, but it  is unclear how he could support that
claim.  A philosophical  account  of  perceptual  experiences  should  be  capable  of
illuminating when such psychological occurrences begin, or, in case that such a
question could not be answered, capable of illuminating why the question has no
answer. (P), however, provides psychological particulars, the temporal boundaries
of which we cannot by definition access, let alone individuate. 
Here  is  another  worry  about  the  temporal  individuation  for  perceptual
processes:  if  perceptual  experiences  are  conceived  along  the  lines  of  (P),  it  is
unclear how many experiences a perceiver is subject to whenever she experiences
her  surroundings  for  a  non-instantaneous  span  of  time.  Say  that  Jim  visually
experiences a bright star, uninterruptedly, from t1 to tx: if perceptual experiences
are  temporally  extended  events  resulting  from  mental  processes,  one  could  in
principle ask how many visual experiences Jim has between t1 and tx. As far as I
can see, there are two lines of reply: first, that our vigilant sailor has one single
experience during that period of time; and, secondly, that he actually undergoes a
number of experiences – 'how many' being, for the time being, irrelevant. Both
options are, I take it, clearly incompatible. That said, my point is not that either
alternative is implausible. Instead, the worry is that there is no definitive evidence
in favour of either view: for all we know, both positions could be correct. This is, I
submit, an unfortunate outcome: was that correct, the temporal individuation of
perceptual experiences would turn out to be an arbitrary matter. I expand a bit
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further on this line of reasoning next.
A  prominent  advocate  of  the  'one-experience'  view   is  Michael  Tye:
according  to  him,  'for  each  period  of  consciousness,  there  is  only  a  single
experience–an  experience  that  represents  everything  experienced  within  the
period  of  consciousness  as  a  whole  (the  period,  that  is,  between  one  state  of
unconsciousness  and the  next).'  (Tye 2003,  97)  This  view has  it  that  Jim goes
through a single  visual  experience from t1 to tx.31 As previously mentioned,  he
stresses the phenomenon of perceptual transparency: a bit more specifically, he
presses the transparency thought  in relation to the spatial  as  well  as  temporal
features  that  perceptual  experience  presents  us  with.  In  broad  lines,  the  view
comes down to this:  just as the spatial items perceptual experience presents us
with  are  not  features  of  experience  itself,  but  features  of  the  experientially
presented environment; the temporal features experientially presented to us are
not features of our experiences, but features of the perceived world. According to
him, the temporal structure of experiential content – that is, the temporal features
presented  to  a  perceiver  in  experience  –  would  not  determine  the  temporal
structures  of  our  perceptual  experiences  (cf.  Tye  2003,  98-9).  Tye  exploits  the
temporal transparency of experience precisely to defend the one-experience view:
given that experiential content provides no guide into the temporal structure of
experiential vehicles, the one-experience hypothesis seems to be the best stance on
experiential  individuation.  This  line  of  reasoning  is  nicely  summarized  in  the
following passage:    
[t]he one experience hypothesis finds further support in the general difficulty we face in
individuating  experiences  through  time.  Consider  an  ordinary  visual  experience  and
suppose that it is exclusively visual. When did it begin? When will it end? As I write now,
I am sitting in a library. Looking ahead, and holding my line of sight fixed, I can see many
books, tables, people in the distance walking across the room, a woman nearby opening
some bags as she sits down. Is this a single temporally extended visual experience? If not,
why not? (Tye 2003, 98)32  
31 In fact, Tye's position is a bit more complex: a subject (Jim, in this case) has a single experience
encompassing everything she is  perceptually aware of:  hence,  Jim would not  have a single
visual experience, but an experiences that encompasses everything he is visually, auditorily,
olfactorily aware of, and so on. For the sake of simplicity, however, I ignore this complication
here.  
32 Tye also comments on the compatibility of his one-experience hypothesis with the linguistic
evidence apparently supporting that subjects could have several experiences over time (cf. Tye
2003,  97).  This constitutes further evidence that his position answers to concerns about the
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When a subject experiences the world during a non-instantaneous span of
time, she has only one experience,  namely,  the event constituted by the whole
experiential  process  between  her  states  of  unconsciousness:  to  repeat,  if  Jim
uninterruptedly sees a bright star from t1 to tx, he has a single experience during
that  period  of  time.  The  target  of  this  rather  economical  framework  for
experiential individuation is two-fold: on the one hand, the view that the temporal
structure of experiential contents determines that of experiential vehicles; and, on
the  other,  the  many-experiences  hypothesis  or  the  view  according  to  which
perceptual experiences are constituted by shorter mental events. Per transparency,
Tye thinks that reflection on perceptual experiences does not provide substantive
evidence in favour of either position. The simplest hypothesis is, hence, the one-
experience view.
As  previously  mentioned,  the  transparency  claim seems quite  plausible:
even if its negative component comes to be contested, I suspect it could be partially
vindicated  –  that  is,  vindicated  in  relation  to  specific  features  presented  in
experience. It is, I think, extremely plausible that the temporal features perceptual
experiences  present  us  with  are  features  of  the  perceived  scene,  not  of  the
experiences themselves. For this reason, I provisionally conclude that Tye makes a
persuasive  case  against  his  two  targets.  The  bad  news  is  that  the  same
considerations concerning the temporal transparency of experiences set pressure
on the one-experience hypothesis: although reflection on perceptual experiences
lends little evidence in favour of the many-experiences view, it is unclear why it
supports Tye's position; after all, evidence against one position is not necessarily
equivalent  to  evidence in  favour of  a  competing alternative.  More importantly,
reflection on perceptual experiences does not show that a subject's uninterrupted
experiential stream constitutes a single mental event for the same reason it does
not show that the same stream breaks into experience-parts, namely, the subject's
insensitivity to the temporal features of her own experiences. Tye asks whether a
subject's uninterrupted conscious stream is constituted by a single psychological
item, and, if it does not, why not: but I think one could in turn ask what evidence
diachronic identity of experiences.
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there  is  to  suppose  that  the  aforementioned experience  is  a  single,  temporally
extended item. To defend the one-experience hypothesis,  Tye does not rely on
considerations about experiential content, but on the theoretical economy of that
view relative to the many-experiences stance. It is, however, unclear to me why
the one-experience stance is in any way more economical: after all, both positions
resort  to  exactly  the  same  type  of  psychological  items;  the  main  difference  is
purely  quantitative  – whereas  Tye  invokes  only  one mental  event  in  order  to
account for a single, uninterrupted experiential stream, the many-experiences view
invokes a number of such events over time. Granted: the latter position may be
problematic, but this does not on its own constitute a positive argument or reason
in favour of the one-experience view. When we experience the world or reflect
about our experiences, we are only aware of worldly items: we are not aware of
our experiences' temporal boundaries; as such, it is not manifest to us whether we
undergo  one or  several  experiences  throughout  an  experientially  uninterrupted
period of time. 
A bit more tentatively, the foregoing considerations also suggest a line of
criticism against (P)'s ability to accommodate the link between experiences and
perceived  items.  It  is  natural  to  conceive  the  objects  of  perception  as  the
informational  sources  of  those  interactions  leading  up  to  the  occurrence  of
perceptual experiences, no matter how difficult it may be to specify the relevant
informational-causal  links.33 Thus  conceived,  the  worldly  items  perceptual
experiences  are  of,  are  just  the  informational  sources  of  the  perceptual
achievements in virtue of  which such experiences  emerge.  I  take the claim for
granted here: when Jim faces a bright star, he sees a determinate object, the source
of  the  informational  transaction  (across  space  and  time)  leading  up  to  Jim's
spotting  of  the  star  and  the  corresponding  relation  of  visual  awareness.  If
perceptual experiences are conceived as mental processes, however, it is unclear to
me how they are related to our surroundings. As Farrell pointed out, the evidence
usually invoked in order to identify and ascribe perceptual experiences would at
best provide indirect access to phenomenally conscious processes: after all, recall
that O'Shaughnessy and Soteriou take such processes to transcend the domain of
33 For a sophisticated example of an account along those lines, cf. Dretske 1981. 
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physical processes and states, behavioural responses, and so on. As far as I can see,
it is by no means obvious what the connection between phenomenally conscious
processes, thus conceived, and the world, is. To address this difficulty, one might
perhaps attempt to bridge the relevant gap by means of those informational-causal
channels  capable  of  linking  physical  and mental  processes.  Such a  strategy  is,
however,  problematic:  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  not  obvious  how  phenomenally
conscious processes could interact with neuro-biological phenomena in a subject's
brain; on the other, to the extent that they could interact with processes and states
of a subject's brain, the relevant processes would become items of the same neural
order  –  but,  as  I  previously  mentioned,  perceptual  experiences  are  naturally
predicated of subjects rather than brains. These considerations are by no means
decisive, but it is unclear to me how a processive theorist could plausibly address
them or otherwise specify the link between perceptual experiences and the objects
of  perception.  As  such,  the  latter  relationship  seems  to  pose  a  considerable
difficulty for (P). 
A processive view thus postulates the existence of mental processes and
events whose conditions of individuation over time cannot be sharply specified.
The  problem is  not  that  we  lack  answers  to  questions  about  the  existence  of
experiences  over  time:  the  recalcitrance  of  the  question 'When did  that  visual
experience start?' might be justified, and I do think that perceptual experiences are
the sort of psychological items about which it would be misguided to ask 'How
many experiences  Jim has  between t1 and tx?'.  Instead,  the problem is  that  (P)
legitimises  such  questions  but  offers  no  means  for  solving  them.  In  short,  I
conclude  that  (P)  does  not  provide  adequate  resources  to  understand  how
perceptual experiences are individuated: on the one hand, it is unclear how the
relevant mental processes relate to the objects of perception; and, on the other, the
processive  view  is  bound  to  questions  of  experiential  individuation  over  time
which, at the same time, it is unable to solve.     
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III. THE INDIVIDUATING ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL STATES
To the extent that processes and states constitute different ontological categories,
it  is  natural  to  expect  them  to  have  different  conditions  of  individuation.
Accordingly, by conceiving perceptual experiences as mental states, (S) might turn
out to avoid the aforementioned difficulties faced by (P). This is precisely what I
argue for in this section: I hold that, where the notion of mental process fails, that
of  mental  state  manages to capture the special  relationship between perceptual
experiences, on the one hand, and, on the other, perceived items and time.
I shall continue assuming that a description of experiential content should
ideally take care of how worldly items are presented to a specific subject. Again,
mental states are intimately related to their subjects: like properties, relations, and
dispositions,  states are  identified in relation to subjects  or objects,  this  being a
point which applies to mental states no less than to physical ones.34 As far as I can
see,  there is  no way of  conceiving (physical  or mental)  states apart  from their
subjects:  a token of  the property of  redness is  not  thought on its  own, but  as
something that obtains in a subject. In other words, the idea of subjectless mental
states cannot be taken seriously. As such, the numerical identity or difference of
token-states crucially depends on what subject instantiates the relevant states. For
example, Jim and Jack have different experiences even if the same worldly items
are presented in exactly the same way to both of them – that is, even if they may
have experiences of the same type: since what it means to be an experiential state
depends on what subject has that state, and since Jim is numerically different from
Jack, it follows that Jim's experience is not numerically identical to that of Jack's.
That said, I think (S) is capable of capturing the close relationship between
experiences and the items they are about. Conceived along stative lines, perceptual
experiences  obtain  in  perceivers  (not  their  sub-personal  parts),  result  from the
interaction  between  those  subjects  and  their  surroundings,  and  dispose  their
subjects to behave in a complex number of ways. What this partially means is that
one could not individuate a given perceptual state unless one could latch onto its
34 For an elaboration of the ascriptive relationship between states and properties, on the one hand,
and, on the other, subjects, cf. Shoemaker 1979; 1980. 
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subject, environmental input, and (at least partially) behavioural output. Indeed,
these  three  components  are  constitutive  of  the  relevant  state.  Within  this
framework, it  is thereby clear how perceptual experiences relate to the worldly
items they are about: if these psychological items are mental states, the items they
present a subject with are simply constitutive elements in their definition. While it
is unclear how mental processes relate to items in physical space, certain mental
states are by definition related to them, for they are simply conditions resulting
from the interaction between a subject and certain objects and properties in her
surroundings. If perceptual experiences are conceived along those lines – that is, as
states resulting from the causal-informational interaction between a perceiver and
her environs – one should accordingly conclude that there is a deep relationship
between them and the items they are about. A stative conception binds experiences
to their respective objects because the worldly items presented in experience are
effectively constitutive of perceptual states.
More importantly,  (S)  could also  deal  with the question how perceptual
experiences relate to time. The tension behind this delicate relationship may be
expressed as follows: although psychological phenomena exist in time, it is unclear
how  perceptual  experiences  should  be  temporally  individuated.  As  previously
explained, (P) legitimises a number of questions about temporal individuation (e.g.
'When  did  that  experience  begin?',  'Does  Jim  have  one  or  many  experiences
between  t1 and  tx?'),  but  it  is  incapable  of  settling  them.  (S)  deals  with  them
differently. To begin with, it is capable of specifying when perceptual experiences
begin. But, in addition to that, it pre-empts the emergence of cardinality questions
–  although perceptual  states  exist  across  the  temporal  dimension,  they  simply
cannot be individuated like processes or tokens of other ontological categories. It
is,  I  think,  more or  less  uncontroversial  that  physical  as  well  as  mental  states
persist: an object may be red or yellow for a number of days; I may be anxious for
two week before my exams, or have a headache for a whole afternoon; and so on.
But, at the same time, it would be conceptually misguided to track states over time
the same way we track the mental processes which go on to constitute processive
mental events. In the present context, the importance of states lies in the fact that
they belong to a family of items (including properties, dispositions, among others)
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which satisfy conditions of existence without being particulars, whether spatial or
temporal  ones:  that  is,  states  do  not  have  the  same  conditions  of  identity  as
material  substances and events.  Conceived as states,  perceptual experiences are
thereby  redefined  in  a  way  that  makes  certain  questions  about  their  identity
legitimate,  and  others,  illegitimate.  According  to  (S),  experiences  have  identity
conditions,  but  the  latter  are  not  the  same  sort  of  conditions  that  spatial  or
temporal particulars (that is, material objects or events) have. More specifically, if
perceptual experiences are mental states, it would be possible to specify (i) when
perceptual experiences begin and end, and (ii), why attempts to count temporally
extended experiences are bound to fail.         
In relation to (i), Farrell pressed the impossibility of directly accessing, and
thereby  dating,  perceptual  experiences.  This  point  is,  I  think,  legitimate  when
experiences are conceived as mental processes, for the latter are neither observable
nor accessible through introspection. By contrast, the same difficulty does not arise
when the same psychological items are modelled along the lines of (S): after all, if
perceptual  experiences  are  states,  their  key  constitutive  elements  are  directly
accessible  to  philosophical  analysis.  To  illustrate  this  point,  let's  return  to  the
example I have been using thus far. Jim sees a bright star from t1 to tx: spotting the
star and losing sight of it are achievements which occur at determinate instants of
time. As I previously said, perceptual achievements and perceptual experiences are
not  identical:  the  instantaneous  event  of  spotting  a  star  is  not  an  experience.
Spotting the star should be conceived as an instantaneous event thanks to which
Jim comes to be in a given mental condition from t1 onwards: he stands in this
state for as long as the informational channel between him and the star exists;
again,  he  will  be  behaviourally  responsive  vis-à-vis  the  relevant  informational
source  for  as  long  as  he  stands  in  such  a  state.  According  to  (S),  the
aforementioned state is constituted by a relation of awareness between Jim and the
star. Spotting the star is not the same thing as experiencing the star at t1: it only
refers to the act of beginning to experience the bright object. 
Let's turn to the cardinality question now. Jim visually experiences a bright
star from t1 to tx. How many visual experiences has he? One or many? I previously
argued that (P) legitimises and, at the same time, fails to settle this question in
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relation  to  those  events  constituted  by phenomenally  conscious  processes.  The
problem is not that the question lacks an answer: after all, I think that perceptual
experiences are not the kind of psychological items which may be counted. Instead,
the difficulty is that the processive account throws no light on why it is misguided
to  attempt  to  solve  the  relevant  question:  it  just  burdens  us  with  extremely
controversial  entities  insofar  as  their  conditions  of  identity  cannot  be  directly
addressed, let alone specified. (S), by contrast, has a tactical advantage: not relying
on  the  existence  of  mental  processes,  it  explains  why  perceptual  experiences
cannot be counted. The reason is actually quite simple: states are not the kind of
things which allow for questions of cardinality over time. Unlike substances and
events, states instantiated throughout a period of time cannot be counted: that is,
given an item instantiating a state  of  a  certain kind from t1 to tx,  it  would be
mistaken  to  ask  how many tokens  of  that  state  the  relevant  item instantiates
throughout t1-tx. States belongs to a family of non-countable categories which also
includes properties, dispositions, and masses: by posing the cardinality question,
one thereby ignores a fundamental conceptual difference between this cluster of
notions and the one including concepts like substance and event.35 It would not be
merely unconventional, but conceptually misguided to ask, for example, how many
instances of  being-yellowness obtain in a banana throughout the time it is ripe.
This sort of question would betray a confusion about what it means for something
to be in a certain state, e.g. having a certain colour. If perceptual experiences are
conceived  as  mental  states,  it  would  thereby  not  be  necessary  to  determine
whether  a  subject  has  one  or  many  of  them  across  a  given  period  of  time:
experiences would not be the kind of things which may be counted; accordingly,
one could not pose the cardinality question in the present context. (S) does not take
a stance between the one-experience and the many-experiences hypothesis, for it
refuses  to  acknowledge  the  question  those  views  attempt  to  address.  This
framework thus provides the necessary resources to understand why perceptual
35 Compare here Anthony Kenny's remarks about ways in which dispositions (like states, non-
particulars) may be reified or hypostatized: 'In one of Andersen's fairy-tales the goblin takes the
housewife's gift of the gab and gives it to the water-butt. To think of a disposition as a piece of
property which may be passed from owner to owner is one way of hypostatizing it. Another
way, by contrast, is to think of a particular disposition as the kind of thing somebody might
have  two of,  to  ask  questions  such as  how many senses  of  humour Oliver  Cromwell  had.'
(Kenny 1989, 72)   
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experiences  exist  in  time,  but  do  not  submit  to  certain  questions  of  temporal
individuation.
For a similar reason, a stative conception of experience is not committed to
the 'snapshot' view of perception. In broad lines, the latter position holds that, if a
subject  S  stands  in  a  relation  of  perceptual  awareness  with  her  surroundings
during  a  given  period  of  time,  she  instantiates  numerically  distinct  states  at
different  moments  or  sub-intervals  throughout  that  period.  So,  if  Jim  visually
experiences a star from t1 to tx,  the snapshot view argues that he instantiates a
perceptual  state  at  t2 (that  is,  taking  t1 to  be  the  instant  at  which  he  began
experiencing the star), another one at t3, another one at t4, and so on up to tx. This
view, endorsed even by Armstrong himself (cf.  Armstrong 1968), multiplies the
mental  processes  underpinning  perceptual  phenomena.  And,  for  one  reason or
another,  this  bit  of  a  stative  conception  has  been  regarded  as  unappealing.
Although it is unclear to me why the snapshot view is incorrect, what one should
do here is to highlight the ontological significance of mental states as opposed to
categories of countable items: if perceptual experiences are states, they cannot be
counted  across  time;  for  exactly  the  same  reason,  it  is  mistaken  to  analyse
temporally  extended  perceptual  experiences  into  temporally  discrete  states
following each other across time. In the present context, it should be clear that the
snapshot view is just a specific version of a general conception according to which
experiences should answer questions of cardinality. The best antidote against this
line of reasoning is, I think, to insist on the ontological differences between states
and spatial or temporal particulars.                  
To sum up, I think that (S) does a better job than (P) when it comes to
individuate perceptual experiences over time:  more specifically,  I  argued that a
stative  conception  neatly  deals  with  the  relationship  between  perceptual
experiences, on the one hand, and, on the other, perceived objects and time. The
worldly items presented in experience are effectively constitutive of  perceptual
states:  as such, a stative conception ties  experiences to their respective objects.
Again, (S) addresses at least two questions concerning the temporal individuation
of experiences: first, when they begin; and, secondly, whether they can be counted.
If  the stative view is  correct,  both problems can be disposed insofar as  mental
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states have clear temporal boundaries (that is, starting-points and end-points) but,
at the same time, cannot be counted over time. In relation to all these issues, I
think  (S)  fares  much  better  than  (P).  Accordingly,  the  previous  considerations
constitute a partial reason to favour the stative view over a processive one.      
IV. CONCLUSION
Whereas the previous two chapters were mainly concerned with formulating a
stative  conception  of  perceptual  experiences,  this  one  aimed  to  defend  it.  In
particular, I argued that (S) provides an elegant framework, first, to get a grip on
the way in which perceptual experiences relate to their objects, and, secondly, to
understand the delicate relationship between experience and time. I broke this task
into three parts. First, I focused on temporally extended experiences and explained
why their contents throw little light on them. Secondly, I argued that a processive
view does not fare well with the identification of experiences over time. And then,
in the final section, I turned to (S) in order to show how it deals with the problems
faced by (P) in a more elegant way.    
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CHAPTER 4
THE ASSERTIVE CHARACTER OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
What kind of items are perceptual experiences? That is, what do we talk about
when  we  talk  about  such  psychological  items?  In  previous  chapters,  I  have
discussed two possible replies to this ontological question, namely, a stative and a
processive view:
  (P) Perceptual experiences are mental processes.
  (S) Perceptual experiences are mental states.
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The goal of this dissertation is to make a modest case for (S). Within this
context, chapter 3 argued that the question how temporally extended perceptual
experiences  are  individuated  is  best  accommodated  by  a  stative  conception  of
experiences than a processive one. This is one positive reason to endorse (S). The
other  reason  I  shall  discuss  here  concerns  what  may  be  called  the  assertive
character of perceptual experiences. By assertive character, I mean an essential
feature of perceptual experiences in virtue of which the worldly items or states of
affairs perceptual experiences present their subjects with, are presented as actual
(not  as  merely  possible)  items or  states  of  affairs.  A bit  more specifically,  the
thought could be expressed either in terms of experiential contents or in terms of
experiential subjects36: on the one hand, experiences are assertive insofar as the
worldly items or states of affairs they present to a subject are presented as being
the case; or, on the other, experiences are assertive insofar as their subjects do not
passively  entertain,  but  are  actually  committed  to  the existence  of  the worldly
items  or  states  of  affairs  such  experiences  present  them  with.  That  said,  this
chapter's  goal  is  to  show  that  a  stative  conception  does  a  better  job  than  a
processive account at accommodating the relevant feature. 
Why  to  focus  on  assertive  character?  Why  not  pick  up  on  any  other
interesting  albeit  puzzling  feature  of  perceptual  experiences  instead?  Time
constraints are naturally part of the answer. But, apart from that, it is important to
note that  my choice is  far  from arbitrary in  the present  context.  To unpack a
stative conception, this dissertation has strongly relied on a comparison between
perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs.  For  example,  I  have  borrowed  much  from
Armstrong's and Pitcher's theories of perception, the purpose of which is precisely
to  highlight  the  similarities  between  both  psychological  categories.  Given  this
general structure, it is natural to discuss the notion of assertive character at this
point, for, as I shall explain in a moment, it constitutes a commonality between
perceptual experiences and beliefs. In line with my overall direction of exposition,
the  thrust  of  this  chapter  is  that  bearing  in  mind  the  paradigmatically  stative
category  of  belief  throws  light  on  the  ontological  significance  of  conceiving
36 For the distinction between experiential content and experiential vehicle, cf. chapter 3.2.
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perceptual experiences as mental states.  
This chapter is structured into three parts. First, I introduce the notion of
assertive character: to begin with, I frame it in relation to perceptual experiences,
beliefs,  among  other  psychological  categories;  and  then,  I  relate  it  to  the
phenomenological notion of perceptual immediacy. Secondly, I turn to the question
how  the  assertive  character  of  perceptual  experiences  should  be  understood:
relying on the aforementioned connection between perception and belief, I argue
that it is extremely plausible to think of it in terms of the functional role which
perceptual  experiences  have  within  a  larger  psychological  and  epistemological
economy. This discussion is crucial, for my defence of (S) depends on a specific
understanding of assertive character. Finally, I argue that a stative conception of
perceptual experiences accommodates the feature of assertive character in a neater
way than a processive view. 
I. ASSERTIVE CHARACTER AND PERCEPTUAL IMMEDIACY
As just anticipated, the goal of this section is to introduce assertive character by
relating it, on the one hand, to a number of psychological categories, and, on the
other,  to  the  notion  of  perceptual  immediacy.  Once  again,  I  shall  keep  the
discussion focused on the visual modality (i.e. on seeing and visual experiences).
Accordingly, I shall continue using the example of Jim the sailor. A sailor on deck,
Jim, looks for a star during a cloudy night. At one point, the sky begins clearing up
a bit, and our vigilant subject suddenly spots a bright star. Jim sees the star from t1
to tx,  over which time there are no interruptions or conspicuous changes in his
visual field and the relevant star looks or appears a determinate way,  w, to him.
With these preliminary points out of the way, I turn to the notion of assertive
character. 
To  begin  with,  one  may  throw light  on  the  sense  in  which  perceptual
experiences are assertive by stressing commonalities as well as contrasts between
different  psychological  categories.  This  strategy  is  not,  I  think,  by  any  means
peculiar. As illustrated by the writings of Armstrong, Pitcher, among many others,
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the philosophical study of psychological categories and phenomena often takes off
from comparisons  rather  than a  priori  definitions.  To illuminate  the  nature  of
seeing,  for  example,  philosophers  usually  describe  some of  the  similarities  and
differences  between this  perceptual  phenomenon and other  perceptual  or  non-
perceptual  events  (e.g.  smelling,  hearing,  judging,  thinking,  etc.).  Again,  our
understanding  of  perceptual  experiences  tends  to  be  enriched,  or  at  least
stimulated, by comparing circumstances where we undergo perceptual experiences
with circumstances where we fail to do so (e.g. blindness) or ones where some
features of perceptual experiences are present but others are absent (e.g. blindsight,
super-blindsight,  among others).  That  said,  it  is  natural  to  draw a  comparison
between  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs,  for  they  stand  apart  from  other
psychological categories in relation to the way in which they convey the world to
their subjects. When a subject S believes that p or experiences a given state of
affairs X, the worldly items p and X are about are presented to S as if they were
actual, not merely possible, items: that is, S takes the proposition her belief ranges
over to be true; or, likewise, the states of affairs experientially unveiled to her seem
to be the case. In this respect, perceptual experiences and beliefs stand apart from
propositional attitudes such as thinking, desiring, and hoping: when these attitudes
present a subject with worldly items via propositions, the relevant subject need not
take such propositions to be true; in fact, some of such propositional attitudes (e.g.
desiring) may presuppose that the relevant subject does not believe that p is true.
For example, Jim may have spotted a bright star, after which he experiences the
luminous object and acquires beliefs the content of which he may express as 'That
is a bright star', 'There is a star at the distance', 'Lo and behold, a star!', etc. Before
t1, Jim could only relate to that object by looking for it, hoping to spot it, imagining
a bright star to be roughly where he expects to find it, etc. An important difference
between the  mental  phenomena Jim goes  through before  t1 and those  he  goes
through  from  t1 onwards  is  that,  unlike  his  hopes  and  desires,  Jim's  visual
experiences and beliefs present or represent a bright star as something actually
present in Jim's environs. Unlike hopes and desires, beliefs and experiences assert
the existence of the items they present or represent.
Even though its formulation may vary a great deal from case to case, the
114
notion  of  assertive  character  is  commonly  approached  in  the  philosophical
literature as  a  respect  of  similarity between perceptual  experiences and beliefs.
Richard Heck explicitly pursues this strategy:
Perception is not belief. But no one, so far as I know, has ever been so much as tempted to
say that perceptions are desires, intentions, or entertainings; only beliefs are liable to be
confused with perceptions.  The reason is that,  as different as perception may be from
belief–as isolated in certain ways as perceptual experience is from the influence of our
beliefs–there is yet something similar: Both purport to represent how the world is;  both,
we  might  say  (borrowing  some  terminology  from  the  philosophy  of  language)  have
assertoric force. Even when the world appears to be a way I know it not to be–when a
stick I know to be straight looks to be bent when I partially immerse it in water (to use a
tired example)–it still looks as if the stick is bent. That is to say, my experience represents
the world as containing a bent stick: In a different way, to be sure, than my beliefs would
were I to believe that the stick was bent, but it represents it as being that way nonetheless.
(Heck 2000, 508)          
A  similar  thought  is  in  the  offing  when  M.G.F.  Martin  describes  an
intentional  (i.e.  representational)  account  of  perceptual  experiences  using  a
distinction  between  what  he  calls  stative  and  semantic  content.  On  a  stative
conception, 'for something to be representational is for it to put something forward
as the case or to take it to be so, or to be apt for either role.' (Martin 2002, 386) In
this  sense  of  representation,  beliefs,  judgements  and  assertoric  statements  are
representational; hopes, desires, and interrogative claims, are not. If a given mental
attitude has stative content in Martin's sense, it will represent states of affairs as
worldly items which actually obtain: 'In believing or accepting something I  am
thereby taking it to be so, and in asserting something I am putting it forward as so.
In contrast, in merely entertaining the proposition, or hoping that it should be so, I
am not  thereby taking it  to  be  so,  and in  making  a  request  I  am not  putting
something  forward  as  so.'  (Martin  2002,  386-7) On  a  semantic  conception  of
content,  meanwhile,  everything  that  is  about  something  other  than  itself  is
representational: in this sense, hopes, desires, and interrogative claims are indeed
representational.  With  this  distinction  at  hand,  Martin  argues  that  the
intentionalist  view  of  experience  should  exploit  a  stative,  not  a  semantic,
understanding of content: for, like Heck, he assumes that there is a commonality
between the ways in which experiences present and beliefs represent the world,
that  is,  one  which  sets  them  aside  from  other  propositional  attitudes;  but,  by
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conceiving perceptual content along semantic lines, one would assimilate the ways
in which perceptual experiences and propositional attitudes like hopes and desires
represent the world, and hence, obscure the aforementioned commonality between
experiences  and  beliefs.  Finally,  Katherine  Glüer  recently  stressed  the  same
psychological  similarity when claiming that perceptual experiences are strongly
representational:  according  to  her,  '[e]xperience  not  only  has  representational
content, it represents the world  as being a certain way.' (Glüer 2009, 306) Like
Heck and Martin, she argues that this is a respect in which experiences resemble
beliefs, but one in which they stand apart from 'desires, imaginings, assumings,
and entertainings' (Glüer 2009, 307). 
Perceptual experiences and beliefs thereby fail to present or represent the
world  the  same  way  propositional  attitudes  like  hopes  and  desires  do:  in  this
particular  respect,  experiences  and  beliefs  jointly  stand  apart  from  other
psychological  phenomena.  As  previously  mentioned,  this  thought  may  be
expressed in a number of ways. My initial choice of words was: the worldly items
and  states  of  affairs  presented  or  represented  in  experience  and  belief  are
presented or represented as actual, not merely possible, items. This is just one way
of saying that, if S experiences a given state of affairs, her experience purports to
present her with that state of affairs or that state of affairs seems to be the case; or
again, if she believes that p, she takes p to be true. To make the same point, it is
not necessary to focus on the way in which experiences and beliefs convey the
world to a subject. Indeed, one could formulate the same idea by stressing the way
in which subjects relate to the worldly items and states of affairs (re)presented in
experience and belief. Whereas some propositional attitudes may be such that their
respective subjects remain neutral in relation to whether the (re)presented items
exist  or  fail  to  do  so,  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs  commit  their
corresponding subjects to take the world to be the way it is (re)presented to them.
A subject may desire or hope there to be a bright star in a certain area of the sky,
but none of these instantiated attitudes implies, as far as the respective subject is
concerned, that  there is  actually  a star at  the distance.  Imagining, hoping, and
wishing are thereby different from experiencing and believing,  for an essential
trait of the latter categories is that they commit their subjects to take the existence
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of the (re)presented items for granted. 
But even if the notion of assertive character is intelligible, is it an essential
trait  of  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs?  Although  the  point  is  not  entirely
uncontroversial, I think there are intuitive reasons to think so. After all, could we
actually conceive a belief in p the subject of which does not take p to be true, or an
experience  of  a  given  state  of  affairs  X which  does  not  impress  the  apparent
existence of X to its corresponding subject? That is, could we conceive beliefs and
experiences which are not assertive? I do not think so. Moore's paradox more or
less settled the issue in relation to beliefs: a subject cannot take herself to believe
that  p and  simultaneously  think  that  p is  false  (cf.  Wittgenstein  1953,  II.x).
Although there is not a similar paradox for perceptual experiences, they are also
essentially  assertive.  To appreciate  this,  one has  to  consider  whether  a  subject
could undergo a perceptual experience of certain worldly items or states of affairs
X but, at the same time, take a passive stance on the experientially presented items
– as it were, simply entertain things rather than take them to be so. In relation to
this possibility, the phenomenon of vision-recovery after prolonged blindness is
specially pertinent (cf. von Senden 1960; Sacks 1995; Ostrovsky et al. 2006). The
related  findings  are,  I  think,  relevant  for  philosophical  purposes  because  they
highlight the role which perceptual experiences play within our psychological and
epistemic  economy.  There  are  certain  forms  of  blindness  where  the  relevant
impairment is reversible.  In one of such cases,  victims of severe cataracts have
undergone surgical procedures which re-establish their visual capacities: before the
relevant procedure, many of the relevant subjects were practically blind or enjoyed
only  degraded  visual  experiences;  thanks  to  this  procedure,  the  same  subjects
recover  the  capacity  of  processing  visual  information  and,  some  qualifications
aside, become sensitive to their visible surroundings. In the path towards recovery,
however, there is a trying stage throughout which these subjects must, as it were,
learn  to  see  again.  A relatively  common result  of  the aforementioned surgical
procedure is that, although the relevant subjects may regain the ability to fix on
visual stimuli, they may ignore or take a completely passive stance vis-à-vis that
information. If there are such things as non-assertive perceptual experiences, the
psychological phenomena emerging in such scenarios come as close as possible to
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fit the bill: that is, they might be naturally described as cases where a determinate
subject undergoes a visual experience, but the worldly items thereby presented to
her would not be presented as actual items. 
But should we actually describe the psychological phenomena involved in
these  cases  as  perceptual  experiences?  I  do  not  think  so.  While  perceptual
experiences endow a subject with the capacity to behave in a complex number of
ways, it seems reasonable to argue that newly sighted subjects fail to experience
the  world  because  they  fail  to  engage  in  such  complex  patterns  of  behaviour
whenever they 'see' a worldly item.37 Even if a newly sighted subject is capable of
latching  onto  visible  items,  she  fails  to  track  them  over  time,  translating  the
acquired  information  into  propositional  content  for  its  use  in  thought  and
language, etc. – all these being possibilities which should be open to her was she
undergoing visual experiences. Thus, if the previous cases of neglectful perception
are the best candidates of non-assertive perceptual experiences, as I think they are,
and they cannot truly be classified as perceptual experiences, one should thereby
conclude  that  assertive  character  is  an  essential  or  non-negotiable  feature  of
perceptual experiences.     
The foregoing remarks intend to establish two things: first, that perceptual
experiences are assertive, the latter being a feature which such experiences share
with beliefs; and, secondly, that assertive character is an essential feature of both
psychological  categories.  Now,  before  turning  to  the  notion  of  perceptual
immediacy, a few points of clarification are in order. First, I am not assuming here
that  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs  are  the  only  assertive  categories.  For
example, if somato-sensory experiences (e.g. pain-experiences) have content in the
sense that they present a subject  with occurrences in bodily parts or regions, I
suspect they would probably count as assertive. In the present discussion, I only
examine perceptual experiences and beliefs  in order to focus the discussion: by
doing so, I do not intend to rule out that other psychological categories might also
37 Along these lines, von Senden describes a stage of purely visual sensation as one where 'vision
is confined to the purely physiological process of the reception and conveyance of stimuli to the
visual centres. For the individual, it remains a quite passive influx of visual impressions, which
do nothing, as yet, to induce him to emerge from his passive state and to try, for his own part, to
take up some sort  of  mental  attitude towards  the chaos of  colours  presented to  him.'  (von
Senden 1960, 129-30)
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share the relevant feature.
Secondly, the terminology used here is not intended to suggest that I am
willing to ascribe linguistic features to our mental lives. Indeed, while I claim that
perceptual experiences and beliefs are assertive, the latter property is primarily
derived from the theory of speech acts. That is, the notion of assertive character
has its philosophical roots in the idea that statements, not psychological processes
or states, have assertive force. Now, by using this piece of linguistic philosophy, I
do not intend to assimilate perceptual experiences or other mental phenomena to
speech acts: that is, I am not claiming that perceptual experiences are assertive in
exactly the same sense in which speech acts are so. The present extrapolation from
the philosophy of language only constitutes a useful analogy.38    
Finally, when I hold that perceptual experiences and beliefs are assertive,
this  does  not  mean  that  they  are  factive.  In  a  nutshell,  being  factive  may  be
described as follows: a factive propositional attitude is such that, if a given subject
instantiates  that  attitude  in  relation  to  a  proposition  p,  then  p  is  true;
correspondingly, a factive non-propositional attitude is such that, if a given subject
instantiates that attitude in relation to a worldly item or state of affairs X, then X
is the case. Knowledge is a standard example of factive propositional attitudes: if
you know that 2+2=4, then it is true that 2+2=4. If pain experiences have content
in the minimal  sense I  have previously stipulated and are not propositional,  it
would be natural to categorize them as factive: if you experience a pain, there is a
pain. That said, claiming that perceptual experiences and beliefs are assertive does
not entail that they are factive. Indeed, I do not think they are. Committed idealists
aside, one would not argue that our perceptual experiences always present things
as  they  really  are:  as  the  possibility  of  perceptual  illusions  and  hallucinations
38 Compare here Searle's characterization of visual content as propositional: 'The content of the
visual experience, like the content of the belief, is always equivalent to a whole proposition.
Visual experience is never simply of an object but rather it must always be that such and such is
the case. Whenever, for example, my visual experience is of a station wagon it must also be an
experience, part of whose content is, for example, that there is a station wagon in front of me.
When I say that the content of the visual experience is equivalent to a whole proposition I do
not mean that it is linguistic but rather that the content requires the existence of a whole state
of affairs if  it is to be satisfied.'  (Searle 1983,  40) He runs the same sort of qualification in
relation to the self-referential character of perceptual content: 'The sense then in which the
visual  Intentional  content  is  self-referential  is  not  that  it  contains  a  verbal  or  other
representation of itself: it certainly performs no speech act of reference to itself!' (Searle 1983,
49) 
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makes  perfectly  clear,  how things  appear  to  us  may fail  to  match how things
actually are. A straight stick partially submerged into water may look bent when I
see it: I perceive an object, but I take it to have a property which it actually lacks.
In the much-used example of visual hallucination, Macbeth seems to see a bloody
dagger suspended in mid-air: in fact, there is nothing but thin air in front of him.
Much in the same way as perceptual experiences may be accurate and inaccurate,
beliefs may be true or false. Now, although perceptual experiences and beliefs may
be accurate  or  inaccurate,  true or  false,  they are always assertive.  Even if  Jim
undergoes an illusion or an hallucination concerning the star he is looking for –
that is, even if the object apparently presented to him in experience does not exist
at all – it will appear to him as if there is actually a bright star in the sky. Again,
although a subject may have false beliefs, she cannot hold beliefs she knows to be
false.   
Before moving on, let me say something about the relationship between
assertive  character  and  perceptual  immediacy:  for,  although  both  notions  are
closely related, this link is a rather delicate one. In the philosophical literature, it is
fairly natural to claim that perceptual experiences are immediate or direct in the
sense that,  whether  accurate  or inaccurate,  they make their  respective subjects
immediately or directly aware of the items they are of. Perceptual experiences are
supposed to stand out in the theatre of our psychological lives because they endow
us with a special form of access into the world: while Jim's visual experience would
genuinely present him with the star, other (non-perceptual) phenomena could only
represent or provide otherwise mediated forms of access to the same worldly item.
Whatever the exact sense in which perceptual experiences are immediate or direct
may  be,  it  is  closely  related  to  the  possibility  of  acquiring  demonstrative  (as
opposed to descriptive) knowledge about worldly items. For example, part of what
it means to say that Jim has direct access to a star when he is visually aware of it,
is that, unlike a subject who fails experiencing the same item, he is in a position to
form beliefs  such as 'That is  bright'  or  'That is  thus'.39 For the time being,  the
important point is that, for all the difficulties behind its exact nature, perceptual
immediacy  is  often  regarded  by  philosophers  as  an  obvious  feature  of  how
39 For  discussion  about  the  relationship  between  perceptual  immediacy  and  demonstrative
knowledge, cf. Snowdon 1992 and Campbell 2002. 
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perceptual experiences convey the world to us – in other words, as a basic datum
of our  perceptual phenomenology (cf. Sturgeon 2000, ch. 1).  
In their respective writings, John Searle and Scott Sturgeon neatly express
the previous line of thought:
If,  for  example,  I  see a yellow station wagon in front of me, the experience I  have is
directly of the object. It doesn't just “represent” the object, it provides direct access to it.
The experience has a kind of  directness,  immediacy and involuntariness  which is  not
shared  by  a  belief  I  might  have  about  the  object  in  its  absence.  It  seems  therefore
unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations, indeed if we talk that way it is
almost bound to lead to the representative theory of perception. Rather, because of the
special  features  of  perceptual  experiences  I  propose  to  call  them “presentations”.  The
visual experience I will say does not just represent the state of affairs perceived; rather,
when satisfied, it gives us direct access to it, and in that sense it is a presentation of that
state of affairs. (Searle 1983, 45-6)
[…] your visual experience will place a moving rock before the mind in a uniquely vivid
way. Its phenomenology will be as if a scene is made manifest to you. This is the most
striking aspect of visual consciousness. It's the signal feature of visual phenomenology.
And there's nothing ineffable about it.  Such phenomenology involves a uniquely vivid
directedness upon the world. Visual phenomenology makes it for a subject as if a scene is
simply presented. Veridical perception, illusion and hallucination seem to place objects
and their features directly before the mind. (Sturgeon 2000, 9; also cf. Crane 2005/2011, s.
2.1.2)
    
 As  previously  mentioned,  the  idea  cutting  across  these  texts  is  that
perceptual experiences present us with worldly items in a very distinctive way:
when we perceive the world, we are not as it were presented with copies of our
surroundings, but with the things themselves. Assertive character and perceptual
immediacy thus share a general commonality: they constitute distinctive features –
that  is,  necessary  but  not  sufficient  conditions  – of  perceptual  experiences.  In
short, assertive character and immediacy are essential or non-negotiable aspects of
perceptual experiences.      
That said, it is also important to appreciate a key difference between the
aforementioned  notions.  The  main  clue  is,  I  think,  provided  by  the
phenomenological character of perceptual immediacy. As previously mentioned,
the notion of immediacy is supposed to constitute a basic datum about perceptual
phenomenology, not a piece of philosophical theorizing. The notion of assertive
character, in turn, has no such connotations: in principle, it would be possible to
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specify this feature in purely functional terms, or at least in terms which make no
reference to how worldly items perceptually appear to a subject. The significance
of this difference fully stands out when one bears in mind the comparison between
perceptual experiences and beliefs. As previously explained, the notion of assertive
character was intended to pick up on a commonality between both psychological
categories: this is at least how philosophers commonly approach the notion. By
contrast, immediacy is intended to set experiences apart from beliefs: for Searle,
beliefs do not present the world to a subject in an immediate or direct way (cf.
Searle  1983,  45).  Indeed,  there  is  an  intuitive  sense  in  which  experiences  and
beliefs present the same worldly items in different ways to their subjects: the direct
way in which perceptual experiences present us the world is simply not the same
way in which beliefs, among other propositional attitudes, do so. This important
asymmetry thereby suggests that the relationship between assertive character and
immediacy is far from straightforward.
How should we understand the relationship between the assertive character
and  the  immediacy  of  perceptual  experiences?  A  fairly  natural  (if  not
uncontroversial)  suggestion is that, while perceptual experiences present certain
things as being the case, the specific way in which they do so is by presenting a
subject  with the world in an immediate  or direct  way.  That is,  while  assertive
character  is  a  feature  in  virtue  of  which  worldly  items  are  experientially  and
doxastically presented to a subject  as actual,  not merely possible,  items, it  also
seems natural  to  conceive  perceptual  immediacy as  the  specific  way in  which
perceptual  experiences  pull  that  off.  The  background thought  is  that,  although
perceptual experiences and beliefs are assertive, it does not follow from this that
they  are  assertive  in  the  same  way.40 Even  if  both  psychological  categories
constitute  forms of  mental  states,  their  tokens  are  obviously  different  in  other
respects:  as  such,  it  would  be  by  no  means  surprising  that  the  general  or
40 This line of thought is hinted at by Heck: 'Even when the world appears to be a way I know it
not to be–when a stick I know to be straight looks to be bent when I partially immerse it in
water (to use a tired example)–it still looks as if the stick is bent. That is to say, my experience
represents the world as containing a bent stick: In a different way, to be sure, than my beliefs
would  were  I  to  believe  that  the  stick  was  bent,  but  it  represents  it  as  being  that  way
nonetheless.' (Heck 2000, 508) By claiming that experiences and beliefs present us with certain
states of affairs as being the case, one need not hold that the way they do so is the same. For all
we know, assertive character may pick up on a determinable, not a determinate commonality
between the relevant psychological categories.
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determinable  features  they share  were implemented or  determined in  different
ways. If functional features of perceptual experiences had an impact on perceptual
phenomenology, it is reasonable to expect that the same feature could not have
phenomenological consequences when implemented by beliefs, since the latter lack
phenomenology,  or  at  least  the  sort  of  phenomenology  which  perceptual
experiences have. On the basis of these remarks, it  seems coherent to conceive
perceptual immediacy as the phenomenological specification of assertive character
among perceptual experiences.  
To  sum up,  this  section  focused on introducing  the  notion  of  assertive
character as a commonality between perceptual experiences and beliefs, that is, as
a feature in virtue of which experiences and beliefs present or represent worldly
items  as  actual,  not  merely  possible,  items  to  their  respective  subjects.  After
pausing on a few points of clarification, I related the notion of assertive character
to that of perceptual immediacy, since they are closely related. The connection is
not straightforward, for both notions play different roles: while assertive character
ties  perceptual  experience and belief  together,  perceptual  immediacy sets  them
apart.  The  latter  feature  may,  I  suspect,  be  understood  as  the  specific  or
determinate way in which perceptual experiences are assertive. Having said that,
even if this section has managed to latch onto the notion of assertive character and
to outline what it does for us – namely, to present worldly items in a distinctive
way to subjects  of  thought and experience – it  has  not quite settled how it  is
exactly  implemented  in  experiences  and  beliefs.  I  take  on  this  task  next:  as
previously  announced,  the  story  I  shall  deliver  provides  the  basis  for  another
motivation to endorse (S) over (P).    
      
II. ASSERTIVE CHARACTER AND FUNCTIONAL ROLE
Assertive character is that feature in virtue of which perceptual experiences and
beliefs  present  us  with  worldly items or  states  of  affairs  as  actual,  not  merely
possible, items or states of affairs. Now, although this description specifies what
assertive character does for us, it does not spell out how experiences and beliefs
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exactly  implement  that  feature.  Heck,  for  example,  describes  perceptual
experiences  and  beliefs  as  assertive,  but  he  also  acknowledges  our  limited
understanding of the property thus ascribed:
Of course, it would be nice to know more about what it means to say that perceptual states
are “assertive.” Unfortunately, I do not know how to explain this. Nor, however, do I know
how to explain what is involved in a belief's being assertive: What exactly does it mean to
say that beliefs purport to represent how the world is? I think an answer to this question
could be converted into an answer for the case of perception, too: At least, that is the point
of my relying upon this analogy here. (Heck 2000, 509n.29)
Two  ideas  stand  out  here:  first,  that  it  is  by  no  means  obvious  what
assertive character amounts to; and, secondly, that a story of such a feature should
be  applicable  to  experiences  as  well  as  to  beliefs  –  this  constraint  is  indeed
determined by our general understanding of the relevant notion as a commonality
between both psychological  categories.  This section aims to  outline a plausible
account of what it exactly means for perceptual experiences to be assertive and,
relatedly, immediate. In particular, I argue that the relevant notions may simply
pick up on the functional roles of perceptual experiences within our psychological
and epistemic economies – that is, the ways in which perceptual experiences affect
propositional attitudes, actions, and linguistic behaviour. Although this proposal
cannot be fully vindicated here,  I  make a case for it  as  an extremely plausible
working hypothesis.    
In chapter 3, I relied on the distinction between experiential content and
experiential  vehicle:  while  perceptual  experiences  have  content  in  the  minimal
sense that they are about or concern worldly items or states of affairs, they are not
identical to their corresponding contents; instead, they are vehicles of content (cf.
chapter 3.2). So, for example, when Jim experiences and thinks about a particular
bright star, similar contents are instantiated by psychological vehicles of different
kinds. Or again, when he sees a star and then looks at the mast of the ship, he
instantiates psychological vehicles of identical type (you might call it visual-type)
with different contents. The content-vehicle distinction may be used to divide the
present discussion into the assessment of two specific questions: 
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  (a) Is the assertive character of perceptual experiences a feature of experiential
contents?
  (b) Is the assertive character of perceptual experiences a feature of experiential
vehicles?
Since my discussion of (a)-(b) is rather lengthy, I shall break this task down
into three sub-sections: first, I defend a negative answer to (a); secondly, I turns to
(b),  so  as  to  argue  that  assertive  character  and  perceptual  immediacy  may be
analysed in functional terms; and, finally, I tackle two potential counterexamples
against the previous view.    
2.1. Assertive Character and Experiential Content
It might be tempting to think that the assertive character of perceptual experiences
is a feature of their contents. Indeed, this is precisely suggested by some statements
of the relevant property in this dissertation and beyond. When I introduced it, I
claimed that perceptual experiences are assertive insofar as the worldly items they
present a subject with are presented as being the case; and this claim seems to
concern  the  things  perceptual  experiences  are  of.  Again,  Martin  unpacks  the
stative-semantic  distinction as a  distinction between different  kinds  of  content:
psychological  phenomena  of  a  given  kind  have  stative  content  only  if  they
represent the world as being the case; they have semantic content only if  they
merely  refer  to  worldly  items,  without  asserting  their  existence.  Glüer  follows
Martin's steps, for she brings up the notion of assertive character in the context of
a representational view of experience: according to her, perceptual experiences are
strongly  representational,  where  psychological  phenomena  are  strongly
representational iff they represent worldly items or states of affairs as being the
case.  Thus,  the  general  thought  is  that  perceptual  experiences  are  assertive  in
virtue of the sort of content they have. What a philosophical story of that feature
should then do for us is to identify the specific trait of experiential contents on
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which  the  assertive  character  of  perceptual  experiences  supervenes.  And,  as
previously mentioned, a constraint on this story will be that the chosen feature
should be shared by experiences and beliefs.
This stance is, however, problematic precisely because it is unclear what
trait of experiential contents could group experience and belief together, and, at
the same time, set them apart from propositional attitudes such as hoping, desiring,
etc. That is, for practically any remarkable feature F of experiential contents that I
can think of, either F is not shared by the contents of experiences and beliefs or it
is not essential to the assertive phenomena I am concerned with. In either case, F
fails drawing a line between perceptual experiences and beliefs, on the one hand,
and, on the other, non-assertive propositional attitudes such as hopes and desires. 41
As far as I can see, the notion of experiential content may be associated at least
with  four  different  features:  (i)  the  worldly  items  or  states  of  affairs  which
perceptual  experiences  present  to  their  subjects;  (ii)  informational  richness  and
fine-grainedness; (iii) concept-independence or non-conceptual character; and (iv)
analog character. (i) does not seem to require further comments. Although (ii)-(iv)
are rather delicate features, it is not necessary to have a thorough grip on them 42:
to understand why they cannot account for the assertive character of perceptual
experiences, all we need is to have a sense of which psychological categories are
and are not characterized by them. As such, I shall keep a description of these
features simple here. To begin with, the notions of informational richness and fine-
grainedness  are  often  introduced  as  points  of  contrast  between  perceptual
experiences  and  cognitive  phenomena  downstream  perception:  so,  the  general
thought  is  that  while  our  perceptual  capacities  retrieve  richer  or  finer-grained
environmental  information  via  perceptual  experiences,  beliefs  and  other
propositional  attitudes  process  less  or  coarser-grained  information  in  order  to
avoid  informational  over-load.  At  this  general  stage,  I  group  fine-grainedness
together  with  informational  richness  for  two  reasons:  first,  it  is  unclear  what
difference, if any, there is between both features; and secondly, both of them are
41 Martin  seems  to  pursue  a  very  similar  line  of  objection:  according  to  him,  a  number  of
prominent features of perceptual content (in a stronger sense of the word 'content' than mine,
though) fail to account for their stative (i.e. assertive) character (cf. Martin 2002, 388-9). Again,
this point emerges more or less explicitly elsewhere throughout the philosophical literature (cf.
Dennett 1996; Speaks 2005; Chuard 2007).
42 But I discuss them further in chapter 5.
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used to draw a distinction between perception and cognition, which is, for present
purposes,  all  that  matters.  Perceptual  content  has  also  been  described  as
nonconceptual, in the sense that it is not constituted or otherwise determined by
the  concepts  or  conceptual  capacities  which  the  relevant  perceiver  is  endowed
with. In this respect, the content of experiences is intended to contrast the content
of propositional attitudes such as beliefs, for the latter do depend on the conceptual
repertoire their respective subjects are endowed with. Finally, perceptual content is
also  said  to  be  analog  as  opposed  to  digital:  crudely  put,  the  thought  is  that,
whereas perceptual representation is more like pictorial representation than like
sentential  representation,  the  way  in  which  beliefs,  among  other  cognitive
phenomena, represent the world is closer to the way in which sentences do so.43  
 None of  the previous features underpin assertive character,  though. To
begin  with,  it  is  true that  (i)  is  a  feature shared by the  relevant  psychological
categories:  both perceptual  experiences  and beliefs  (re)present worldly items to
their subjects. But non-assertive attitudes also represent the world: a sailor may
hope a certain star to be visible from the main deck; a person may fear that this
will be a cloudy night; and so on. There are thus a wide range of propositional
attitudes which are non-assertive and, at the same time, represent aspects of the
world.  As such, (i)  could not set apart assertive phenomena from non-assertive
one. An initially plausible reply consists in denying that hopes and desires present
us with the world exactly the same way perceptual experiences do so: elaborating
on Searle's work, one could claim that experiences 'present' us with the world and
that non-assertive propositional attitudes only 'represent' it, where 'presentation'
and 'representation' stand for mutually exclusive notions. The problem with this
line of response is that it is hard to motivate a similar distinction in relation to
beliefs: although these propositional attitudes are assertive, it is unclear that the
way in which they represent the world is any different from that in which hopes
and desires do so. Since (i) does not thereby set perceptual experiences and beliefs
43 For different characterizations of perceptual content as analog, cf. Dretske 1981; Peacocke 1986,
1989.  Although Thau persuasively criticizes  fleshing out the experience-belief  distinction in
analogy to the contrast between pictorial and sentential representation (cf. Thau 2002), I do not
think that, say, Peacocke's understanding of perceptual content as analog ultimately rests on the
picture-sentence metaphor. This shows that the notion of analog character should be articulated
more carefully than I have done here. The present discussion does not depend on the exact
import of that feature, though. 
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apart  from non-assertive propositional  attitudes,  it  cannot  pick up on assertive
character. 
Informational  richness  and fine-grainedness  could  not  play  the  relevant
role either: for, as usually understood in the philosophical literature, these features
are  taken  to  constitute  a  difference,  not  a  commonality,  between  perceptual
experiences  and  beliefs.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  even  clear  that,  like  assertive
character, they constitute essential components of perceptual experiences: after all,
a subject could well be visually aware of primitive scenes (e.g. a black square on a
white background), in which case the corresponding contents would not be any
informationally richer or finer-grained than the contents of their doxastic counter-
parts. Similar remarks apply to concept-independence and analog character: even
if they are features of perceptual content – which is rather controversial – their
standard role  is  that  of  setting perceptual  experiences  apart  from propositional
attitudes  in  general,  including  beliefs;  again,  it  is  not  obvious  that  those
philosophers claiming that perceptual content is nonconceptual and analog would
go as  far  as  claiming that  perceptual  content  is  essentially  so.44 The foregoing
remarks thereby suggest that none of the aforementioned features specifies what it
means for perceptual experiences to be assertive.45               
2.2. Assertive Character and Functional Role
   
Since prominent features of experiential content do not determine the assertive
44 For example, while José Luis Bermúdez claims that perceptual content need not be conceptual,
he  is  not  committed  to  the  modally  stronger  claim  that  perceptual  content  could  not  be
conceptual (cf.  Bermúdez 2007).  Again,  Christopher Peacocke has provided one of the most
sophisticated characterizations of perceptual content as analog, but he seems to allow for the
idea that there could be perceptual experiences with digital content (cf. Peacocke 1989).
45 The previous remarks aim to show that there is not a direct correlation between any of the
features  (i)-(iv),  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  the  assertive  character  of  perceptual
experiences. Another way of pulling the same trick off, I think, consists in comparing cases of
assertive and non-assertive psychological attitudes which nevertheless shared the same sort of
content – or at least the same sort of features along dimensions (i)-(iv). I do not pursue this
strategy here, for it depends on the possibility of conceiving a rather delicate scenario, namely,
one where we control for features (i)-(iv) but, at the same time, spin psychological attitudes
along  the  assertive/non-assertive  dimension.  The  line  of  reasoning  I  have  followed  here,
meanwhile,  relies  on  actual  ascriptive  practices:  as  a  matter  of  fact,  perceptual  content  is
conceived as informationally richer or finer-grained than doxastic content; perceptual content is
conceived as analog rather than digital; and so on. 
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character  of  perceptual  experiences,  it  is  time  to  consider  the  option  behind
question (b), namely, that the assertive character of perceptual experiences might
be  a  feature  of  experiential  vehicles.  I  do  think  that  this  suggestion  is  a  live
philosophical option. Heck, for example, hints at a position along such lines: 
Perceptions are not beliefs: But they may yet be attitudes of some other kind, even if they
are not desires, intentions, or entertainings. In fact, I suggest, perceptions  are attitudes,
attitudes that are like beliefs insofar as to be in a perceptual state is to hold an assertive, or
presentational, attitude towards a certain content. (cf. Heck 2000, 509) 
Of course, more needs to be said, for it is unclear how such psychological
attitudes  or  vehicles  exactly  instantiate  the  feature  I  am  concerned  with.  To
address this issue, I shall pursue a functionalist story here: in a nutshell, the main
thought is that the assertive character of perceptual experiences (and beliefs, for
that matter) is nothing over and above the way in which instances of this category
affect or govern other mental phenomena and behaviour. To unpack this position, I
shall move in two stages: first, I outline what I take to be a fairly familiar (albeit
non-constitutive) connection between assertive character and the functional role of
a given psychological category; and, secondly, I go on to hold that this link may be
conceived as a constitutive one – as far as I can see, such a proposal is the most
straightforward understanding of the relevant connection. The notion of assertive
character,  it  seems to  me,  simply  picks  up on part  of  the  functional  role  that
perceptual experiences play within our psychological or epistemic economies.  
The link between assertive character and functional role is relatively well-
known in the philosophical literature. According to Martin, when an intentionalist
philosopher describes perceptual representation as 'stative', she thereby stresses 'a
distinctive role in one's mental economy that experience has and the others [i.e.
other  intentional  states]  lack.'  (Martin  2002,  388)  The  assertive  character  of
perceptual  experiences  is  closely  related  to  the  consequences  that  such
psychological items have within a subject's overall mental economy. In particular,
Martin  highlights  the  distinctive  epistemological  link  between  experiences  and
beliefs: although appropriate counter-evidence may challenge the authority of the
senses, perceptual experiences tend to fix the content of a subject's beliefs about
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her environment (cf. Martin 2002, 390). Experiences' distinctive contribution does
not merely consist in causing beliefs, but also in rationally grounding them. While
Martin describes but does not endorse a representationalist  view of experience,
Glüer espouses a stance along that line. According to her, psychological types are
defined  by  their  respective  functional  roles:  in  this  context,  she  conceives  the
strongly  representational  character  (i.e.  what  I  call  here  assertive character)  of
experiences and beliefs as a commonality on the 'output' side of their functional
roles – in particular, as their readiness to make an impact on further cognitive
states  (cf.  Glüer  2009, 308).  By focusing on the output side of  functional  roles
alone, Glüer makes room to draw a distinction between both psychological types
on  their  input  side:  while  perceptual  experiences  are  caused  by  sub-personal
cognitive processes, beliefs are caused by other strongly representational attitudes.
In  chapter  5,  I  challenge  the  idea  that  the  'output'  functional  role  of  both
psychological  categories  is  the  same  (cf.  chapter  5.4).  For  the  time  being,  the
relevant point is that both Martin and Glüer hint at the possibility of conceiving
the key commonality among assertive attitudes as a functional one. 
According  to  the  previous  writers,  then,  perceptual  experiences  affect
beliefs by causing and rationally grounding them. One could slightly expand this
functionalist  picture  by  noting  that  perceptual  input  also  affects  action  and
language:  that  is,  a  subject's  perceptual  experiences  determine  not  only  what
beliefs  she has,  but also how she could act  vis-à-vis her surroundings and, if  a
language-user, what linguistic reports she could make. This does not mean that the
relevant subjects are forced to act or make reports in relation to whatever they
happen to perceive. The point is just that a subject's behaviour is sensitive to the
deliverances of her perceptual experiences in the sense that she could, but need not
make  perceptual  input  manifest  in  action,  speech  acts,  etc.  Of  course,  the
experience-belief  link  is  still  paramount  within  this  expanded  picture,  for
perceptual information would most likely influence (loco-motive, linguistic, etc.)
behaviour via belief.46   
46 Heck notes that there might be cases where, by-passing belief, perceptual input affects action: in
particular,  he  briefly  examines  cases  of  'perception without  belief'  where,  even though she
knows things are not so, a subject acts driven by how things appear to her (cf.  Heck 2000,
508n.27). To make room for such cases, I refrain from saying that perceptual input necessarily
affects action via belief. 
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The  foregoing  remarks,  I  think,  invite  us  to  understand  the  assertive
character of perceptual experiences as follows:
  (F) The  assertive  character  of  perceptual  experiences  is  correlated  with  a  
functional  role in virtue of which perceptual experiences causally and/or 
rationally affect (a) propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.), (b)  
action, and (c) linguistic  behaviour. 
    
(F) thus draws a close connection between the assertive character and the
functional  role  of  perceptual  experiences,  where  the  relevant  functional  role
concerns the way in which experiences affect propositional attitudes, action, and
linguistic behaviour: it seems fairly clear that perceptual input determines what
beliefs and desires we can form, how we may interact with the environment, and
what  linguistic  reports  about our surroundings we could perform. Furthermore,
beliefs  also  share  the  functional  role  thus  ascribed  to  perceptual  experiences:
indeed,  they are capable  of  governing certain propositional  attitudes  (including
other beliefs),  actions,  and linguistic reports.  (F)  thus satisfies  the constraint of
latching onto a commonality between the two psychological categories at stake. If
other mental phenomena have assertive force, we could reasonably predict that
they would share the same feature.   
Now,  although  (F)  describes  a  close  relationship  between  the  assertive
character  and the functional  role  of  perceptual  experiences,  it  is  non-commital
about the exact nature of such a link. The substantive position I shall espouse here
is that the connection should be seen as a constitutive one: assertive character and
functional role are not only correlated; the former is actually constituted by the
latter.  To  appreciate  this,  just  consider  what  would  happen  if  perceptual
experiences did not have the sort of functional role outlined in (F): were they not
to have any influence altogether in reasoning, action, and language, there is an
intuitive  sense  in  which  they  would  simply  fail  to  present  their  subjects  with
apparently  actual,  as  opposed  to  merely  possible,  worldly  items  and  states  of
affairs. The assertive force of perceptual experiences commands the corresponding
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subjects to take a psychological or epistemological stance on the world: if a given
mental state or process lacked any such influence altogether, it would be unclear
why it has assertive force. As Glüer noted, psychological categories are typed by
their  functional  roles:  accordingly,  a  reasonable  answer  to  the  question  what
perceptual experiences and beliefs have in common is that their functional roles
partially coincide.   
In short, I think that (F) could be developed along the following lines:
  (F*) The assertive character of perceptual experiences is constituted by their  
ability  to   causally  or  rationally  affect  (a)  propositional  attitudes  (e.g.  
beliefs, desires,  etc.), (b) action, and (c) linguistic behaviour. 
The difference between (F) and (F*) should be more or less clear by now:
whereas (F) only states that there is some connection between assertive character
and functional role, (F*) specifies such a link as a constitutive one. 
All  I  am prepared to  do here is  to  endorse (F*)  as  a  plausible  working
hypothesis. A full defence of this claim would involve defusing a non-functionalist
account  of  (F),  that  is,  a  view  according  to  which  the  assertive  character  of
perceptual experiences is not (or at least not only) constituted by their functional
roles.  Such  a  position  does  not  have  to  reject  the  general  correlation  between
assertive character and functional role, of course. To begin with, it could state that
assertive character is a fundamental or irreducible feature, that is, a feature which
lies beyond a purely functionalist  characterization of  perceptual phenomena:  in
relation to perception, for example, one could first argue that assertive character is
a phenomenal or sensational aspect which cannot be specified in functional terms.
Then, it could set up a contingent link (a causal one, perhaps?) between this non-
functional  feature  and  the  functional  role  of  perceptual  experiences.  Hence,  it
would be possible to save (F) and, at the same time, to reject (F*). 
While a bullet-proof case for (F*)  requires blocking its  non-functionalist
counter-parts, the latter enterprise goes well beyond the limits of this dissertation. 47
47 My own guess is that there is no decisive argument against a non-functionalist  view. Even
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For this reason, I only presume to endorse (F*) on the basis of what seems telling
but by no means definitive evidence. First, (F*) is a straightforward and intuitive
account of (F). It is straightforward because, unlike a non-functionalist proposal, it
does not rely on conceptual resources other than the notions of assertive character
and functional role; it claims that the assertive character of perceptual experiences
is just a certain sort of functional role. In this sense, a functional story of (F) is
more austere than a non-functionalist  one.  It  is,  in turn, intuitive because, as I
previously stressed,  there is an intimate connection between assertive character
and functional role. Secondly, the non-functionalist proposal is germane to very
much alive, but rather funky, philosophical views relying on notions such as sense-
data,  qualia,  or  sensations.  As  it  is  sufficiently  clear  throughout  our  recent
philosophical  history,  however,  these  entities  face  serious  difficulties:  crucially,
they face problems concerning their  criteria of  individuation and the way they
interact with items of the natural world. To pick up on a very specific issue, a non-
functionalist account of (F) must not only identify a special non-functional feature
in virtue of which perceptual experiences are assertive, but also one which beliefs
could credibly share. Thirdly, it is possible to neutralize the counter-examples that
a non-functionalist theorist would most likely throw at (F*). This point is crucial,
for (F*)'s internal coherence (let alone plausibility) depends, among other things,
on its ability to deal with such counter-examples. For this reason, I examine some
of such cases next. 
2.3. Potential Counterexamples against (F*)  
Does  (F*)  hold  water?  According  to  this  principle,  the  assertive  character  of
worse,  it  might  turn  out  that  the  choice  between  (F*)  and  its  denial  simply  rests  on  a
fundamental  decision  of  principle.  Dennett  is  instructive  on  this  point:  a  contemporary
eminence  among  critics  of  non-functionalist  accounts  of  perceptual  phenomenology,  he
acknowledges that, at the end of the day, his own strategy boils down to a persuasive case for
one picture of consciousness instead of another: 'I haven't replaced a metaphorical theory, the
Cartesian Theater, with a nonmetaphorical (“literal, scientific”) theory. All I have done, really, is
to  replace  one  family  of  metaphors  and  images  with  another,  trading  in  the  Theater,  the
Witness, the Central Meaner, the Figment, for Software, Virtual Machines, Multiple Drafts, a
Pandemonium of Homunculi. It's just a war of metaphors, you say – but metaphors are not
“just” metaphors; metaphors are the tools of thought.' (Dennett 1991, 455) Of course, all the
issues raised here demand further discussion.    
133
perceptual experiences is constituted by their functional roles. As such, it would
face difficulties if,  
  (a) instances  of  an  assertive  psychological  category  lacked  the  sort  of  
functional role which (F*) ascribed to perceptual experiences; or
  (b) instances  of  a  non-assertive  psychological  category  had  the  sort  of  
functional role  which (F*) ascribed to perceptual experiences.
(a) and (b) are schemata capable of embracing specific counter-examples. In
this sub-section, I shall focus on one case for each possibility. Furthermore, I shall
assume that  these  cases  are  paradigmatic:  that  is,  I  shall  assume that,  if  it  is
possible to meet these challenges, it would be possible to provide similar solutions
to other versions of (a) and (b). 
Since I have already introduced the relevant case – namely, that of ignored
perceptual experiences – I shall keep the discussion of (a) brief. This schema asks
us to imagine mental phenomena which, apart from having different functional
roles within our psychological and epistemic economy, are otherwise identical to
our assertive attitudes. To tackle this imaginative project, we may pick up on an
instance of an assertive phenomenon – say, a given perceptual experience – and
then mess around with its functional role alone. Recall what Jim was up to: he
looks for a star on a cloudy night; the sky suddenly clears up; he spots the bright
object; and then he remains in perceptual contact with it for a period of time. As
the result of this perceptual phenomenon, it is natural to think that Jim will be
disposed to do a number of things: forming certain beliefs and linguistic reports
about his surroundings ('Lo and behold, a star!'), acting in ways informed by the
perceived  information  (e.g.  reporting  back  to  his  captain  or  making  a  few
calculations based on his discovery), etc. He can do all of these things because he is
visually aware of the star. Given this scenario, (a) asks us to imagine a case where
the  visual  experience  of  a  possible  subject,  S,  is  exactly  identical  to  Jim's
experience. By stipulation, S's experience would be assertive: it would, that is, be
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committal  about  the  apparent  existence  of  a  bright  star.  But  the  relevant
imaginative project demands something else at this point, namely, to assign to S's
experience a functional role which is different from that corresponding to Jim's
visual experience: for example, you should imagine that S's experience disposes
her not to behave the way Jim would be disposed to behave after spotting the star,
but the way he would when entertaining hopes or desires. The relevant experience
does not affect S's propositional attitudes, actions, and linguistic reports the way
Jim's visual experiences affect his. She would thus have a visual experience which,
in all but functional respects, is identical to a perceptual experience which you or
Jim could undergo. Does this sort of counter-example challenge (F*)? As previously
anticipated, I do not think so.
For the sake of the argument, there are issues I ignore here. For example, a
pressing question I  shall  not  pursue is  whether  a  non-functionalist  view could
develop a story of assertive character common to perceptual experience and belief:
after all, the irreducible features on which non-functionalist stories of perception
usually rely tend to be phenomenological ones (e.g. qualia, sensations, etc.), and it
is extremely implausible that beliefs could have the same sort of phenomenology
that perceptual experiences have. The point on which I focus instead has already
been envisaged: the notion of assertive character simply vanishes once perceptual
experiences are isolated from their distinctive functional role. This is true if,  as
Glüer claims, psychological attitudes are typed by their functional roles: since the
functional role of the mental phenomenon S instantiates does not correspond to
that typical of perceptual experiences, she would fail to be perceptually aware of
her surroundings. But one could also reach the same conclusion by reflecting on
assertive character and the aforementioned thought experiment.  In  broad lines,
perceptual  experiences  are assertive  insofar  as  they present  their  subjects  with
apparently actual items, or,  again,  insofar  as they commit their  subjects  to the
apparent  existence  of  what  is  thereby  presented  to  them.  Now,  if  perceptual
experiences could not affect reasoning, language, and action, the way they actually
affect their subjects – that is,  if, like desires and hopes, they did not determine
what we take to be actual – in what sense would they commit a subject to take the
world to be the way it seems to be? As far as I can see, this line of reply is by no
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means circular, for the general understanding of assertive character I invoke here
does  not  rely  on  (F*):  all  the  previous  question  does  is,  as  it  were,  to  pose  a
challenge  against  the  non-functionalist  view  from  which  the  above  example
derives; a challenge which (F*) can intuitively address. What does it mean to say
that  Jim's  or  S's  experience  is  committal  or  non-neutral  in  relation  to  starry
presence – in short, that their experiences are assertive? A natural reply is, I think,
that perceptual experiences incline their subjects to take the world to be a certain
way by affecting their thoughts, actions, and linguistic reports. Indeed, the most
obvious sense in which Jim's  visual  experience is  assertive or  committal  about
starry presence is that it has such a pervasive influence in Jim's psychological life.
If one renounces to a story along these lines, it will be necessary to identify what
non-functional component is constitutive to the assertive character of perceptual
experiences. I have not shown or intended to show here that this cannot be done,
but,  considering  the  history  of  non-functionalist  views,  I  would  be  very  much
surprised was this project to succeed.  
Turning to (b) now, if anything illustrates the possibility of non-assertive
psychological  phenomena  which  are,  at  the  same  time,  functionally
indistinguishable  from  assertive  ones,  I  think  that  would  be  the  well-known
thought experiment  of  super-blindsight.  For present  purposes,  I  shall  rely on a
fairly  broad understanding of  this  philosophical  fiction and the real  albeit  rare
condition  from  which  it  derives.48 Blindsight  is  essentially  a  peculiar  form  of
cortical blindness: as the result of damage in the primary visual cortex (or V1), a
subject's visual field is partially affected by scotomata (i.e. blind spots). In many
respects, blindsight is no different from more standard forms of blindness: on the
one hand, there is damage in an area of the brain relevant to vision; and, on the
other,  the  subject's  reports  and  actions  by  and large  correspond to  those  of  a
visually impaired person. The funny thing is this: in forced-choice tests concerning
visible items occluded by their scotomata, blindsighters score well above chance on
certain rudimentary discrimination tasks; and this, in turn, indicates that they are
not  wholly  insensitive  to  the  relevant  visual  information.  Of  course,  these
48 Much  has  been  written  on  blindsight  and  super-blindsight.  In  relation  to  blindsight,  cf.
Weiskrantz 1986/2009 and Milner & Goodale 1995. On super-blindsight, cf. Dennett 1991, 1995;
Tye 1995; Lowe 1996; Block 1995.
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individuals take themselves to bump into the correct answers only by chance, for
they insist on their inability to perceive items falling under the relevant scotomata.
Now,  since  there  is  a  minimal  sense  in  which  seeing  is  a  way  of  processing
information, and the aforementioned subjects do process some visual information,
there is accordingly a minimal sense in which they do perceive their surroundings.
From a functional  point of  view, however,  the form of vision blindsighters are
endowed with is extremely degraded:  for this reason too, the present condition
does not illustrate a scenario along the lines of (b).
Super-blindsight is relevant precisely because it bridges the functional gap
between the original impairment and normal perception. Imagine that, as a result
of similar damage in V1, the relevant subject's visual field is not only partially, but
totally affected by scotomata. So, while a super-blindsighter is not visually aware
of her surroundings, she still processes visual information. The two main respects
in  which  super-blindsight  sharply  differs  from  blindsight  are:  first,  whereas
subjects affected by the real condition must be forced to access what little visual
information they can, the victims of the fictional impairment need not be coerced;
and,  secondly,  whereas  blindsighters  only  have  access  to  degraded  visual
information, fairly rich visual input is available to their philosophical counterparts.
According  to  this  thought  experiment,  then,  the  relevant  subject  lacks  visual
experiences,  but  she  spontaneously  acquires  thoughts  about  her  actual
surroundings – visual information, as it were, pops up into her mind bypassing
visual  awareness.  Thanks  to  the  appropriate  training,  super-blindsighters  could
thereby  navigate  and  cope  with  the  world  in  spite  of  their  lack  of  perceptual
experiences: they might still show signs of brain damage and report their lack of
perceptual experiences; but, for all intents and purposes, they would behave just
like  normal  perceivers.  Hence,  this  fictional  condition  seems to  illustrate  non-
assertive  mental  phenomena  which  are  nevertheless  functionally  similar  to
perceptual experiences: even if spontaneously acquired thoughts about her visible
environs serve a super-blindsighter well over an extended period of time, it is still
conceivable that such thoughts are no more assertive or committal about worldly
items than written reports, spoken testimony, or other thoughts simply entertained
(that is, not assented to) by the relevant subject. Although super-blindsighters lack
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the sort  of  experiential  lives which normal perceivers have,  they do instantiate
psychological phenomena which, from a functional point of view, suitably replace
perceptual experiences. 
Does super-blindsight actually undermine (F*)? This depends on whether
the  thoughts  spontaneously  acquired  by  the  relevant  individuals  are  in  fact
instances of (b), and my main point is that they are not. While I concede that the
'visual'  thoughts  instantiated  by  super-blindsighters  are  non-assertive,  it  seems
incorrect,  on  closer  inspection,  to  claim  that  they  are  functionally  similar  to
perceptual experiences. Consider once again a crucial aspect of the philosophical
fiction at hand, namely, that she lacks visual experiences of her surroundings and
is capable of ensuing the corresponding linguistic reports. As far as I can see, one
cannot  renounce  this  bit  of  the  story:  as  previously  mentioned,  the  defining
condition  (i.e.  the  absence  of  perceptual  experiences)  is  crucially  manifested
through the linguistic reports of the affected subjects; after all, brain damage itself
is evidential of some defect only if it has subsequent consequences. If they coped
with their surroundings without complaining about any defect whatsoever, these
subjects would not be impaired in any robust sense. The subject's verbal reports to
the effect that she lacks visual experiences thus constitute the best sort of evidence
for classifying that subject as a visually impaired one. This being the case,  the
thoughts  acquired  by  a  super-blindsighter  cannot  be  functionally  similar  to
perceptual  experiences:  for,  whereas  the  latter  would  dispose  their  respective
bearers to acknowledge their existence, the super-blindsighter's thoughts do not
dispose her  to recognize any experiential  item – on the contrary,  our  fictional
victim  by  definition  insists  that  she  lacks  the  experiential  life  that  a  normal
perceiver  would  enjoy.  In  general,  the  psychological  attitudes  resulting  from
normal vision and super-blindsight are functionally different because they relate to
linguistic behaviour in different ways: that is, they allow their subjects to make
different reports about how they have come to know anything about their visible
surroundings.  Discussions  of  this  thought  experiment  assimilate  the  functional
roles  of  super-blindsight  thoughts  and  of  perceptual  experiences  because  they
overlook  the  importance  of  the  mind-language  relation  in  a  functional
characterization of perceptual experiences. Why such a link should be bypassed is
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unclear, though.    
Of course, the functional difference goes deeper, for the kind of linguistic
reports that super-blindsighters and normal perceivers are prepared to issue are
related to the networks of propositional attitudes they are endowed with. So, if a
subject is prepared honestly to report that she has no perceptual experiences, she
will also have beliefs, hopes, and desires concerning her impoverished experiential
life. On the contrary, if she can bear witness to her perceptual experiences, this
suggests that she does not hold the propositional attitudes that a blind person or a
super-blindsighter  would  hold.  Hence,  since  super-blindsight  thoughts  and
perceptual experiences relate  to different linguistic reports,  it  is  also natural  to
conclude that they relate to different networks of propositional attitudes. In short, I
think  that,  although  they  may  well  be  non-assertive,  the  visual  thoughts
spontaneously  formed  by  super-blindsighters  are  not  functionally  similar  to
perceptual experiences. That is, they constitute neither examples of (b) nor threats
to (F*).  
To  sum  up,  I  have  aimed  to  specify  the  notion  of  assertive  character
introduced in the previous section. In this context, I have suggested that (F*) is a
straightforward  and  intuitively  plausible  account  of  the  relevant  notion:  for
perceptual experiences, to be assertive or to be committal about the existence of
worldly items and states of affairs is to affect thought, action, and language by
determining what  the relevant  subject  takes to  be the case.  After arguing that
experiential content does not throw lights on the relevant feature, I went on to
claim  that  the  assertive  character  of  perceptual  experiences  may  well  be
constituted by the functional role they have within our psychological economies.
To highlight the internal coherency of this working hypothesis, I tackled potential
counter-examples to (F*). Moving on, I shall examine now how ontological views
of perceptual experience have a bearing on a discussion of assertive character. 
III. ASSERTIVE CHARACTER, PROCESSES, AND STATES
The  goal  of  this  chapter  is  to  show that  the  assertive  character  of  perceptual
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experiences is much better accommodated within the framework of (S) than of (P).
Thus far, I have been mainly concerned with the very notion of assertive character:
since  my case  for  (S)  depends  on  how  that  notion  is  exactly  understood,  the
foregoing discussion is crucial. To close this chapter, I shall explain why a stative
view does a better job than a processive one at handling (F*). In particular, this
section proceeds in two stages: first, I argue that the notion of assertive character,
understood along the lines of (F*), poses a difficulty to (P), insofar as it is unclear
how mental  processes  are  related  to  the  functional  roles  which  constitute  the
assertive character of perceptual experiences; and, secondly, I move on to explain
why (S) does not face the same obstacle.  
My suggestion  was  to  conceive  the  notion  of  assertive  character  as  an
essential component of perceptual experiences: that feature, I also claimed, may be
understood in terms of the impact that perceptual experiences have on thought,
action, and language. With this functionalist conception at hand, let's go back to
the ontological views of experience I am concerned with. To begin with, assume
that  perceptual  experiences  should  be  described  as  phenomenally  conscious
processes. Then, let's suppose (F*) is an adequate account of assertive character.
That being the case, one could press the following challenge: how are perceptual
processes related to the functional role in virtue of which perceptual experiences
are  assertive?  I  grant  that  the  relevant  processes  may  fulfil  a  determinate
functional role without a larger psychological and epistemic economy. The issue I
raise  here  is  an  explanatory  one:  if  a  processive  conception  of  experiences  is
intended to shed any light on the nature of perceptual experiences, it is natural to
think that it should account for the assertive character of such psychological items.
To fulfil the latter task, the processive theorist should specify how phenomenally
conscious processes are related to the relevant functional role. As far as I can see,
however, she will meet a significant difficulty at this stage. The role played by
perceptual  experiences  within  our  psychological  economy  is  to  a  good  extent
defined by their impact on thought, action, and language. It is unclear to me what
kind of story a processive theorist may provide of such relationships. Even if she
manages to account for the connection between phenomenally conscious processes
and the thoughts they are supposed to ground, chapter 3 highlighted the fact that it
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is  far  from  obvious  how  mental  processes  relate  to  behaviour  in  general  (cf.
chapter 3.2). If perceptual experiences are phenomenally conscious processes, it is
necessary  to  specify  how  they  relate  to  other  physical  and  mental  processes,
physical  and mental  states,  action,  and language.  I  do not  claim here that  the
challenge cannot be met: I only aim to point out the existence of that question, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that it has no obvious solution within a
processive framework. A stative view could, in turn, deal with the same issue in a
far more elegant way. Let's turn to this point.  
In particular, consider how perceptual states relate to a functional role of
the sort  specified in (F) and (F*).  The answer is,  I  suspect,  surprisingly simple:
perceptual  states  are  partially  constituted  by  the  psychological  and  epistemic
relations  which define  their  functional  roles.  According to  the version of  (S)  I
defend here, perceptual experiences are a subject's instantial states, that is, states
which obtain when a subject instantiates a determinate informational relation vis-
à-vis  her surroundings.  As such, key constitutive elements of perceptual states,
thus understood, include (i)  a subject  of experiences,  (ii)  a subject-environment
informational transaction or relation, and (iii) the interval of time at which the
previous relation is  instantiated by the relevant subject.  (i)-(iii)  are constitutive
parts of perceptual states. This much should be clear since chapter 2. But now note
that the informational relations captured under (ii) embrace those informational
links in virtue of which the world causes a subject to stand in a certain perceptual
state as well as the manifold ways in which those states affect thought, action, and
language.  A  constitutive  description  of  perceptual,  instantial  states  thereby
includes a description of the role which perceptual experiences play within a larger
psychological and epistemic economy – in other words, a functional role like that
invoked by (F)  and (F*).  Correspondingly,  if  (F*)  is  an  adequate  description of
assertive  character,  a  constitutive  description  of  perceptual,  instantial  states
includes those ingredients in virtue of which perceptual experiences are assertive.
Hence, a stative view seems to throw light on the assertive character of perceptual
experiences.  The  original  challenge  faced  by  the  processive  theorist  was  how
perceptual  experiences  are  related  to  the  functional  role  which  defines  their
assertive character. If experiences are conceived as mental processes, it is initially
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unclear why or how perceptual experiences exactly implement what I called their
assertive character. A stative view is, by contrast, not in the same predicament:
after  all,  the  functional  role  outlined  by  (F)  and  (F*)  is  not  merely  related  to
perceptual states, but is a constitutive element of their description. It is not possible
to individuate such states without invoking, among other things, the way in which
they determine thought, action, and language. 
The  foregoing  remarks  may  suggest  a  potential  reply  in  favour  of  the
processive view. I just claimed that the relation between perceptual experiences
and the functional role they play in a subject's psychological life poses no problems
for (S) insofar as that functional role is a constitutive component of perceptual
states. But then, a processive theorist could argue that the mental processes she
invokes are such that the functional role that perceptual experience plays in our
mental  lives  is  also  constitutive  of  the  relevant  processes:  there  would  be  no
relation to trace between perceptual processes and their functional roles because
the latter are simply part of what it is to be such processes. If this line of reasoning
is plausible, one could thereby conclude that (P) is in no worse position than (S)
when it comes to account for the assertive character of perceptual experiences. 
The  previous  reply  does  not  seem  satisfactory,  though.  A  processive
theorist could no doubt stipulate what kind of processes subjects go through when
they are perceptually  aware  of  their  surroundings:  in  particular,  she is  free  to
stipulate  that  the  functional  role  corresponding  to  perceptual  experiences  is
actually a constitutive element of perceptual processes. But, in doing this, she also
seems to  renounce  to  the  ontological  significance  of  the processive  view.  (P)'s
distinctive contribution to the debate about the ontology of perception is that an
analysis of perceptual experiences would be incomplete if it relied on mental states
alone: according to that position, it is necessary to bring mental processes into the
picture  so  as  to  capture  the  dynamic  and  the  phenomenological  character  of
perceptual experiences.  But if  perceptual processes now turn out to be nothing
over and above psychological phenomena defined by their functional roles, it is
just unclear whether the processive view makes an additional contribution to the
ontological landscape envisaged by (S): after all, those psychological phenomena
are  exactly  the  same  ontological  items  on  which  (S)  relies.  If  there  is  any
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controversy between the processive and the stative view at this stage, it only seems
to be a terminological one. At this stage, the processive theorist might want to eat
her cake and have it: for she might want to hold that, although a certain functional
role is constitutive of perceptual processes, it is not exhaustively so; there is still an
additional constitutive element of mental processes, corresponding to the 'temporal
stuffing' posited by O'Shaughnessy, Soteriou, and Crowther. The latter component,
the  processive  theorist  may  thus  conclude,  is  not  captured  by  a  functionalist
specification. But this tactic only takes the original question one level deeper: for
the processive theorist now has to address how that meta-functional, constitutive
component of perceptual processes relates to their functional, constitutive aspects.
If the considerations unpacked throughout this section are along the right
lines, the outcome is this: whereas (S) makes sense of the essential link between
perceptual experiences and assertive character, the latter relation is a recalcitrant
issue for (P). Although I have not shown that a processive view could not live up to
the challenge, I think, first, that (S) is comparatively more straightforward, and,
secondly, that it would be reasonable to hold some degree of scepticism about (P)'s
ability to deal with the problem at hand. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout the present chapter, I have tried to show how the ontological views I
am concerned with – i.e. (S) and (P) – have a bearing on the assertive character of
perceptual  experiences.  As  I  previously  mentioned,  assertive  character  is  an
essential  feature  of  perceptual  experiences.  Furthermore,  it  is  a  commonality
between perceptual  experiences  and beliefs,  and thus  constitutes  a  strategically
sound  starting-point  for  an  attempt  to  highlight  the  ontological  similarities
between both psychological categories. My main hypothesis was that a significant
virtue of the stative view over the processive one is its ability to account for the
fact  that  perceptual  experiences  are  assertive:  if  the  assertive  character  of
perceptual experiences is taken to be constituted by part of their functional role, I
think a stative view provides the simplest story of how perceptual experiences are
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essentially related to that feature. As the antecedent of this claim makes clear, the
present line of reasoning hangs on a specific understanding of assertive character
along functionalist lines: for that reason, it was also necessary to dive into a rather
lengthy discussion of assertive character itself.  
Of course, the line of reasoning unpacked throughout this chapter is not
intended to constitute a K.O. argument in favour of (S). Chapters 3 and 4 should
only be seen as attempts to motivate the stative view by stressing that, when it
comes  to  deal  with  certain  key  aspects  of  perceptual  experiences  (i.e.  their
individuation and their assertive character), that ontological conception faces less
difficulties than the processive stance. My own guess is that there is no such a
thing as an 'ultimate' argument for (S) or against (P): instead, a case has to be made
in the piecemeal way I have pursued throughout these chapters. For the time being,
all  I  hope  to  convey  is  a  sense  that  the  stative  and the  processive  view have
something  to  say  about  assertive  character,  and  that  the  stative  view  has
something better to say than the processive view. 
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 CHAPTER 5
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND BELIEF
In reply to the ontological question as to what we talk about when we talk about
perceptual experiences, this dissertaion has unpacked and discussed two positions,
namely,  a  stative  and  a  processive  view.  On  the  assumption  that  there  is  a
significant  distinction  between  the  categories  of  mental  states  and  mental
processes, those ontological views may be briefly expressed as follows:
  (S) Perceptual experiences are perceptual states.
  (P) Perceptual experiences are mental processes.
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Throughout this dissertation, I have made a modest case for a version of (S)
capable  of  dispensing  with  mental  (in  particular,  phenomenally  conscious)
processes. To the extent that the notions of state and process are not obviously
exclusive,  it  is unclear that (S) and (P) are incompatible. The initial motivation
behind this position was that a conception of perceptual experiences as instantial
states is more ontologically austere than a processive view: in the light of a stative
framework,  the  substantive  commitment  to  the  existence  of  phenomenally
conscious processes seems unnecessary and even problematic. Chapters 3 and 4
also went on to show that a stative view accommodates otherwise problematic
features of perceptual experiences, namely, their individuation over time and their
assertive character: within a processive framework, the same features, I think, raise
recalcitrant problems. Thus, the overall suggestion is: once perceptual experiences
are framed within a relatively austere stative framework, we need not and should
not introduce suspicious entities such as phenomenally conscious processes into
our ontology of perception. 
Although a stative view identifies a key ontological commonality between
perceptual experiences and beliefs – that is, their stative character – it need not
assimilate  both psychological  categories.  The present  chapter  thus  turns  to  the
question how perceptual experiences stand apart from beliefs. 
A prominent contemporary take on this issue is a nonconceptualist view of
perceptual experiences. In very broad lines, the perceptual nonconceptualist – or
simply  nonconceptualist,  for  short  –  argues  that  perceptual  experiences  are
nonconceptual or concept-independent. Such a view does not immediately concern
the relationship between perceptual  experiences  and beliefs,  but  it  is  relatively
clear that it grounds a criterion of psychological distinction: for, while one might
accept that there is a sense in which our perceptual lives are independent of the
repertoire of concepts we are endowed with, it is natural to think that what beliefs
we can form is constrained by what concepts we possess – in short, that beliefs are
conceptual or concept-dependent. In principle, the broad nonconceptualist claim
could be specified in two different ways: on the one hand, as a claim about the
representational  content  of  perceptual  experiences  –  i.e.  content
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nonconceptualism; and, on the other, as a claim about the psychological attitudes
or  capacities  involved  in  the  occurrence  of  perceptual  experiences  –  i.e.  state
nonconceptualism.  Correspondingly,  the  ensuing  psychological  divide  may  be
drawn either at a level of representational content or at a level of psychological
states. Although a nonconceptualist stance has traditionally been interpreted along
the lines of the content-reading, this chapter turns to state nonconceptualism so as
to relate it to the stative view I have developed and defended. In particular, my
goal is to show that, to the extent that it addresses a key explanatory objection
against state nonconceptualism, the stative view accommodates the thought that
perceptual states are nonconceptual. If one feels sympathy for a nonconceptualist
stance, in general, and a state reading, more specifically, the present analysis will
thus unveil another virtue of (S).
This chapter is divided into four parts. To begin with, I expand a bit further
on the general question what sets perceptual experiences apart from beliefs, and
then highlight two levels at which the relevant distinction may be drawn: that of
representational contents, on the one hand, and, on the other, that of psychological
states.  Section  2  critically  assesses  three  potential  criteria  of  psychological
distinction, each one of them related to three features famously ascribed to the
content  of  perceptual experiences:  informational  richness,  fine-grainedness,  and
analog  character.  This  survey  aims,  first,  to  highlight  the  limitations  of  most
attempts to distinguish perceptual experiences from beliefs at  the level  of  their
respective representational contents, and, secondly, to set the ground for a more
attractive distinction based on a nonconceptualist stance. In section 3, I turn to the
distinction  between  content  nonconceptualism  and  state  nonconceptualism.
Although the content-reading has been the most fashionable version thus far, it
builds  on  the  assumption  that  perceptual  experiences  have  representational
content. I focus on state nonconceptualism precisely because this position remains
silent on what is now regarded as a highly controversial question, namely, whether
perceptual experiences are representational: more specifically, it remains silent on
this  question  in  the  sense  that,  unlike  content  nonconceptualism,  it  would  be
tenable  even  if  perceptual  experiences  turned  out  not  to  be  representational.
Finally, section 4 links state nonconceptualism to a stative view of experience via a
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prominent objection faced by the former position. In a nutshell, the worry is that
merely  claiming  that  perceptual  states  are  nonconceptual  does  not  settle  why
perceptual  experiences  are  nonconceptual:  it  may  well  be  true  that  perceptual
states are nonconceptual, but this claim does not on its own throw any light on
why perceptual experiences should be so conceived. Correspondingly, the relevant
position could not explain why perceptual experiences stand apart from beliefs: at
best,  it  could  only  formulate  the  distinction.  In  reply,  I  shall  argue  that  the
informational-functionalist story underpinning a stative view (cf. chapters 2 and 4)
could complement state nonconceptualism so as to meet the previous explanatory
challenge.     
To clear this up right away, the present discussion does not constitute a
case  against  perceptual  conceptualism,  that  is,  the  view  according  to  which
perceptual  experiences  are  in  some  sense  conceptual  or  concept-dependent.
Neither am I defending state nonconceptualism against content nonconceptualism.
These  issues  transcend  the  present  chapter.  My  goal  may  be  expressed  in
conditional form: if one adopts a stative view of experience, one could also address
the aforementioned explanatory challenge faced by state nonconceptualism. More
generally, I intend to show how a stative view could accommodate a significant
distinction  between  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs.  A  full  defence  of  state
nonconceptualism would, meanwhile, presuppose a critique of content and state
conceptualism,  content  nonconceptualism,  and  nonrepresentationalist  views  of
experience.  Such  an  enterprise,  however,  constitutes  the  subject  of  a  different
dissertation. 
 
I. EXPERIENCE AND BELIEF
A recurrent theme in the philosophy of mind is the analysis or conceptual anatomy
of different psychological faculties and phenomena. In this tradition, David Hume
famously claimed that '[e]very one of himself will readily perceive the difference
betwixt  feeling  and thinking.'  (T  1.1.1.1;  SBN 1-2)  It  is  no doubt  true  that  we
intuitively  acknowledge  different  mental  types:  at  a  very  general  level  of
description,  there  is  the  difference  between  thinking  and  feeling;  and,  more
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specifically,  one  may  distinguish  perceptual  experiences,  beliefs,  hopes,  among
other propositional attitudes. But, as it  is well known by now, Hume's claim is
controversial to the extent that it is far from obvious what principles govern the
conceptual classification of our mental geography. Indeed, a prominent issue in the
philosophy of perception is how perceptual experiences and beliefs exactly relate
to each other: that is, the challenge is to identify the commonalities as well as the
differences between both psychological categories. For illustrative purposes, I shall
use a very simple example.
Example 3
In good lighting conditions, an unimpaired perceiver, Molly, faces a white
wall on which a black square has been drawn. For a respectable amount of
time, Molly remains still with her eyes fixed on the black square. Hence,
Molly sees a black square on a white background, and what she perceives
does not look to her like anything other than a black square on a white
background. In short, Molly has a visual experience of a black square on a
white background. A while later, Molly shuts her eyes: at this point, she
ceases to experience the square. Immediately after doing that (but perhaps
not  too soon after  that,  so  as  to  avoid  potential  confusions  with  visual
iconic imagery), she positively believes that there is a black square on a
white background in front of her.    
In spite of their similarities, the mental tokens introduced in this example
belong to different psychological  kinds,  namely,  experiencing and believing. To
facilitate the comparison, I normalize both tokens as much as possible: they have
the same subject (i.e. Molly) and are about the same worldly items, the latter being
kept at a minimum. With these pieces in place, the question I wished to address in
this chapter could be formulated as follows: on the assumption that both perceptual
experiences  and  beliefs  are  mental  states  (as  opposed  to  mental  events  or
processes),  how  could  one  account  for  the  difference  between  Molly's  visual
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experience and her belief concerning a black square on a white background? The
relevant psychological difference does not seem to be defined either by subject or
by intentional object: after all, both tokens have the same subject and are about the
same worldly items. How could one thereby address the previous question?
As far  as  I  can see,  the distinction between perceptual  experiences and
beliefs may be developed at least in two directions:
  (1) Perceptual experiences and beliefs differ from each other insofar as they 
involve different kinds of states or attitudes.
  (2) Perceptual experiences and beliefs differ from each other insofar as they 
involve different kinds of representational contents.49 
Accordingly,  there  are  at  least  two general  ways  of  accounting  for  the
difference between Molly's visual experience and her subsequent belief. First, she
might be said to instantiate state-tokens of different kinds in each occasion: at one
time, she instantiates a perceptual state presumably directed to the very worldly
items of Molly's surrounding; then, she instantiates a doxastic state. This proposal
is not exhaustive, of course: as just formulated, (1) does not amount to much more
than a formal acknowledgement of the difference between perceptual experiences
and beliefs; as such, it is necessary to specify how their underpinning states exactly
differ from each other. But, as far as I can see, the legitimacy of this story is not
automatically undermined by its initial indeterminacy. One way of developing (1)
is along functionalist lines: that is, one could argue that perceptual experiences and
beliefs are different because they involve different kinds of mental states, and that
perceptual and doxastic states in turn stand apart from each other because they
49 By talking of representational content here, I wish to distinguish this technical notion of content
from the broader notion I used in chapter 3: back then, I introduced a minimal sense of content
according to which perceptual experiences have content if they are of or about worldly items or
states  of  affairs  (cf.  chapter  3.1).  In  relation  to  (2),  meanwhile,  I  turn  to  the  far  more
controversial  notion of  content  at  the heart  of  the debate between representationalists  (e.g.
Brewer 1999, Siegel 2010, Pautz 2010) and nonrepresentationalists (e.g. Campbell 2002, Travis
2004, Brewer 2011).
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play  different  functional  roles  within  a  subject's  psychological  and  epistemic
economy.50 In  section  4,  I  shall  precisely  spell  out  how  the  stative  and  the
nonconceptualist  view  of  experience  I  favour  relate  to  each  other  within  a
functionalist framework. 
The  second  way  of  spelling  out  the  difference  between  Molly's  visual
experience  and  her  subsequent  belief  is  as  one  concerning  representational
contents of different kinds. In one version of this stance, perceiving and believing
are ways in which a subject  represents the world,  but they constitute different
ways of representing the world. The notion of intentional object most naturally
related to the notion of belief is thus extrapolated into a description of perceptual
experiences: hence, one could argue that, although Molly's visual experience and
belief are about a black square – the same square, if you may – there is a specific
difference in the ways in which they concern or represent the same worldly item. 
Throughout this chapter, I pursue the first strategy. But I also concede that
(2) may seem more natural (cf. Brewer 2011, 57-8): after all, a vast amount of work
in contemporary philosophy of perception is devoted to elucidating the distinctive
nature of perceptual content vis-à-vis the content of other psychological categories.
For  this  reason,  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  proceeds  in  a  roundabout  way:
instead of turning to the difference between perceptual and doxastic states head
on, I first examine a number of ways in which the difference between perceptual
and doxastic contents might be developed. By doing so, I hope to highlight the
limitations  of  specifying  the  experience-belief  divide  at  the  level  of
representational  content,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  motivate  a  distinction
exclusively based on the difference between perceptual and doxastic states. 
50 Bill  Brewer states that the difference between perceptual experiences and thoughts could be
addressed by positions like (1) and (2). He also acknowledges that (1) could be developed along
functionalist  lines  (cf.  Brewer  2011,  56ff.).  Brewer's  claims do not  exactly overlap  with my
remarks, though. First, he addresses the general distinction between perceptual experiences and
thoughts, whereas I keep close to the more specific contrast between perceptual experiences and
beliefs.  Secondly,  Brewer  builds  a  controversial  conception  of  perceptual  experiences  as
propositional attitudes into his critique of (1) and (2). Unlike him, I seek to endorse (1) and do
not assume that perceptual states or attitudes have to range over propositions.   
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II. RICHNESS, FINE-GRAINEDNESS, ANALOG CHARACTER
To  set  perceptual  experiences  apart  from  beliefs,  one  may  attempt  to  stress
substantive  differences  between  their  respective  contents.  This  tactic  naturally
requires picking up on a determinate representational feature (either a perceptual
or a doxastic one) capable of grounding the relevant distinction. In this section, I
examine  three  features  that  have  traditionally  been  associated  with  perceptual
content vis-à-vis doxastic content: in particular, I argue that, although typical of
perceptual content, such elements do not capture characteristic traits of perceptual
experiences, and, as such, fail to deliver the desired psychological distinction. Thus,
I  expect  to  highlight  the  limitations  of  conceiving  the  difference  between
perceptual experiences and beliefs at the level of their respective contents.   
For  the  time  being,  this  section  divides  into  three  sub-parts,  where  I
examine  and  critically  assess  attempts  to  ground  the  relevant  psychological
distinction on the notions of informational richness, fineness of grain, and analog
character, respectively.    
2.1. Informational Richness
To begin with, I shall introduce the notion of informational richness relevant to
perceptual experiences. Then, I shall formulate and critically assess a criterion of
distinction between perceptual experiences and beliefs building on that feature. 
The thought that perceptual experiences are informationally rich has been
widely invoked in the philosophical literature. To take one example, Michael Tye
says that, 'in typical cases, visual experiences are rich. This is to be understood as
the thesis that typically visual experiences contain more information than their
subjects are able to extract cognitively (in belief or judgment).' (Tye 2006, 519; also
cf.  Chuard  2007,  20)  As  Fred  Dretske  points  out,  specifying  the  notion  of
information  is  not  a  trivial  task  (cf.  Dretske  1981,  ch.  1).  Again,  Tye's
understanding of the relationship between perception and cognition has recently
met a good deal of resistance. That said, this line of thought takes off from a fairly
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intuitive point: our perceptual capacities are capable of processing a large amount
of information about our surroundings; or again, the environmental information
that perceptual experiences present us with is quite generous. Pursuing this line of
thought, Philippe Chuard claims that, when seeing a particular scene,  
[…] it seems that the overall spatial arrangement of the scene is represented in your visual
experience. But this means that the shape of the various objects that make up the display,
together with their location and the spatial relations that hold between such objects, must
also be represented in your experience. If you can perceive the shape and location of these
objects,  this  must  owe partly to  the fact that  their  colour – as  well  as  the chromatic
differences between such objects and their respective backgrounds – are represented in
your experience too. (Chuard 2007, 29)
When  a  subject  perceives  her  surroundings,  she  becomes  perceptually
aware of a great deal of details about the environment – in other words, that she
receives a vast amount of information via her senses. Of course, there is a sense in
which  this  thought  is  uncontroversial:  whether  personal-level,  conscious
perception does process a high rate of information or not, it certainly seems as if it
did so to their subjects. Even if scientific evidence spoke against the informational
richness  of  perceptual  experiences,  there  is  no  doubt  that,  when I  observe  my
room, it seems to me as if I saw a wide range of worldly objects and their sub-
parts.
The  previous  characterization  of  perceptual  experiences  has  fuelled  a
popular  criterion of  distinction between perceiving and believing.  The relevant
divide could, I think, be expressed as follows: 
  (2.a) Whatever  their  respective  attitudes,  perceptual  experiences  differ  from  
beliefs because
perceptual content is informationally richer than doxastic content.
Informational richness could thus be conceived not only as a typical feature
of  perceptual  experience:  somewhat  more  strongly,  (2.a)  suggests  that  it  sets
perceptual experiences apart from beliefs. With this distinction at hand, I take it
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that  informational  richness  is  intended  to  pick  up  on  an  aspect  of  the
representational  content  of  perceptual  experiences:  the  claim  that  perceptual
experiences are informationally richer than beliefs concerns a difference between
what (or, to be more precise, how much information) perception and belief present
a subject with. As such, it is natural to formulate the corresponding criterion of
psychological  distinction  as  one  about  perceptual  and  doxastic  contents:  while
perceptual experiences have contents which are informationally rich, the contents
of cognitive phenomena lack that feature. 
In the present context, then, the notion of informational richness is doing
two things for us:  on the one hand, it  refers to a typical  feature of perceptual
experiences; and, on the other, it sets perceptual experiences apart from beliefs,
among other cognitive states. Both roles should be kept apart: after all, one could
concede that perceptual experiences are informationally rich and, at the same time,
reject  (2.a).  In  this  sub-section,  I  assume  that  informational  richness  does
constitute  a  typical  feature  of  perceptual  experiences.  But  does  that  feature
distinguish perceptual content from doxastic content? This is far from clear. As far
as I can see, the present criterion faces at least two kinds of difficulties: first, it is
often driven by controversial motivations; and, secondly, since it does not pick up
on a necessary and sufficient feature of perceptual experiences, it is unclear how
the corresponding criterion could set perceptual experiences apart from beliefs. I
turn to both issues next.
The  idea  that  perceptual  experiences  informationally  overflow  mental
states  downstream  perception  is  often  motivated  with  the  help  of  Sperling's
experiments on iconic or visual memory (cf. Sperling 1960; also cf. Averbach &
Coriell  1961).51 On  a  basic  version  of  these  experiments,  a  subject  is  briefly
presented with an ordered grid of letters: shortly after the grid's disappearance, the
relevant  subject  is  capable  of  reporting  how many letters  it  contained;  she  is,
however,  incapable  of  providing a full  list  of  which letters  she has  seen. On a
variation of this basic case, the subject is cued by tones of varying degrees of pitch
right  after  the  grid's  offset  –  normally,  only  a  few  milliseconds  after  its
51 In the philosophical literature, these experiments are used to illuminate the relationship between
perceptual  experiences  and  attention,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  that  between
perceptual experiences and iconic memory.
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disappearance. The purpose of these tones is to indicate in each case which series
or row of letters has to be identified: thus, a high-pitched tone means that one has
to identify the letters of the upper row; a middle-pitched tone means that one has
to identify the letters of the middle row; and a low-pitched tone refers to the lower
row. Although test-subjects would again be hard pressed to list every letter from
the grid, they are extremely good at identifying all or most letters from the row
they were instructed to pick up on. The cuing tone is presented a few milliseconds
after the grid has disappeared, and since the relevant subject has no way to guess
which row of letters she will be instructed to identify, the experiment apparently
suggests  that  there is  a difference between what is  perceptually processed and
what  is  cognitively  accessed  by  the  test-subject.  In  particular,  a  number  of
philosophers take experiments of this kind to suggest that a subject is perceptually
aware of more information than she can cognitively access.52 Thus, while a subject
could identify the relevant row of letters because she is actually aware of all the
letters  when she sees the grid,  her reports are bound to the limited amount of
perceptually acquired information available to cognitive states (i.e. to memories,
beliefs, etc.). 
The previous line of motivation is controversial,  though. In particular, a
number of writers have recently provided paradigms for thinking about perceptual
experience where Sperling's experiments do not support the claim that perceptual
experiences  informationally  overflow our  attentional  capacities  or  our  memory
store. James Stazicker, for example, plausibly argues that perceptual experiences
could present or represent fairly indeterminate information (cf. Stazicker 2011). In
the present context, this possibility is significant: following Stazicker, one could
then argue that a Sperling subject is not fully aware of all the letters in the grid;
instead,  her  perceptual  experiences  may  simply  represent  every  letter  in  an
indeterminate  way.  Granted:  to  access  more  determinate  information  after  the
activation  of  the  aural  cue,  the  relevant  subject  must  somehow  possess  it
beforehand. But Stazicker's point is, I take it, that the test-subject need not have
that information in a conscious way before or at the time of the cuing tone: for all
we know, she could have it at a sub-personal or unconscious level. Ian Phillips does
52 Cf. Block 1995, 2008; Tye 2006, 509-20, specially 518; Dretske 1996, 2006; Burge 2007.
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not invoke the indeterminacy of perceptual content, but phenomena of postdictive
perception in order to challenge the extent to which Sperling's experiments support
the 'overflowing' claim (cf. Phillips 2011). Phillips reminds us that there is plenty of
experimental evidence in support of the thought that perceptual awareness of a
given stimulus may be affected by our perceptual awareness of a second stimulus
taking place briefly after the first stimulus. Since the interval between the offset
and onset of the first and second stimuli, respectively, often matches the interval of
time between the  offset  of  the  lettered  grid  and the  onset  of  the  tonal  cue  in
Sperling's  experiments,  Phillips  suggests  that  the  latter  experiments  fit  the
paradigm of postdictive perception in general. Thus conceived, the relevant cases
would not show that subjects may perceive more than what they can cognitively
access: instead, they show that a subject's awareness of the lettered grid is affected
by her awareness of the cues presented a few milliseconds later. According to this
paradigm, the tonal cue would not constitute an instruction for accessing part of a
larger amount of information a subject has already been conscious of:  together
with information of the grid processed at a sub-personal level, it determines the
test-subject's  experience  of  the  grid.  The  present  remarks  on  Stazicker's  and
Phillips's  work  are  by  no  means  exhaustive.  They  only  intend  to  suggest  that
Sperling's experiments – an apparently important motivation behind a criterion of
distinction like (2.a)  – do not necessarily show that  perceptual  experiences are
informationally richer than cognitive states downstream perception.53    
An  alternative  route  for  motivating  (2.a)  could  perhaps  rely  on  pre-
theoretical,  phenomenological  grounds.  Recall  that  Chuard  introduces  the
informational  richness  of  perceptual  experiences  as  a  fairly  uncontroversial
phenomenological datum. Likewise, one could go on to argue that pre-theoretical
reflection  on  the  relationship  between  perception  and  cognition  supports  a
principle along the lines of (2.a): that is,  just as perceptual experiences seem to
present  us  with  a  vast  amount  of  information  about  our  surroundings,  our
repertoire  of  concepts  seems to be too coarse-grained to capture all  the details
perceptually presented to us. But this line of motivation is also controversial, at
least to the extent that the notion of perceptual phenomenology is too elusive to
53 For further critical literature on the motivations behind (2.a), also cf. Irvine 2011.
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ground  substantive  philosophical  claims  about  the  nature  of  perceptual
experiences. To take one example alone, Dennett makes a compelling case against
a conception of perceptual experiences as a sort of phenomenological repository
(cf. Dennett 1991, 359-62).54 As far as I can see, there is no problem in using claims
about  perceptual  phenomenology as  the  subject-matter  or  the  starting-point  of
philosophical reflection: using them to legitimize substantive philosophical tenets
is, in turn, much more controversial.
Setting  its  typical  motivations  aside,  (2.a)  faces  a  more  fundamental
problem, namely, that informational richness seems to be neither a necessary nor a
sufficient  condition  of  perceptual  experiences.  In  other  words,  a  subject  could
undergo sense experiences which are as informationally rich or degraded as some
of her cognitive states downstream perception: that being the case, (2.a) would not
provide  a  criterion sufficiently  robust  to  set  perceptual  experiences  apart  from
beliefs. Informational richness is not sufficient for perceptual experiences because
we  could  in  principle  conceive  a  subject  of  thoughts  and  experiences  whose
cognitive capacities are not informationally limited in the way ours are. A subject
endowed with absolute or perfect pitch (that is, a subject capable of remembering
and reidentifying sounds they have heard before) could constitute a basic model for
developing  an  example  along  such  lines.  That  feature  is  not  necessary for
perceptual experiences either: impaired subjects (e.g. short-sighted perceivers) or
unimpaired subjects perceiving extremely basic states of affairs may have coarsely-
grained  experiences.  So,  Molly  may  have  a  visual  experience  and  a  belief
concerning  the  same  worldly  state  of  affairs,  e.g.  a  black  square  on  a  white
background: although her experience would be neither more nor less rich than her
belief,  it  is still  natural  to draw a line between both mental tokens. Thus, (2.a)
apparently fails to pick up on a distinctive feature of perceptual content capable of
setting perceptual experiences apart from beliefs.
In  short,  (2.a)  is  a  problematic  criterion of  psychological  distinction.  To
begin  with,  its  typical  motivations  are  controversial.  But  perhaps  more
importantly, informational richness does not seem to be a necessary and sufficient
condition of perceptual experiences.  
54 For a different critique of the notion of phenomenal character, cf. Snowdon 2010.
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2.2. Fine-Grainedness
Now I introduce the notion of fine-grainedness relevant to perceptual experiences.
Then, I formulate and critically assess a criterion of distinction between perceptual
experiences and beliefs building on that feature. 
Like informational richness, fine-grainedness is widely recognized in the
literature on perceptual content (e.g. Evans 1982, 229; McDowell 1994, 56; Heck
2000,  489-90;  Tye  2006,  519).  Christopher  Peacocke  expresses  the  notion  as
follows:
Writers on the objective content of experience have often remarked that an experience
can have a finer-grained content than can be formulated by using concepts possessed by
the experiencer. If you are looking at a range of mountains, it may be correct to say that
you see some as rounded,  some as jagged. But the contents of your visual experience in
respect of the shape of the mountains is far more specific than that description indicates.
The description involving the concepts round and jagged would cover many different fine-
grained contents  which your experience could have,  contents  which are discriminably
different from one another. (Peacocke 1992b, 111; also cf. Peacocke 1992a and 2001, 240)
   
In this quote, Peacocke hints at two things that perceptual fine-grainedness
may refer to: on the one hand, that the content of perceptual experiences is more
determinate  than  that  of  cognitive  phenomena;  and,  on  the  other,  that  our
perceptual capacities of discrimination are more sensitive to incoming stimuli than
our cognitive capacities of type-identification. The fine-grainedness of perceptual
content may thus refer (i) to the determinacy of perceptual content itself, or (ii) to
the discriminatory sensitivity of our perceptual capacities. 
The  resulting  criterion  of  psychological  distinction  could  be  stated  as
follows:
  (2.b) Whatever  their  respective  attitudes,  perceptual  experiences  differ  from  
beliefs because
perceptual content is finer-grained than doxastic content. 
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On the basis of the previous remarks, (2.b)'s explanans could in turn be
specified in two different ways:
  (i) Perceptual content is finer-grained than doxastic content iff
perceptual content is more determinate than doxastic content.  
  (ii) Perceptual content is finer-grained than cognitive content iff 
a subject's perceptual capacities of discrimination are more sensitive
to  incoming  stimuli  than  her  cognitive  capacities  of  type-
identification.
In correspondence with (i) and (ii), the above criterion of distinction has
two different readings – call them (2.b.i) and (2.b.ii), respectively. To get a grip on
these criteria of distinction, it is of course necessary to say a bit more about (i) and
(ii).  
According to (i), perceptual content is finer-grained than doxastic content
in the sense that the former is more determinate than the latter. In this context, the
notion  of  determinacy  is  usually  fixed  through examples.  Basic  paradigms are
provided  by  concepts  of  colour-  and  shape-properties  structured  alongside  the
determinable-determinate  dimension:  coloured-red,  red-scarlet,  shaped-circular,
among other contrasts. The notion of perceptual determinacy builds on that kind
of examples. Thus, one may compare perceptual experiences so as to claim that a
visual  experience,  say,  of  a  red23 apple  is  more  determinate  than  a  visual
experience of a red apple; or again, that a visual experience of a square object is
more determinate than one of a mere geometrical figure. Only with a difference of
degree, (2.b.i) uses the same examples in order to set perceptual experiences apart
from beliefs: while we see determinate qualities (e.g. red21 or red23), we only think
of determinable ones (e.g. red, crimson, or indigo); again, one may believe that the
top of a mountain is jagged or round, but a visual experience of the same object
conveys more determinate qualities than merely jagged or round. These examples,
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among others, are thus intended to illuminate the notion of determinacy at stake in
(i) and (2.b.i). 
Although  often  spelt  out  in  terms  of  (i),  statements  of  perceptual  fine-
grainedness also invoke (ii).  Fred Dretske, for instance, formulates a distinction
along the lines of (2.b) in the following terms:    
At  the  level  of  experience,  I  am  sensitive  to  (i.e.,  can  discriminate)  all  manner  of
differences in the light, sound, pressure, temperature, and chemistry of objects affecting
my  senses.  I  nonetheless  have  a  limited  conceptual  repertoire  for  categorizing  these
sensory differences, for making judgments about […] the differences I experience. […] At
the sensory level I can discriminate hundreds of different colors. At the conceptual level I
operate with, at best, a few dozen categories for the colors I experience. (Dretske 1995, 18)
    
For  Dretske,  the  difference  between  perception  and  cognition  concerns,
among  other  things,  the  discriminatory  potential  of  perceptual  and  cognitive
capacities.  Diana Raffman hints  at  a  similar  distinction  saying  that,  'with rare
exceptions, discrimination along perceptual dimensions surpasses identification. In
other words, our ability to judge whether two or more stimuli are the same or
different in some perceptual respect (pitch or colour, say) far surpasses our ability
to type-identify them.' (Raffman 1995, 294) 
I take it to be fairly clear that, like informational richness, determinacy is a
feature of perceptual contents, not perceptual states. It may be less obvious how (ii)
feeds  into  a  distinction  between  perceptual  and  doxastic  contents:  this  issue,
however, might be addressed by means of an additional premise to the effect that a
subject's  perceptual  discriminations  determine  what  content  their  perceptual
experiences  have;  hence,  identifying  a  distinctive  trait  of  our  capacities  of
perceptual  discrimination  would  indirectly  highlight  a  distinctive  aspect  of
perceptual content. That said, even if determinacy and discriminatory sensitivity –
that is, the features picked up by (i) and (ii) – are typical features of perceptual
content,  the  corresponding  criteria  of  distinction  (2.b.i)  and  (2.b.ii)  face
complications.
In a nutshell, the problem with (2.b.i) is that it collapses into a criterion of
distinction  along  the  lines  of  (2.a),  thereby  failing  to  provide  a  necessary  and
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sufficient condition of perceptual experiences vis-à-vis beliefs. The issue assessed
in these sub-sections is whether informational richness and fine-grainedness could
draw  a  line  between  two  unequivocally  different  psychological  categories,  i.e.
perceptual experiences and beliefs. Now, an assumption of the discussion thus far
is that both features constitute different components of perceptual content, a point
that finds more systematic support in the philosophical literature. Michael Tye, for
instance,  notes  that  richness  fails  to  constitute  a  necessary  component  of
perceptual experiences: instead, this feature only seems contingently to depend on
the  way  in  which  living  organisms  like  human  beings  evolved.  As  previously
mentioned, one might think of cases where there is no informational barrier on the
cognitive side – that is, we could imagine organisms that can judge about as much
information  as  they  can  perceptually  process;  or,  conversely,  cases  where
informational  barriers  are  imposed  on  the  perceptual  side  –  that  is,  where  a
perceiver has experiential access to very little information. By framing the relevant
difference as only one of degree, the notion of informational richness apparently
blurs the divide between perceptual and doxastic content. Setting fine-grainedness
apart from informational richness is thereby motivated as an attempt to reflect the
intuitively  radical  difference  between  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs;  a
difference, that is, which informational richness alone cannot capture.55 
As just anticipated, however, conceiving perceptual fine-grainedness along
the lines of (i) threatens to collapse (2.b) into (2.a).  The point is,  I think, fairly
manifest on the basis of some examples: when a subject perceives or thinks about
O in a determinate way w1, she accesses more information than she would was O
presented in the less determinate way w2; conversely, was a subject presented with
O in the determinable way w2, there would be a loss of information in relation to
w1.  For instance, when I see Marston Ferry Road on a foggy day, I access less
information than I do when I stare at the same scenery on a clear day: the former
experience is informationally poorer than the latter. If  this is all  one means by
coarse-grainedness,  then  the  notion  has  collapsed  into  that  of  informational
paucity; and, correspondingly, that of fine-grainedness into informational richness.
The assimilation also emerges in the philosophical literature whenever the notion
55 For  a  similar  motivation  to  set  the  fine-grainedness  of  perceptual  content  apart  from  its
informational richness, cf. Peacocke 1989, 315).
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of fine-grainedness is refined. After setting this notion apart from informational
richness – in particular,  after  identifying fine-grained but  informationally poor
experiences and coarse-grained but rich experiences – Chuard ends up collapsing
both notions when he recognizes that '[t]o some extent, the difference between (i)
fineness of grain and (ii) informational richness is a matter of degree, since a fine-
grained representation of x will typically contain more information about x than a
non-specific one.' Immediately after this, and in order to bridge the gap between
the two relevant notions, he adds that 'the additional information involved in (i) is
about particular properties or objects (the ones presented in more detail). With (ii),
the additional information is about different objects and properties, so that it need
not  contain  specific  information  about  anything  in  particular.'   (Chuard  2007,
29n.10) But this qualification seems to come a bit too late, for fine-grainedness
simply bottoms up as a sub-class or special version of informational richness. Bill
Brewer  also  hints  at  a  similar  line  of  thought.  In  an  attempt  to  understand
paradigmatic forms of hallucinatory experiences, he claims that '[i]n certain cases,
experiences are therefore to be construed most fundamentally as merely degraded
acquaintance with the physical objects in question.' (Brewer 2011, 116) According
to him, experiences concerning determinable properties (e.g. an experience of an
object, located in the periphery of the visual field, which looks red but no particular
shade of red; or an experience of blurry objects) are to be understood as cases of
degraded  acquaintance,  where  I  take  'degraded  acquaintance'  just  to  be
informationally  poor  awareness  of  worldly  items.  Hence,  (2.b.i)  seems to  be  a
problematic gloss on (2.b): lest it be otherwise redefined, it collapses (2.b) into (2.a),
thus exposing the former to the latter's problems.
Turning now to (2.b.ii), the main problem springs from a point flagged by
Raffman: our perceptual capacities' relative superiority over our cognitive skills is
contingent on how the subjects of such psychological phenomena are constituted
(cf. Raffman 1995, 295-6). Human beings happen to be constituted in such a way
that  they  perceptually  pick  up  on  more  information  than  that  they  can
conceptually  process.  This  relative  richness  hangs  on  constraints  imposed  on
perceptual  memory:  in  order  to  type-identify  (or  subsume  under  concepts)
perceived objects and properties,  a subject  has to remember what she has thus
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perceived; but it seems that human memory has only so much capacity to store
information about perceived objects  and properties;  thus,  limitations on human
memory also impose limitations upon our capacities of conceptual identification.
This informational asymmetry naturally has an evolutionary rationale: to avoid
information  overload,  it  is  sensible  for  an  organism to  store  only  part  of  the
information she latches onto; was it not for the natural limits set by perceptual
memory, our cognitive capacities would be crushed or delayed by an overflow of
perceptual information. And it should be clear by now that (2.b.ii) relies on such a
contingent  distinction.  The  reason  our  capacities  for  perceptual  discrimination
surpass  our  capacities  for  type-identification  is  that  our  cognitive  capacities
downstream perception  get  less  information  than that  retrieved by our  senses.
Raffman stresses this feature by describing the role which perceptual memory has
in  the  previous  asymmetry:  memory  sets  a  bar  to  what  we  can  type-identify
because it stores less information than it is perceptually available. Accordingly, one
could in principle conceive subjects whose perceptual experiences and beliefs are
not appropriately distinguished by means of (2.b.ii). 
In short, it is unclear that fine-grainedness manages to draw a line between
perceptual  and  doxastic  content,  let  alone  between  perceptual  experiences  and
beliefs. 
2.3. Analog Content
The last criterion of distinction I shall examine in this section may be formulated
as follows:
  (2.c) Whatever  their  respective  attitudes,  perceptual  experiences  differ  from  
beliefs because
perceptual  content  is  analog  (or  analogically  encoded),  whereas
doxastic content is digital (or digitally encoded). 
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The  relevant  contrast  here  is  one  between  analog  and  digital  ways  of
representing or encoding information: perception or perceptual experiences stand
apart  because  they  process  analogically  encoded  information;  cognitive
phenomena,  in  turn,  involve  digital  representations  or  processes  where
information is digitally encoded. 
To understand whether (2.c) is a suitable criterion of distinction, it is of
course necessary to get a grip on what analog (as opposed to digital) means. And
this already proves to be a recalcitrant issue, as the notion of analog representation
or encoding of information is by no means a clear-cut one. In his seminal piece on
the analog-digital divide, John Haugeland reminds us that analog and digital are
engineering notions lacking the clarity and distinction dear to philosophers (cf.
Haugeland 1982, 217, 220). To fix some of their uses, Haugeland focuses on devices
capable of registering and reproducing information of a certain kind – in his own
terminology, 'feasible procedures for writing and reading tokens' of a certain kind
(cf. Haugeland 1982, 215). Within this context, he characterizes analog devices as
those (i) that register and reproduce information in a smooth or continuous way,
that  is,  without  gaps  (smoothness);  (ii)  for  which  only  certain  dimensions  of
variation  are  relevant  (dimensionality);  and  (iii),  for  which,  within  a  relevant
dimension of variation, every difference makes a difference (sensitivity). In virtue
of  these  features,  Haugeland  describes  an  analog  device  as  an  'approximation
procedure',  that  is,  as  a  means  of  processing  information  whose  capacity  for
successfully or accurately representing input information necessarily has a margin
of error, no matter how small it may be. Digital devices, in turn, stand apart from
analog ones precisely on the count of fallibility: they constitute positive procedure,
where  'a  positive  procedure  is  one  which  can  succeed  [i.e.  in  registering  and
reproducing information of a certain type] absolutely and without qualification–
that is, not merely to a high degree, with astonishing precision, or almost entirely,
but  perfectly,  one  hundred percent!'  (Haugeland 1982,  214)  Analog  and digital
watches provide helpful  examples.  In relation to the representation of  time, an
analog  watch  exhibits  the  features  of  smoothness,  continuity,  and  sensitivity:
accordingly,  it  is  a  device  effectively  capable  of  representing  time,  but  always
within  a  margin  of  error.  Digital  watches,  meanwhile,  constitute  positive
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procedures  for  representation:  by registering and reproducing information in a
discrete (i.e. non-continuous) way, digital watches are better suited than analog
ones to represent information about time precisely. This section is of course not
concerned  with  the  analog-digital  distinction  at  this  level  of  generality,  but
Haugeland's remarks correctly stress that the way in which the relevant pair of
concepts should be understood is, at least to a good extent, context-dependent. As
far as I know, two writers, Fred Dretske and Christopher Peacocke, have applied
the analog-digital contrast to the sort of issue I am concerned with, namely, the
experience-belief distinction. Furthermore, both of them have used it in different
ways. I turn to their proposals next. 
Dretske uses the digital-analog contrast to get a grip on the relationship
between perception and cognition: accordingly, he applies it in a way that should
also  illuminate  the  more  specific  relation  between  perceptual  experiences  and
beliefs.  The  starting-point  of  Dretske's  proposal  is  a  difficulty  faced  by  an
informational account of the mind (cf. Dretske 1981, 135): if the activities of the
human mind (perception, cognition, etc.) are understood in terms of informational
transactions  between  informational  sources  and  executive  systems (that  is,  via
different  informational  channels),  is  it  possible  to  save  intuitively  different
psychological  phenomena  from  collapsing  into  a  more  or  less  homogeneous
informational process? Dretske wishes to endorse what may be termed a broadly
informational-functionalist  model  of  the  mind,  but  he  recognizes  that  this
framework  might  obscure  the  distinctive  contributions  that  perception  and
cognition make to our psychological economy. Although an informational theorist,
Dretske  also  wishes  to  accommodate  the  intuitive  difference  between,  say,
perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs.56  'Perception  is,'  Dretske  first  claims,
'concerned  with  the  pickup  and  delivery  of  information,  cognition  with  its
utilization.'  (Dretske  1981,  135)  And  the  analog-digital  contrast  is  brought  up
precisely to flesh this point out. 
Dretske's  understanding  of  the  analog-digital  distinction  in  general  is
56 The problem is of course not new to philosophers: if the differences between perception and
cognition are exaggerated, it becomes unclear how they relate to each other; on the other hand,
if their commonalities are stressed, one runs the risk of obscuring their differences. The way I
see it, Kant and Hume faced these problems, respectively.
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similar to that of Haugeland's. 'It is traditional', he says, 'to think of the difference
between an analog and a digital encoding of information as the difference between
a continuous and a discrete representation of some variable property at the source.'
(Dretske 1981, 135-6) When it comes to expand on this general distinction, he goes
on as follows:
I will say that a signal (structure, event, state) carries the information that s is F in digital
form if and only if the signal carries no additional information about  s, no information
that is not already nested in  s's being  F. If the signal  does carry additional information
about s, information that is not nested in s's being F, then I shall say that the signal carries
this information in analog form.  When a signal carries the information that  s is  F in
analog form, the signal always carries more specific, more determinate, information about
s than that it is F. Every signal carries information in both analog and digital form. The
most specific piece of information it carries (about s) in digital form. All other information
(about s) is coded in analog form. (Dretske 1981, 137)
On the  face  of  it,  the  relevant  contrast  is  one  between continuous  and
discrete ways of encoding information. Elaborating on this point, however, Dretske
argues that, given a piece of information 's is F', a signal S represents s's being F in
an analog way if S carries more information about  s than that it is  F; a signal S
carrying the same piece of information will be digital, in turn, if S fails to carry
more information about s than that it is F. As here formulated, the main difference
between  analog  and  digital  representations  of  's is  F' is  that  an  analog
representation conveys more information about  s than the corresponding digital
representation. This reading is reinforced by Dretske's gloss on what the process of
digitalization amounts to:
To describe a process in which a piece of information is converted from analog to digital
form is to describe a process that necessarily involves the loss of information. Information
is lost because we pass from a structure […] of greater informational content to one of
lesser information content. Digital conversion is a process in which irrelevant pieces of
information are pruned away and discarded. Until information has been lost, or discarded,
or  information-processing system has failed  to  treat  different things as  essentially the
same. It has failed to classify or categorize, failed to generalize, failed to “recognize” the
input as being an instance (token) of a more general type. (Dretske 1981, 141)
  
Dretske qualifies these remarks by noting that digitalized information is
discriminatingly and selectively filtered (cf. Dretske 1981, 260n.5), but this does not
change  the  crucial  fact  that  the  main  difference  between  analog  and  digital
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representations  is  a  quantitative  one  relative  to  a  certain  represented  state  of
affairs: the analog-to-digital conversion of information is fundamentally a process
where information is discarded, lost. 
On  the  basis  of  the  previous  distinction,  Dretske  relates  perception  to
cognition as follows:
Perception is a process by means of which information is delivered within a richer matrix
of information (hence in  analog form) to  the cognitive centers  for their  selective use.
Seeing, hearing, and smelling are different ways we have of getting information about s to
a digital-conversion unit whose function it is to extract pertinent information from the
sensory representation for purposes of modifying output. (Dretske 1981, 142)
According  to  this  proposal,  our  senses  deliver  informationally  rich
representations:  perceptual  activity  consists  in  registering  input  information,
where  the  resulting  representations  reproduce  detailed  information  about  the
perceiver's surroundings. Through a process of digitalization, cognitive capacities
downstream perception retrieve this information and filter it so as to make it more
manageable. If perceptual experiences are conceived as the vehicles of perceptual
representations and beliefs as a particular kind of cognitive representations, I think
that Dretske's conception of the perception-cognition link also provides a criterion
of distinction along the lines of (2.c). 
It  should be clear by now what difficulty I wish to charge the previous
criterion with: like (2.b.i), this way of conceiving (2.c) collapses into a proposal like
(2.a),  and hence,  faces a  similar problem. Perceptual content  stands apart  from
doxastic content because it is analog as opposed to digital: but, for Dretske, being
an analog representation of a given state of affairs simply amounts to representing
more  information  about  that  state  of  affairs  than  the  corresponding  digital
representation. As such, the distinctive component of perceptual content turns out
to  be  nothing  more  than  informational  richness.57 According  to  this  proposal,
cognitive  digitalization  amounts  to  a  process  of  information-elimination:
'[c]ognitive activity is the  conceptual mobilization of incoming information, and
this  conceptual treatment  is  fundamentally  a matter of  ignoring differences (as
57 This is basically the same point that Peacocke 1989, 314 makes against Dretske's use of the
analog-digital pair in order to set perception apart from cognition. 
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irrelevant to an underlying sameness), of going from the concrete to the abstract,
of passing from the particular to the general.' (Dretske 1981, 142) As he sees it, the
formation of concepts and conceptual representations is simply underpinned by
the elimination of perceptual information in a discriminate and selective way. In
relation to conceptual representations, perceptual representations convey a richer
amount  of  information  to  a  subject.  In  section  2.1,  however,  I  noted  that
informational richness does not constitute a necessary or sufficient condition of
perceptual experiences: hence, it does not seem to provide a satisfactory way of
distinguishing perceptual experiences from beliefs. 
As  previously  mentioned,  Peacocke  builds  on  a  different  way  of
understanding  the  analog-digital  pair:  unlike  Dretske,  he  keeps  the  contrast
between continuous and discrete ways of representation in sight so as to avoid
collapsing the notion of analog character into that of informational richness. This
characterization of perceptual content as analog, however, is also motivated by an
attempt to  reflect  the different  ways  in  which perception  and thought  allow a
subject  to access  the world (cf.  Peacocke 1989,  303).  To use one of  Peacocke's
examples, there are different ways in which we may come to know the size of a
table: on the one hand, we could look at it and thus become perceptually aware of
the table and its size; or, on the other, we could be told the table's dimensions in
inches,  centimeters,  meters,  or other metric units.  Both ways of addressing the
table's size are intuitively different: only one feature in which they differ, Peacocke
tells us, is that perceptual awareness provides unit-free knowledge of magnitudes.
The notion of analog character comes into play precisely to capture the distinctive
way or manner in which perception conveys the world to a subject:
There is a sense in which manners of perception conforming to these principles and which
featured in our initial examples can be described as an analog. As a first approximation, a
type of manner is analog provided that there is some dimension of variation such that for
any pair of distinct points d, d' on that dimension, there are  two  manners  of  the
given type one of which is a manner of perception of something which is or includes d but
not d', and the other of which is a manner of perception of something which is or includes
d'' but not d. The dimension may be direction or size, but it is neither confined to these,
nor to spacial characteristics. (Peacocke 1989, 304)
In subsequent work, Peacocke revisits the idea of analog content in more
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accessible terms:
To say that the type of content in question [i.e. the objective content of experience] is
analogue is to make the following point. There are many dimensions – hue, shape, size,
direction – such that any value on that dimension may enter the fine-grained content
of an experience.  In particular,  an experience is not restricted in its range of  possible
contents to those points or ranges picked out by concepts – red, square, straight ahead –
possessed by the perceiver. (Peacocke 1992b, 111-2)
As one may appreciate from this quote, Peacocke links the analog character
to the fine-grainedness of perceptual content. Leaving this complication aside for
the time being, there is a relatively clear thought cutting across both passages.
Peacocke picks up on those low-level properties which visual experiences are most
likely to represent: hue, shape, size, direction, etc. Each one of these qualities may
be conceived as a  dimension (that  is,  a quality-dimension) the points of  which
stand for all the determinate forms the relevant property may take, systematically
ordered in the quality-dimension at stake. Consider one particular colour, red. This
colour may be thought of as a quality-dimension – which may in turn belong to
another quality-dimension, namely, that of colours – the points of which are all the
possible varieties of red there are. Additionally, assume that perceptual experiences
do represent properties like redness. That said, the first quote above states that, for
a quality-dimension corresponding to a property P and for any two points, p and
p', along that dimension P, a visual experience may always represent property P in
a manner corresponding to p but not to p', or vice versa. Perceptual manners, the
ways  in  which  perception  represents  properties,  or  again,  the  contents  of
perceptual  experiences,  may be conceived as  analog if  they form a continuous
pattern along one of such quality-dimensions. The second quote, in turn, expands
on the previous thought by suggesting, in connection to the fine-grainedness of
perceptual content, that the aforementioned quality-dimensions indeed count with
an extremely rich number of points: no matter how many concepts a subject may
have  in  order  to  conceptualize  or  type-identify  different  shades  of  red,  her
conceptual repertoire will always run short of all the different manners in which
our visual experiences may represent red. 
But  could  Peacocke's  characterization  of  perceptual  content  as  analog
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ground a criterion of distinction along the lines of (2.c)? I do not think so: in a
nutshell, the problem is that analog content, as conceived by Peacocke, does not
seem  to  be  a  necessary  mark  of  perceptual  experiences.  Peacocke  certainly
characterizes  the perception-cognition distinction in terms of  the analog-digital
contrast:  given  a  quality-dimension  constituted  by  a  structured  pattern  of
continuous  quality-points,  visual  experiences  are  capable  of  representing
properties  corresponding  to  points  in  such  a  dimension;  concepts  (and,
accordingly, all those cognitive events or states depending on concepts) only pick
up on entire strips of quality-dimensions – that is, they are not (perhaps cannot be)
sensitive to all the different points within a quality-dimension. In accordance with
this  line  of  reasoning,  conceiving  perceptual  experiences  with  digital  content
would amount to conceiving perceptual experiences the contents of which are not
sensitive to all the differences corresponding to points within a quality-dimension.
But it turns out that such experiences are not too hard to envisage. A standard
normal human being may well perceptually discriminate red23 from red24; a subject
having perceptual experiences with analog content is, in turn, simply one that fails
making discriminations like these. As far as I can see, a given subject could, say,
have a visual experience of  a  determinable  colour without discriminating what
determinate  colour  it  is:  instead of  perceiving  red23 or  red24,  this  subject  could
perceive  a  red  blur.  The  thought  that  perceptual  experiences  could  represent
merely determinable properties is indeed a live philosophical option in the current
literature. Stazicker, for example, observes that 'it's tempting to assume that we
always  see  maximally  determinate  properties.  Perhaps  this  is  because  of  our
tendency to reify visual experience, to confuse determinacy in experience with the
determinacy of its objects.' (Stazicker 2011, 172) But this reification, he notes, is
unwarranted.  In  particular,  Stazicker  challenges  the  thought  that  all  perceived
properties are necessarily determinate for two reasons. First, he invokes scientific
evidence supporting the limited and varying resolution of vision: whether foveal or
perifoveal vision be at stake, the spatial resolution of the representations produced
by the visual system decays with the spatial frequency which that representation
registers, where spacial frequency is the rate of change of a phenomenon across
space. Secondly, he also brings up a phenomenon known as the crowding effect:
'when  a  stimulus  is  presented  in  the  periphery  of  a  subject's  visual  field,
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surrounded by other slightly different stimuli, the subject is sometimes unable to
identify the specific character of the stimulus.' (Stazicker 2011, 173) According to
Stazicker, a natural way of thinking about this phenomenon consists in supposing
that the unidentified stimulus is perceptually (not just cognitively) represented in a
purely  determinable  way.  These  scientifically  informed  remarks  are,  I  suspect,
additionally supported by parochial phenomena, e.g. the sort of blurry vision short-
sighted people are well aware of. If such considerations are along the right lines, I
think one could plausibly argue that perceptual experiences may (and, in many
cases,  do)  represent  more  or  less  extensive  segments  of  a  quality-dimension.
Hence, analog character would not be a necessary trait of perceptual experiences.
Apart from the previous remarks, a decisive point is that Peacocke himself
conceives the possibility of 'digitalized' perception: 'We can conceive of our visual
experience being digitized in a 1000x1000 matrix of squares. A visually perceived
straight  line  of  squares  would then be perceived in  a distinctive manner.  This
manner would not be counted as analog under the first approximation, with its
requirement about every pair of points on the relevant dimension.' (Peacocke 1989,
304)  This  concession  is  somewhat  puzzling:  Peacocke  first  uses  the  notion  of
analog content to characterize perception vis-à-vis cognition, only to allow then
that visual experiences might have digital content. I am inclined to think here that,
although Peacocke takes  analog content  typically  to be a prominent  feature of
human perceptual experience, he would not aim to frame it as a necessary and
sufficient criterion of perceptual experiencehood.58 
Summing up. Although Dretske and Peacocke hold that perceptual content
is typically analog, their respective views do not ground a principle of distinction
like (2.c). In Dretske's characterization, the analog character of perceptual content
collapses  into  its  informational  richness:  as  such,  the  resulting  principle  of
experience-belief  distinction  would  simply  constitute  a  reformulation  of  the
problematic  principle  (2.a).  Peacocke's  characterization of  perceptual  content  as
analog  does  not  seem  to  meet  the  same  fate,  but  it  is  also  clear  that,  as  he
understands  it,  analog  character  is  not  a  necessary  feature  of  perceptual
experiences. Hence, I conclude that it is unclear how (2.c) could account for the
58 In conversation, Professor Peacocke seems to have confirmed this suggestion.
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distinction between perceptual experiences and beliefs.
Throughout this section, I have examined different ways in which the distinction
between perceptual experiences and beliefs may be drawn at the level of perceptual
and doxastic content. The general point I thus aimed to press is that the relevant
distinction cannot exclusively rely on the notion of perceptual content. In the next
section, I examine a nonconceptualist view of perceptual experiences so as to keep
pressing  the  same point.  My positive  proposal  will  be  that  an  analysis  of  the
relevant  psychological  distinction  has  to  look  into  the  differences  between
perceptual and doxastic states. 
III. CONTENT AND STATE NONCONCEPTUALISM 
       
The previous section showed that certain features of perceptual content – namely,
informational richness, fine-grainedness, and analog character – do not seem to
distinguish perceptual experiences from beliefs. This outcome, I suspect, partially
suggests that the relevant psychological divide should not be specified at the level
of perceptual and doxastic contents. In a modest attempt to explore the possibility
of  drawing  that  distinction  at  the  level  of  perceptual  and  doxastic  states  or
attitudes,  I  shall  discuss  a  nonconceptualist  view of  perceptual  experiences.  Te
present  section  is  divided  into  three  sub-parts.  First,  I  introduce  the  general
thought that perceptual experiences are nonconceptual or concept-independent as
a  component  in  a  distinction  between  experiences  and  beliefs.  Then,  in  the
following  two  subsections,  I  unpack  two  ways  of  reading  the  general
nonconceptualist thought, and hence, the corresponding criterion of psychological
distinction:  after  all,  the  relevant  position  could  be  taken  to  concern  either
perceptual contents or perceptual states. Content nonconceptualism has no doubt
been the most popular version: however, to the extent that this chapter aims to
explore a criterion of distinction at the level of psychological states (as opposed to
representatioanl contents), I shall focus on state nonconceptualism. At the end of
this chapter, I specifically explain how the state-reading dovetails with a stative
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view of experiences. 
3.1. General Nonconceptualism
To begin with, let's turn to the following criterion of distinction:
  (?) Perceptual experiences differ from beliefs because
perceptual  experiences  are  nonconceptual,  whereas  beliefs  are
conceptual.  
According  to  (?),  perceptual  experiences  do  not  depend  on  concept-
possession  in  the  same  way  beliefs  do.  Although  the  principle  is  no  doubt
extremely general, its reliance on a nonconceptualist understanding of perceptual
experiences should be fairly manifest. 
To a first approximation, perceptual nonconceptualism may be stated as
follows:     
  NC: Perceptual experiences need not be conceptual.
(NC)  is  no  less  general  than  (?),  but  it  makes  vivid  a  crucial  thought:
according  to  the  nonconceptualist,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  perceptual
experiences  a  subject  has  are  not  necessarily  constrained  by  the  repertoire  of
concepts  she  is  endowed  with.  This  position  naturally  contrasts  with  a
conceptualist  stance,  that  is,  the view that  conceptual  capacities  do necessarily
determine what kinds of perceptual experiences a subject could have. 
To  an  important  extent,  the  debate  between  conceptualism  and
nonconceptualism is  an  epistemological  one:  for,  while  the  conceptualist  often
invokes concept-dependency as a feature capable of throwing light on the question
how perceptual experiences justify beliefs, among other propositional attitudes (cf.
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Mcdowell 1994, 1998); the nonconceptualist seeks to show that, even if concept-
independent, perceptual experiences could still fulfil the same justifying role (cf.
Heck 2000). Although this delicate aspect of the controversy is no doubt crucial,
recall that the present chapter is not interested in vindicating nonconceptualism
over conceptualism, or vice versa: instead, all I aim to do here is to distinguish two
readings of (NC), so as to develop a distinction between perceptual experiences
and beliefs at the level of psychological states or attitudes – that is, so as to develop
an instance of (1).    
In  sub-section 3.2,  I  briefly  state  the content-reading in terms of  which
(NC)  and,  accordingly,  (?),  are  traditionally  understood.  To  set  content
nonconceptualism  aside,  I  shall  sketch  the  following  difficulty:  although  the
content-reading of nonconceptualism and conceptualism emerged at a time when
it was popular to think that perceptual experiences have representational content,
the latter claim is now deemed to be extremely controversial; as such, the worry is
that, in virtue of its problematic assumption, a content-reading would be unable to
express  (NC),  let  alone  (?),  against  the  background of  an  increasingly  popular
nonrepresentationalist conception of perceptual experiences. Then, in 3.3, I move
on to unpack the state-reading of (NC). Since it downplays the role of perceptual
content in a characterization of (NC), it does not face the same difficulty I pressed
against the content-reading. Perhaps more importantly, I think it could specify (?)
as a version of (1), that is, as a specific distinction between perceptual experiences
and beliefs at the level of their respective states or attitudes.  
3.2. Content Nonconceptualism 
(NC) is naturally far too general. In particular, the claim is silent on, first, how
concept-independence  (and,  contrastively,  concept-dependence)  should  be
understood,  and,  secondly,  what  specific  feature of  perceptual  experiences  that
notion is supposed to determine. Fully to specify the nonconceptualist claim, it is
necessary to  address  both issues.  Throughout this  section,  however,  I  shall  not
discuss the import of the conceptual and the nonconceptual. The two versions of
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(NC) I shall unpack only relate to the second question, that is, what is specifically
said to be nonconceptual, no matter how the latter feature be understood.  
Since its  inception into  the philosophical  mainstream, nonconceptualism
has  traditionally  been  read  as  a  claim  about  the  representational  content  of
perceptual experiences. Thus, it could be expressed along the following lines:
CNC:  Perceptual experiences have representational contents which need
not be conceptual or concept-dependent.
(CNC) tells us that perceptual content need not be conceptual. All it does
for us in the present context is  to specify the exact  sense in which perceptual
experiences  are  supposed  to  be  concept-independent:  they  are  nonconceptual
because the representational contents they incorporate are so. This formulation,
meanwhile, remains fairly neutral on how the contrastive pair of the conceptual
and the nonconceptual should be understood. Without abandoning this neutrality,
one could alternatively say that perceptual experiences need not have the same
sort  of  content  that  paradigmatically  concept-dependent  propositional  attitudes
(e.g. beliefs) have. This formulation is no less neutral than (CNC): after all, it relies
on a contrast with paradigmatically conceptual attitudes, but does not fix on any
particular  understanding  of  the  conceptual  and  the  nonconceptual.  A  fully
determinate characterization of perceptual nonconceptualism has to get a fix on
the notion of concept-independence. In other words, it has to settle what it means
to be nonconceptual. (CNC) aims to provide no such a characterization, though: it
only  highlights  the  intimate  link  that  many  nonconceptualist  philosophers
envisage between concept-independence and perceptual representational content.
This is why (CNC) may be suitably termed content nonconceptualism. 
By  partially  specifying  (NC)  in  terms  of  (CNC),  the  criterion  of
psychological  distinction  formulated  in  (?)  could  also  take  a  more  determinate
shape.  On  the  basis  of  content  nonconceptualism,  one  may  set  perceptual
experiences apart from beliefs as follows:
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  (2.d) Perceptual experiences differ from beliefs because
perceptual  content  is  nonconceptual,  whereas  doxastic  content  is
conceptual. 
Like (CNC), (2.d) is silent on the import of concept-independence. Again, to
the extent  that  it  draws the relevant  distinction  at  the level  of  perceptual  and
doxastic  contents,  this  criterion  apparently  presupposes  that  perceptual
experiences  have  representational  content.  Thus,  while  (CNC)  and  (2.d)  are
relatively flexible on the question what concept-independence amounts to, they are
stuck  with  the  notion  of  perceptual  representational  content.  As  previously
anticipated, the point I shall press next precisely concerns (CNC)'s reliance on a
representationalist understanding of perceptual experiences.
In a nutshell, the difficulty I have in mind is this: to the extent that they
rely  on  the  notion  of  representational  content,  (CNC)  and  (2.d)  are  legitimate
claims  only  within  the  boundaries  of  a  representationalist  model  of  perceptual
experiences; against the backdrop of a nonrepresentationalist framework, however,
content nonconceptualism would not throw light on perceptual experience and its
relationship to belief.  Of course,  to appreciate the force of  this  complaint,  it  is
necessary  to  say  a  bit  more  about  a  nonrepresentationalist  view of  perceptual
experience. 
Nonrepresentationalism is actually an umbrella term for a family of views
related by their common rejection of a theoretical framework where perceptual
experiences  are  taken to  represent  the  world  in  a certain  way to  a  subject  of
experiences. In other words, a nonrepresentationalist view primarily refers to any
position driven by a rejection of what Bill Brewer calls the Content View, a theory
according to which 'the most fundamental account of our perceptual relation with
the physical world is to be given in terms of the complete representational contents
of perceptual experience' (Brewer 2011, 54-5). According to a representationalist or
content-based stance, how things perceptually appear to a subject is conceived as a
way of representing the world. For a number of ontological, epistemological, and
phenomenological  reasons  which  I  shall  not  rehearse  here,  that  conception  of
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perceptual experiences was extremely popular at the time Fred Dretske and Gareth
Evans championed a nonconceptualist stance (cf. Dretske 1981; Evans 1982). Alas,
philosophical  fashions  change.  For  different  reasons,  an  important  number  of
philosophers  have  challenged  the  thought  that  perceptual  experiences  have
representational  content  (cf.  Martin 2002;  Campbell  2002;  Travis  2004;  Brewer
2006,  2011).  Driven  by  direct  or  naïve  realist  intuitions,  for  example,  certain
writers hold that, at a fundamental level of characterization, an analysis of how
things  perceptually  appear  to  subjects  could  dispense  with  representational
ingredients:  instead,  they  argue  that  a  philosophical  story  of  perceptual
experiences  only  has  to  specify  the  complex  ways  in  which  a  subject  is
perceptually related to her surroundings (cf. Campbell 2002, 2011; Brewer 2011).
Relationally understood, a description of perceptual experiences need not invoke
the  notion  of  representational  content.  But,  for  the  same  reason,  a  relational
understanding of perceptual experiences could not accommodate (CNC) or (2.d): in
general, no nonrepresentational account of perception make room for either claim.
As I previously noted, content nonconceptualism as well as its negation, content
conceptualism,  presuppose  that  perceptual  experiences  have  representational
content. By dispensing with the latter assumption, a nonrepresentationalist stance
would not strictly speaking refute a nonconceptualist view: more dramatically, it
would undermine the very terms in which (CNC), (2.d), and their corresponding
negations, are formulated.      
Having  said  that,  it  is  important  to  appreciate  the  limitations  of  the
foregoing remarks. To begin with, I do not intend to develop an objection in favour
of content conceptualism: the previous line of reasoning targets a conceptualist
stance no less than a nonconceptualist one. Again, I have not made a case against
a  representationalist  view  of  experience.  The  present  discussion  has  indeed
touched on two paramount debates in contemporary philosophy of perception: on
the  one  hand,  that  between  conceptualists  and  nonconceptualists;  and,  on  the
other,  that  between  representationalists  and  nonrepresentationalists.  In  this
context, all  I have intended to do here is to say something about the relatively
neglected question what bearing these debates have on each other. Specified along
the  lines  of  a  content-reading,  conceptualism  and  nonconceptualism  are  only
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accommodated  by  a  representationalist  view  of  experience.  Within  a
nonrepresentationalist  framework,  however,  both  positions  do  not  seem  to  be
intelligible. To the extent that it depends on (CNC), (2.d) is also incompatible with
a  nonrepresentationalist  stance.  Since  I  have  not  set  out  to  undermine
representationalism, these exploratory remarks do not undermine (CNC). But the
foregoing considerations do raise a problem for (CNC) and its negation on the
plausible  assumption  that  the  choice  between  conceptualism  and
nonconceptualism  should  be  intelligible  even  beyond  the  boundaries  of  a
representationalist framework.    
In short, this sub-section has aimed to suggest (but by no means to prove)
that,  given  current  trends  in  the  representationalism-nonrepresentationalism
debate, the most popular version of the nonconceptualist claim, (CNC), might not
ground  a  satisfactory  distinction  between  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs.
Granted:  in  spite  of  its  current  popularity,  nonrepresentationalism  may  be
incorrect, in which case the difficulty I have pressed here would be innocuous. But
this  is  yet  to  be  proven.  The  present  remarks  thus  draw  from  the  fact  that
nonrepresentationalist  views of  experience constitute a  legitimate option in the
current  philosophical  scene.  At  the  present  stage  of  the  debate  between
representationalism  and  nonrepresentationalism,  it  would  be  reasonable  to
formulate  (NC)  and,  correspondingly,  (?),  in  a  way  sufficiently  flexible  to  be
compatible  with  representationalist  as  well  as  nonrepresentationalist  views.  So,
while the previous line of reasoning does not constitute a K.O. case against (CNC)
and  (2.d),  I  hope  it  provides  a  reasonable  motivation  to  explore  alternative
formulations of (NC) and (?). I turn to one of such alternatives next.   
3.3. State Nonconceptualism    
Although  the  debate  between  conceptualism  and  nonconceptualism  has
traditionally  been  framed  along  the  lines  of  a  content-reading,  an  interesting
development has taken place in the past  few years.  A number of  writers have
recently suggested that the relevant positions of this debate do not concern how
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the content of perceptual experiences is constituted, but how we should think of
the psychological states or attitudes involved in perceptual experiences. In other
words,  the  suggestion  is  that  a  claim  like  (NC)  could  be  taken  to  ground  an
instance of (1) rather than (2). The goal of this sub-section is, first, to unpack a
state-reading of (NC) and its corresponding version of the criterion of distinction
(?), and, secondly, to address a potential objection based on the thought that even
state nonconceptualism partially relies on the notion of perceptual representational
content.  
A  state-reading of  (NC)  is  prominent  in  the  work  of  Jeff  Speaks  and
Thomas Crowther (cf. Speaks 2005 and Crowther 2006; also cf. Heck 2000, Toribio
2008 and Duhau 2014). To begin with, Speaks acknowledges the existence of a
position like (CNC): that is, a view according to which perceptual experiences have
'a different kind of content than do beliefs, thoughts, and so on.' (Speaks 2005, 360)
But he also flags an interpretation where '[a] mental state of an agent A (at a time
t) has relatively nonconceptual content if and only if the content of that mental
state includes contents not grasped (possessed) by A at  t.' (Speaks 2005, 360, also
cf.  392n.4)  Speaks  thus  distinguishes  two readings  of  a  nonconceptualist  view,
namely,  an  absolute and a  relative one.  Whereas  the  absolute  version roughly
corresponds to  (CNC),  relative nonconceptualism seems to  specify (NC) as  the
view that perceptual experiences are nonconceptual iff they could be had without
the need of possessing those concepts required to express their contents. By means
of this contrast, Speaks highlights the fact that relative nonconceptualism is not
primarily a position about the nature of perceptual content: otherwise, it would
collapse into absolute  nonconceptualism.  What  the alternative nonconceptualist
stance  is  intended  to  deliver  is  a  characterization  of  the  relationship  between
subjects and the content of their perceptual experiences, that  is,  of experiential
states  or  attitudes.  Although  the  notion  of  perceptual  content  may  figure  in
Speaks's  description  of  relative  nonconceptualism,  the  latter  position  does  not
throw light on experiential contents as such.     
Crowther, meanwhile, identifies a compositional and a possessional reading
of  nonconceptualism  (as  well  as  of  their  conceptualist  counterparts).
Compositionally understood, the nonconceptualist thesis holds that the contents of
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perceptual experiences are not composed or constituted by concepts (cf. Crowther
2006, 250). Like (CNC), this position concerns the nature of perceptual content. A
possessional conception, in turn, reads as follows:
(NCposs) Where S has an experience, e, with the content p, p is a nonconceptual content iff
it is not the case that in order for S to be undergoing e, S must possess the concepts that
characterize p. (Crowther 2006, 252)
This view does not answer to the question whether perceptual content is
composed of concepts, but to that whether a subject of perceptual experiences need
possess the concepts required to describe the content of such experiences. 
Crowther's  possessional  nonconceptualism  and  Speaks's  relative
nonconceptualism coincide at least in two respects:  on the one hand, they take
distance  from  attempts  to  specify  the  representational  content  of  perceptual
experiences; and, on the other, they focus on the question what the conditions for
having experiential states are. Hence, it should be relatively clear that both writers
aim to identify a version of (NC) which is not primarily concerned with the nature
of  perceptual  content,  but  with  the  psychological  states  or  attitudes  which
underpin our perceptual experiences. 
Speaks's and Crowther's proposals no doubt differ in points of detail. Josefa
Toribio, however, specifies (NC) in a way which apparently captures the spirit of
relative and possessional nonconceptualism:
SNC: For any perceptual experience E with content C, any subject S, and any time t, E is
nonconceptuals iff it is not the case that in order for S to undergo E, S must possess at t the
concepts that a correct characterization of C would involve. (Toribio 2008, 354)
Indeed, I think (SNC) – that is, a state-reading of (NC) – captures the key
elements of Speaks's relative reading and Crowther's possessional version: first,
(SNC) is not strictly speaking a claim about the nature of perceptual content; and,
secondly, it invokes the notion of concept-independence to characterize perceptual
states, not perceptual contents. Unlike (CNC), the present stance does not crucially
rely on the assumption that perceptual experiences have representational content.
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As such,  I  think (SNC) is  not  exposed to  the  same sort  of  difficulty I  pressed
towards the end of the previous sub-section: that is, I think that (SNC) as well as
its  negation  –  state  conceptualism  –  could  be  accommodated  within  a
representationalist  and  a  nonrepresentationalist  understanding  of  perceptual
experiences. 
On the basis of (SNC), an alternative reading of (?) is available too:
  (1.a) Perceptual experiences differ from beliefs because
perceptual  states  are  nonconceptual,  whereas  doxastic  states  are
conceptual. 
Both (2.d)  and (1.a)  use the notion of  concept-independence in order to
draw a line between perceptual experiences and beliefs: but, while (2.d) takes that
feature to characterize the content of perceptual experiences, (1.a) only takes it to
specify the psychological states or attitudes underpinning perceptual experiences.
The criterion of distinction deriving from (SNC) draws the relevant distinction at
the  level  of  psychological  states.  In  order  words,  it  is  an  instance  of  (1).
Furthermore, since it hangs on (SNC), (1.a) seems to be an intelligible criterion of
distinction  within  a  representationalist  as  well  as  a  nonrepresentationalist
conception of perceptual experience. 
At this point, however, one could raise the following worry: to the extent
that she still invokes the notion of perceptual content, the state nonconceptualist
faces the same problem I pressed against the content nonconceptualist, namely, the
threat  of  making  her  position  unintelligible  within  a  nonrepresentationalist
framework. Although (SNC) does not directly concern the nature of  perceptual
content, it is still a claim about the relationship between subjects and perceptual
contents:  as  such,  it  seems  to  presuppose  that  perceptual  experiences  are
representational. I suspect that several specific objections against (SNC) hint at this
partial reliance on the notion of perceptual content. For example, a potential line of
objection takes off from the thought that perceptual states and perceptual contents
are so intimately related to each other that (SNC) entails  (CNC): for,  if  this  is
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correct,  a  critic  of  the  state-reading  could  complain  that  (SNC)  is  somewhat
redundant – after all, (CNC) would be enough to express that the contents and
states involved in perceptual experiences are nonconceptual. For the time being,
my  point  is  just  this:  since  state  nonconceptualism  assumes  that  perceptual
experiences have representational content, its intelligibility also seems to be bound
to a representationalist conception of perception.   
I  do  not  think  that  (SCN)  makes  the  same  controversial  assumption,
though. To appreciate this, one should distinguish a broad and a narrow sense of
perceptual content.  First, there is a fairly intuitive sense in which our perceptual
experiences are of or about worldly items or states of affairs. For example, when
Jim sees a bright star from t1 to tx, he undergoes a visual experience of or about a
bright star. There is thus a trivial sense in which perceptual experiences are about
things other than themselves – that is, intentional. This is the notion of perceptual
content I invoked in chapter 3. Of course, this broad sense in which perceptual
experiences are intentional or have content is philosophically uncontroversial. The
notion of perceptual content at stake in the debate between representationalists
and nonrepresentationalists is a heavier-duty one. A narrower notion of content
thus derives from an attempt to extrapolate a neo-Fregean conception of thought
or  belief  into  an  analysis  of  perceptual  phenomena  (cf.  Evans  1982;  Peacocke
1992a, 1992b). In this context, the notion of perceptual content is introduced so as
to suggest that perceptual experiences represent the world as being a certain way,
that  perceptual  experiences  incorporate  relatively  fine-grained  modes  of
presentation,  that  perceptual  experiences  contain  a  propositional  component
relevant for their type-specification, and so on. With this distinction at hand, it
should  be  more  or  less  clear  why  (SNC)  need  not  be  constrained  by  a
representationalist  conception  of  experience:  although  the  state  conceptualist
advances  a  claim  about  the  relationship  between  subjects  and  contents,  the
contents thus invoked may be understood broadly, not narrowly. (CNC) obviously
depends on a narrow understanding of perceptual content, for its most prominent
formulations  (e.g.  Evans's,  Peacocke's)  commonly emerge within a neo-Fregean
framework  of  cognition  and  perception.  Meanwhile,  by  spelling  out
nonconceptualism and its negation in terms of a state-reading, what I wish to show
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is precisely that the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism need not
rely on such a neo-Fregean framework – in other words, that (NC) or its negation
could  be  set  against  a  representationalist  as  well  as  a  nonrepresentationalist
backdrop. Hence, the present formulation of (SNC) need not incorporate a narrow
conception of perceptual content: as far as I can see, it could perfectly well rely on
the broader notion.59    
In  support  of  the claim that  state  nonconceptualism need not involve a
heavy-duty notion of perceptual content, it is worth noting that (SNC) could be
reformulated   so  as  to  avoid  any  references  to  the  content  of  perceptual
experiences:       
  (SNC*) For any perceptual experience E, any subject S, and any time t, E is 
nonconceptual, iff it is not the case that in order for S to undergo E, 
S  must possess at t any particular concept.
(SNC*)  is  almost  identical  to  Toribio's  formulation  of  state
nonconceptualism:  the  only  difference  is  that  (SNC)'s  revised  version  does  not
refer  to  the  content  of  the  relevant  perceptual  experiences.  At  its  heart,  the
nonconceptualist's point is not that certain experiences may be independent of one
or another concept, but that they may be independent of any concept whatsoever.
(SNC) as well as (SNC*), I think, capture this core idea. (SNC*) does not latch onto
the sub-set of concepts one would typically use to specify the content of a given
type of perceptual experience:  it  simply stipulates that an organism could have
perceptual experiences of a certain kind even if she lacked any particular sub-set of
concepts  or  conceptual  capacities.  (SNC)  additionally  invokes  the  notion  of
perceptual content in order to get a fix on the concepts most commonly used to
express what certain perceptual experiences are about. But while this extra bit may
59 In an attempt to defend state nonconceptualism, Laura Duhau argues that (CNC) and (SNC) rest
on different notions of representational content (cf. Duhau 2014). Although her strategy may
thus resemble the line of thought I rehearse here, our stances are actually quite different. To
make sense  of  (SNC),  Duhau  brings  up a  philosophically  loaded notion of  representational
content.  By  the  end  of  this  subsection,  however,  I  hope  it  will  be  clear  that  I  take  state
nonconceptualism to be independent of any such representational component or, perhaps, only
to depend on a pre-theoretical notion of content.  
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be informative, one may dispense with it.
To  sum  up.  This  section  has  unpacked  two  readings  of  (NC)  and  the
criterion  of  experience-belief  distinction,  (?).  In  relation  to  the  first  and  most
traditional version of (NC) – namely, content nonconceptualism – I noted that it
relies  on  the  assumption  that  perceptual  experiences  have  representational
content: as such, this position or its negation, content conceptualism, could not be
accommodated  within  a  nonrepresentationalist  framework  of  perceptual
phenomena. Similar remarks apply to the principle of distinction resulting from
(NC), namely, (2.d). Then, I introduced a more recent gloss on (NC), namely, state
nonconceptualism: since (SNC) does not presuppose that perceptual experiences
have  representational  content,  I  think  it  could  be  accommodated  within  a
representationalist  as  well  as  a  nonrepresentationalist  framework.  Accordingly,
(SNC)  grounds  a  criterion  of  psychological  distinction,  (1.a),  which  does  not
depend  on  the  controversial  question  whether  perceptual  experiences  are
representational.  This  logical  independence  from  the  debate  between
representationalism and nonrepresentationalism is, I think, a systematic virtue of
(SNC) and (1.a) over (CNC) and (2.d).  In the next section, I  shall  finally relate
(SNC) to the stative view of experience I have advocated here, the ultimate purpose
of which is to show that, even if  perceptual experiences and beliefs are mental
states,  one could still  draw a significant distinction between both psychological
categories.
IV. PERCEPTUAL STATES AND NONCONCEPTUALISM
In  chapters  1  and  2,  I  introduced  and  developed  a  stative  view  of  perceptual
experiences: that is, a position according to which these psychological items are
conceived as  mental  states obtaining in a subject,  not as temporally protracted
events constituted by processes of a phenomenally conscious kind. The goal of this
chapter is to show that, although a stative view sets experiences and beliefs on the
same side of the event-state divide, it could still accommodate a sharp distinction
between  both  psychological  categories  –  whether  it  should accommodate  this
distinction not being a question I address here. To pursue this task, I began by
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critically assessing a number of criteria of psychological distinction at the level of
perceptual  and  doxastic  contents.  Then,  I  turned  to  a  recent  reading  of  a
nonconceptualist  stance,  state nonconceptualism, according to which perceptual
states  or  attitudes  (as  opposed  to  perceptual  contents)  need  not  be  concept-
dependent: this position, I think, grounds a criterion of psychological distinction at
the level of perceptual and doxastic states. To close the present chapter, I shall
briefly relate state nonconceptualism and its resulting criterion of distinction to the
stative view of experience I previously defended.
In  the  present  context,  the  significance  of  the  stative  view  becomes
manifest as an answer to a prominent objection against state nonconceptualism.
The general worry seems to be that (SNC) is unmotivated. José Luis Bermúdez puts
the thought nicely by saying that 'the state view proposes a principled distinction
between  concept-dependent  state-types  and  concept-independent  state-types.
Plainly, proponents of the distinction owe us an account of where it comes from.
Why is it the case that beliefs do, while perceptions do not, respect the conceptual
constraint?' (Bermúdez 2007, 68) Along similar lines, Toribio presses that 'the real
question  is  why  believing,  but  not  perceiving,  is  thus  constrained  by  concept
possession.' (Toribio 2007, 357) Even if the claim that perceptual experiences need
not be concept-dependent addresses the question how perceptual experiences differ
from  beliefs,  it  does  not  tackle  the  more  important  question  why perceptual
experiences  need  not  be  concept-dependent.  In  other  words,  although  state
nonconceptualism  expresses  a  distinction  between  perceptual  experiences  and
beliefs, it fails to throw light on its explanation. Bermúdez's and Toribio's remarks
are no doubt legitimate, but they do not amount to anything like a refutation of
state  nonconceptualism:  instead,  they  only  constitute  invitations  to  expand  on
(SNC)'s novel interpretation of the nonconceptualist view. And the proposal I wish
to voice here is precisely that one way of developing state conceptualism consists
in setting this position within the larger framework of a stative view of experience.
I turn to this point next. 
While unpacking a stative view in chapters 2 and 4 (cf. chapters 2.1 and
4.2-3), I stressed that the notion of perceptual state is particularly at home within a
functionalist conception of perceptual phenomena. Within this larger framework,
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important  differences  between  perceptual  experiences  and  cognitive  states
downstream  perception  emerge.  Commenting  on  Kathrin  Glüer's  work,  for
example,  I  flagged a  functional  difference  on the  input  side  of  perceptual  and
doxastic states: whereas perceptual experiences stand more or less directly related
to sub-personal processes triggered by our surroundings' input, beliefs incorporate
environmental information indirectly via other perceptual and cognitive states (cf.
chapter  4.3.2).  Glüer  also  argues  that  perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs  are
functionally similar on their output sides, a move motivated by a conception of
assertive character as a feature determined by the functional role of experiences
and beliefs. But, while it may be true that the notion of assertive character refers to
a commonality between experiences and beliefs and that it is determined by the
functional role of these psychological items, one need not concede that perceptual
experiences and beliefs are functionally identical on their output sides. After all,
functional similarity is a matter of degree: visual experiences and beliefs may share
certain ways of affecting our psychological and epistemic economy; and yet they
may diverge in other respects.  In general,  perceptual and doxastic states  affect
other mental states and action in different ways, among other reasons, because
beliefs  do  not  have  the  same  robust  (albeit  defeasible)  evidential  force  that
perceptual experiences typically have. What linguistic reports we are prepared to
make also varies depending on whether the information we talk about is conveyed
by perceptual experiences or beliefs. Again, as examples of illusions along the lines
of  the  Müller-Lyer  diagram  show,  perceptual  experiences  are  also  belief-
independent  in  ways  beliefs  are  not  (cf.  McDowell  1994;  Brewer  1999).  Thus,
glimpses of a distinction between the two relevant psychological categories have
already emerged throughout this dissertation. This divide could be schematically
formulated as follows:       
  (1.b) Perceptual experiences differ from beliefs because
perceptual states and doxastic states have different functional roles.
Having said that, how are (1.a) and (1.b) related to each other? In other
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words,  how  is  a  state  nonconceptualist  criterion  of  distinction  related  to  the
functionalist  distinction sketched throughout  my defence of  the stative view? I
think that (1.b) could complement (1.a) so as to address the explanatory challenge
posed by Bermúdez and Toribio.
Recall that the aforementioned challenge may be expressed as follows: why
might  perceptual  experiences  not  be  concept-dependent,  whereas  beliefs  are
always  so?  Well,  I  think  that  a  natural  answer  is  suggested  by  the  previous
remarks  concerning (1.b).  Perceptual  experiences  – or,  to  be  more  precise,  the
information presented to a subject by her experiences – result more or less directly
from  sub-personal  processes  and  states  which  in  turn  triggered  by  incoming
information from the world beyond our sense organs. There is an intuitive sense in
which  perceptual  experiences  are  world-dependent:  that  is,  when  a  subject
perceives her surroundings, what she thus becomes aware of is the world itself; or
again, when she undergoes perceptual illusions or hallucinations, it is natural to
think  that  the  deceptive  semantic  component  of  her  experiences  is  somehow
parasitic on previously perceived worldly items. By contrast, beliefs are concept-
dependent: that is, their contents are partially or fully constituted by concepts the
relevant  subject  possesses.  The  present  contrast  suggests  why  perceptual
experiences need not be concept-dependent, namely, because the information they
incorporate is world-dependent.  In a graphic even if  crude way, one might say
that, when we judge something, beliefs do not unveil the world, but concepts – that
is, images or representations of the world. Beliefs are not directly related to the
information  provided  by  our  surroundings:  as  such,  their  contents  are  not
determined  by  worldly  items,  but  by  the  next  best  thing,  namely,  conceptual
representations.  For  the  same  reason,  beliefs  are  always  concept-dependent.
Perceptual experiences may no doubt be penetrated by a conceptual component,
but their contents do not necessarily depend on them, since the world – that is, the
objects, properties, states of affair, events – a subject perceives may play the role of
what is perceptually presented to us.60
60 Bill Brewer has argued that a distinction in terms of functional roles is way too general to throw
light on the distinction between perception and cognition (cf.  Brewer 2011, 56). This charge
could be tailored so as to target (1.b),  in which case it would pose a difficulty against that
criterion similar to the point that Bermúdez and Toribio press against (1.a). Although I do not
find Brewer's objection wholly persuasive, I am not quite sure how to meet it yet. In principle,
one could hold that a requirement for explanatory clarity can be pushed only so much: in the
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Unlike  cognitive  events  and  states,  perceptual  phenomena  could  be
functionally  characterized  as  informational  transactions  by  means  of  which
perceivers  relate  to  their  surroundings.  As  Armstrong  graphically  puts  it,  'the
organism can take account of the environment only if the environment affects the
organism: affecting it in different ways for different states of the environment.
These affections are perceptions. So the fact that perceptions of the environment
are brought into  being by that  environment pertains  to the deepest  essence of
perception.'  (Armstrong  1968,  255)  When  broadly  and  functionally  conceived,
perceptual phenomena concern the ways in which perceivers are affected by their
surroundings. That being the case, the reason why perceptual experiences need not
be concept-dependent  is  that perceptual states  are determined by informational
interactions  between  the  perceiver  and  her  surroundings.  Since  cognitive
phenomena (e.g. believing or judging) are not characterized in terms of the same
kind of informational transactions, something other than the world has to take its
place in the constitution and individuation of these states or events – at this point,
it seems reasonable to think that what a subject believes or judges constitutively
depends  on  what  concepts  she  possesses.  In  short:  while  the  constitution  of
perceptual  experiences  relies  on  worldly  items,  the  constitution  of  beliefs  and
judgements relies on concepts and propositions. This does not rule out that some
perceptual experiences could be concept-dependent or that some cognitive states
(e.g.  demonstrative  thoughts)  could  be  object-dependent:  it  only  shows  why
perceptual  experiences  need  not  be  concept-dependent.  Perceptual  experiences
need not rely on concepts because the world does for them what concepts do for
cognitive states. Although this picture is no doubt sketchy as it stands, I think it is
fairly intuitive.
In  short,  I  believe  that  functional  differences  between  perceptual
experiences and beliefs are not only part of a stative view of experience, but also
illuminate state  nonconceptualism.  For,  while  the state  nonconceptualist  counts
with the resources to set experiences apart from beliefs, she cannot spell out what
governs such a divide. At this point, one may fall back on a functionalist view of
end, explanations run out, 'I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.' (Wittgenstein 1953,
I § 217) Or again, for present purposes, one might specify (1.b) further by unpacking the import
of perceptual experiences' world-dependent character and beliefs' concept-dependent character.
Of course, this point deserves more discussion than I have devoted to it here.   
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perceptual  phenomena:  perceptual  experiences  need  not  be  conceptual  because
perceptual states directly relate a subject to her surroundings. I do not mean to
claim that the connection between (1.a) and (1.b) is a necessary or a logical one:
the thought is just that both criteria, one based on state nonconceptualism and the
other based on a functionalist view of perception, complement each other nicely.  
V. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have outlined and defended a stative conception of perceptual
experiences. Chapter 1 focused on formulating my main target, a processive view.
Chapter 2 unpacked the stative stance and addressed some preliminary difficulties
that it may face. Chapters 3 and 4 went on full defence-mode. I first discussed how
perceptual  experiences  should  be  individuated  over  time:  while  a  stative
conception neatly accommodates questions of diachronic experiential identity, the
latter remain recalcitrant issues for a processive stance. Then, I argued that a key
but otherwise puzzling feature of perceptual experiences, their assertive character,
is also accommodated by a stative conception. Since the present project heavily
drew from the similarities between perceptual experiences and beliefs, it also raises
the  question  whether  it  could  in  principle  accommodate  a  sharp  distinction
between both psychological categories. This is the issue addressed by the present
chapter.
To draw the relevant distinction, one may pursue at  least  two different
strategies. I briefly expressed them as follows:
  (1) Perceptual experiences and beliefs differ from each other insofar as they  
involve different kinds of states or attitudes.
  (2) Perceptual experiences and beliefs differ from each other insofar as they  
involve different kinds of contents.
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Then, I went on to explore four versions of (2):
  (2.a) Whatever  their  respective  attitudes,  perceptual  experiences  differ  from  
beliefs because
perceptual content is informationally richer than doxastic content.
  (2.b) Whatever  their  respective  attitudes,  perceptual  experiences  differ  from  
beliefs because
perceptual content is finer-grained than doxastic content.  
  (2.c) Whatever  their  respective  attitudes,  perceptual  experiences  differ  from  
beliefs because
perceptual  content  is  analog  (or  analogically  encoded),  whereas
doxastic content is digital (or digitally encoded). 
  (2.d) Perceptual experiences differ from beliefs because
perceptual  content  is  nonconceptual,  whereas  doxastic  content  is
conceptual. 
For different reasons, all these criteria of distinction seem unsatisfactory. I
then turned to a particular instance of (1):
  (1.a) Perceptual experiences differ from beliefs because
perceptual  states  are  nonconceptual,  whereas  doxastic  states  are
conceptual.
The goal of this chapter was to show that (1.a), a criterion grounded on
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what is known as state nonconceptualism, captures a sharp distinction between
perceptual  experiences  and  beliefs  within  the  context  of  a  stative  view  of
experience. Meanwhile, a stative view throws light on the principle governing a
distinction like (1.a).
Thus, I have tried to show a number of things: first, that the stative stance
is internally coherent and that the processive view is not compulsory; then, that a
stative  view  nicely  defuses  a  number  of  questions  which  otherwise  remain
recalcitrant problems for the processive view; and then, that conceiving perceptual
experiences  as  mental  states  need  not  obliterate  a  sharp  intuitive  distinction
between  perceiving  and  believing.  A  full  defence  of  a  stative  view  requires
assessing many other psychological, epistemological, and ontological issues. This
dissertation only constitutes the groundwork for such an enterprise.    
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